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This thesis concerns the measurement of freedom, and its value. Specifically, I am
concerned with three overarching questions. First, can we measure the extent of
an individual’s freedom? It had better be that we can, otherwise much ordinary
and intuitive talk that we would like to vindicate – say, about free persons being
freer than slaves – will turn out to be false or meaningless. Second, in what ways
is freedom valuable, and how is this value measured? It matters, for example,
whether freedom is valuable only insofar as it enables us to pursue specific ends we
happen to value for independent reasons, or whether it is also valuable in itself. In
the latter case, but not the former, more freedom will always (other things being
equal) be better. Likewise, it’s important to get clarity on what ends, exactly,
freedom is especially instrumentally valuable in promoting, since this goes to how
much we should care about it. And finally, the liberal political tradition asserts
that there is a special sphere of personal choices within which individuals should
be free to do as they please, for reasons over and above the value of freedom itself.
Now, can we measure the extent to which states and individuals respect individual
liberties, and can we weigh the importance of respecting liberty against competing
values like social welfare?
To answer these questions, I follow the axiomatic tradition of social choice the-
ory, and I develop several novel measures of freedom – including the first measure
of freedom ever proposed that is sensitive to how modally robustly our options are
available – a novel approach to measuring the diversity of an opportunity set, and
I develop an account of the value of freedom according to which an important part
of why freedom matters is that it enables us to improve our preferences through
learning, and I construct ways of measuring the value of freedom along this di-
mension of value. Finally, in later chapters, I provide a representation result for a
measure of illiberalism, i.e. of the degree to which states fail to respect the rights
of their citizens, and I extend this result to provide a characterization of moral
theories that express concern for respecting the rights of others. The final chapter
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Canada is free and freedom is its Nationality ∼ Wilfrid Laurier
I am a Canadian, a free Canadian... This heritage of freedom I pledge
to uphold for myself and all mankind. ∼ John Diefenbaker
We peer so suspiciously at one another that we cannot see that we
Canadians are standing on the mountaintop of human wealth, freedom,
and priviledge. ∼ Pierre Trudeau
Whatever positive associations come to mind when you think of Canada –maple syrup, beaver tails, hockey, politeness, Inuit throat singing, Ryan
Gosling – freedom is unlikely to feature among them. Perhaps this is not so
surprising. After all, our revolt against the British failed, we have a sordid history
of repression against indigenous peoples, and we have to compete for attention on
the world stage with our neighbours down south, who are much noisier than we
are in boasting about how much they love freedom. Still, it’s not for lack of good
intentions on our part. A look at the history of Canadian political thought reveals
some of the most prolific writing in defense of multiculturalism, the open society,
open borders, and a surprising number of libertarians (left and right). Our most
eminent socialist and communitarian thinkers (G.A. Cohen, Charles Taylor) write
as much on freedom as our most notorious anarcho-capitalists (e.g. Jan Narveson).
And our former prime ministers certainly enjoyed waxing poetic about it.
It is thus coming on the heels of an established Canadian tradition that I
write this thesis, on the subject of freedom. In contrast to my many forebears,
though, the questions I take up here are primarily axiological in nature, rather than
political. That is, I won’t attempt (directly, at least) to slice any of the traditional
Gordian knots regarding how far protections on free speech should extend, or how
large government should be, etc. Because although freedom is one of the most
powerful values in morals and politics, the way we deploy it in ordinary discourse
to criticise or justify norms, powers, privileges, and social arrangements rests on
the often unargued presupposition that we can talk meaningfully about which
arrangements curtail or expand individual freedom the “most,” and that there are
principled, non-capricious ways of weighing the importance of protecting freedom
against other important values and ends. These presuppositions must be defended
to secure the well-foundedness of our disputes. Defending them, however, requires
us to answer some fundamental questions about the structure and nature of value,
and these are the questions at the heart of this thesis.
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Specifically, I am concerned with three overarching questions. First, and most
fundamentally, can we measure the extent of an individual’s freedom? By this I
mean: can we design a procedure for assigning real numbers to individuals which
represent the individuals’ degrees of freedom, such that some important relations
between those numbers – notably their order, difference, and ratio – can be mean-
ingfully taken to encode analogous relation between individuals’ degrees of free-
dom? It had better be that we can measure freedom, otherwise much ordinary and
intuitive talk that we would like to vindicate – say, about free persons being freer
than slaves, or about Canadians being on the mountaintop of human freedom –
will turn out to be false or meaningless. Second, in what ways is freedom valuable,
and how can this value be measured? It matters, for example, whether freedom is
valuable only insofar as it enables us to pursue specific ends we happen to value for
independent reasons, or whether it is also valuable as an end in itself. In the latter
case, but not the former, more freedom will always (other things being equal) be
better. Likewise, it’s important to get clarity on what ends freedom is especially
instrumentally valuable in promoting, since this goes to how much we should care
about it. And finally, the liberal political tradition asserts that there is a special
sphere of personal choices within which individuals should be free to do as they
please, for reasons over and above the value of freedom itself. Bader (2018) and
R. Dworkin (2011) refer to these specially protected freedoms as “liberties,” a con-
vention I will adopt. My third question will therefore be: can we measure the
extent to which states, individuals, and other agents respect individual liberties,
and can we weigh the importance of respecting liberty against competing values
like social welfare? This question is especially relevant for philosophical traditions
which hold that people have certain rights not to be interfered with, rights which
follow from duties of respect, and therefore exert independent pressure on us not
to curtail their freedom in certain ways.
These three questions pick up on different aspects of what we care about in
relation to freedom. The first two questions concern what Amartya Sen (1993b)
has called the “opportunity aspect” of freedom, which is concerned with our actual
capability to achieve things that we can and do value, while the third question
concerns rather the “process aspect,” which has to do with the procedure of free
choice itself and the importance of not being interfered with in the exercise of one’s
free will. As Sen (1993b, p. 522) rightly observes, “a[ny] comprehensive assessment
of freedom must take note of both these aspects and the irreducible importance
of each of these respective features.” It is important to treat all three questions if
we want to arrive at a full picture of what freedom is and why it matters. These
questions are not simply unified by a common theme, however: they are also unified
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by a common methodological approach I take to answering them. This approach
is characterized by a reliance on the formal tools and methods of social choice and
rational choice theory to frame and analyse problems. This is not an innocent
methodological choice on my part. Formal tools involve simplifying or idealizing
assumptions about agents and the world, which may obscure real difficulties. And
of course it’s important not to get carried away with formalism to the point of
losing contact with the real philosophical problems that motivated us in the first
place. But formal models also allow us to state our questions and assumptions very
precisely, and when we study the implications of precisely stated assumptions, we
often reach surprising insights that can inform philosophical reflection in fruitful
ways.
It’s worth emphasizing at the outset that, when we talk about measuring some
moral good, or the weight of some moral consideration, there are two kinds of
questions that might be at issue: one semantic, the other epistemological. When we
are disagreeing over how to measure freedom, this might suggest an epistemological
disagreement about how to measure an independently specified thing – freedom –
whose interpretation we all agree on. If this were so, measuring freedom would be
a bit like measuring inflation: there is a clear concept at stake (how much prices
rise) but because not all prices rise at the same rate and different people buy
different baskets of good, there is no unique rate at which all prices rise nor even
an average rate common to all baskets of goods. So economists disagree over how
best to measure the overall rate of increase. My own emphasis on formal methods
might suggest that this is precisely the sort of problem I am dealing with. But
in fact when we’re disagreeing over how to measure freedom, the disagreement is
really conceptual: as we will see, disagreements over how to measure freedom are
really disagreements over what freedom is, and what it is to be freer than another.
Philosophers actively disagree over how to interpret the concept of freedom. And
many different factors seem to matter to our intuitive judgements, but it’s not clear
how to combine those concerns into a coherent overall view. Formal modelling is
simply a tool for investigating how these concerns can be made to interact.
My thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the problem of
the measurement of freedom, and contrasts two different measurement approaches:
the axiomatic approach adopted by social choice theorists, and a more informal ap-
proach historically favoured by philosophers. Both approaches, thankfully, promise
to vindicate the possibility of measuring freedom, but I believe that the formal ax-
iomatic approach is more attractive, as we will see, and so I devote my energies
in this chapter to defending it. The most eloquent (and certainly the most cited)
defender of the more informal approach is Ian Carter, so he will serve as my foil.
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With this argument in place, in chapters 2 and 3 I work within the axiomatic
tradition to construct new measures of freedom. Specifically, my aim in chapter 2
is to design measures of freedom that are sensitive to the fact that not only may
more or fewer opportunities be available to individuals, but any given opportunity
may be more or less accessible them. Roughly, the intuition is that (paraphras-
ing Berlin, 1969) your degree of freedom does not depend merely on how many
possibilities are open to you, but also how capable you are of actualizing those pos-
sibilities. In chapter 3, in contrast, I aim to construct measures of freedom that are
sensitive to a different set of considerations, namely, how many opportunities are
available to you and how robustly available they are. Numerous philosophers have
argued that being free doesn’t require merely that others don’t prevent you from
doing what you will, it requires additionally that no one could arbitrarily prevent
you from doing what you will. If I could easily, and with impunity, prevent you
from doing anything I didn’t want you to do, then whatever you do do, you do only
with my (implicit) permission – you are a subject of my will, not a free person.
Constructing a measure of freedom that is sensitive to these modal considerations
will require first constructing a measure of “distance” across modal space – i.e. a
device that can tell us how much would need to change about the world for some
opportunity that is actually available to you to become unavailable.
I transition from the measurement of freedom to the measurement of its value
in chapter 4. The motivating question of this chapter is whether the quality of
one’s opportunities affects how much freedom they offer us, to which my answer
is no: the quality of one’s opportunities rather affects the non-specific value of
one’s freedom, that is, the value that freedom has in itself, over and above its
specific value in enabling us to pursue ends we value for independent reasons that
have nothing to do with freedom. In taking this line, I commit myself to the
view that freedom has value in itself, and this is a controversial view, so much of
the chapter is devoted to defending this thesis. Of course, the specific value of
freedom is also very important, and so I devote chapter 5 to its exploration. The
main thesis of this chapter is that there is an important dimension of freedom’s
specific value which has been overlooked by theorists of freedom, namely, what I
call its diagnostic value. This is the value it has in providing us with a kind of
self-knowledge that improves our abilities as evaluators and choosers. The bulk of
this chapter is devoted to discussing the many dimensions of the diagnostic value
of opportunities, and along the way I propose ways of measuring diagnostic value
along each of its dimensions.
Finally, in chapters 6 and 7, I turn to the discussion of liberty, and of the rights
that protect it. In chapter 6 I defend a new formal framework within which to think
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about rights, and I then operationalize this framework and show how to construct
from it several measures of how well the liberty of everyone in society is respected
– i.e. a measure that can tell us, say, whether the liberty of residents in Canada
is better safeguarded than the liberty of residents in France. An important result
of this chapter is that it provides the first formal characterization of how rights
constrain social choice that really captures standard philosophical intuitions about
the functioning of rights. In chapter 7, I study how the concern for protecting rights
interacts with more welfarist concerns. Some philosophers argue that rights have
an absolute priority over other, “merely” axiological considerations: you cannot
infringe people’s rights, no matter the consequences. I argue, using the vocabulary
established in chapter 6, that this view cannot be coherently extended to the
context of uncertainty without undermining its own motivations. I thus defend a
more moderate picture of how concerns for liberty and concerns for welfare interact,
providing a simple representation of how individuals who are suitably responsive




Measuring Freedom in Economics
and Philosophy
We often speak as though freedom is measurable. I have a firm convictionthat I am freer than the typical North Korean, and that ordinary citizens
are a great deal freer than prisoners. Mill (1885, p. 81) asserted that the freest
country in his day was the United States. Hayek (1960) and Friedman (1962) built
their argument for laissez-faire capitalism on the back of the claim that it is the
economic system that maximizes individual freedom, a claim which G. A. Cohen
(2011) rebuts by arguing that it’s really socialism that maximises human freedom.
Such claims are rhetorically powerful, but whether they are meaningful depends
on the answer to several further questions.
What do we mean when we say of an individual that they are free in some
respect? Is it possible to determine which of two individuals enjoys more freedom,
given what each of them can do? To answer these questions is to take a stance on
whether and to what extent and in what way freedom (in its opportunity aspect)
can be measured, and it is the central question that will concern us for the next
four chapters.
The measurement question has attracted the attention of both philosophers and
welfare economists. Unsurprisingly, different approaches to the measurement of
freedom have emerged in the two fields, and they have generated different answers
to the above questions. Welfare economists have framed the problem as one of
which axiomatic constraints to impose on a rule for ranking finite sets of options in
terms of how much freedom they offer. Disagreement in this field thus tends to be
marked by disagreement over which axioms are most compelling. In contrast, many
philosophers have seen the problem as one of measuring some natural quantity in
the world, and here metaphysics has played a big role in defining different authors’
positions. For instance, R. Dworkin (1977, p. 172) argues that freedom cannot be
measured because freedom is not some “commodity” or physical magnitude which
individuals can have in greater or lesser quantities. Likewise, Kristjánsson (1996,
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p. 11) claims that freedom cannot be measured because “freedom is a relation,
not a property”, unlike, say, wealth. In this context, Ian Carter’s (1999) approach
has been particularly influential. He argues that a person’s degree of freedom
is measurable, and that it is determined by the number and extensiveness over
space-time of the actions available to them.
I wish in this chapter to argue that Carter’s approach is methodologically and
substantively inferior to the axiomatic approach followed in social choice theory.
I should clarify at the outset that Carter’s approach is only one of two dominant
approaches to the measurement of freedom in philosophy; some philosophers (such
as Taylor, 1985; G. A. Cohen, 2011; Sen, 1990c; Norman, 1978; Arneson, 1985)
see the project of measuring freedom as one of measuring the value of people’s
opportunities, rather than as one of measuring how extensive these opportunities
are. My critique is not addressed to this second group. The reason for my focus on
Carter’s work is that, like Carter, I think it is the extent of people’s opportunities
that is at issue in the measurement question, it is his sort of approach which I
believe deserves scrutiny.
I shall proceed as follows. In section 1, I present and motivate Carter’s view
about the nature of freedom and its measurement. My exegesis will proceed in
two steps: first I will explain why Carter thinks we need a measure of freedom
and what having one is suppose to solve for us. Second, I will present the actual
substance of Carter’s proposed measure of freedom. I then contrast this approach
in section 2 to the axiomatic approach taken in welfare economics. Here I will
highlight three significant methodological advantages of the axiomatic approach:
it is more general, it forces us to state our assumptions precisely, and it is more
fruitful. In section 3, I take issue with the substance of Carter’s view, arguing
that the central role that the metaphysics of action plays in his proposal leaves
us unable to appreciate the link between the diversity of one’s options and one’s
freedom. Here again the contrast with welfare economics is instructive, and speaks
in favour of the axiomatic approach. I devote section 4 to responding to Carter’s
objections to the approach I favour.
1.1 Carter’s measure of freedom
1.1.1 Aims
Most discussions of freedom of choice or social freedom take MacCallum’s (1967)
analysis of the concept of freedom as their starting point; so does Carter (1999,
p. 15). According to MacCallum, when we say that someone is free in some respect,
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we have in mind the following triadic relation: x is free from y to do/be/have/be-
come z, or x is free, with respect to y, to do/be/have/become z. The z parameter
denotes agent x’s opportunity set, that is, the set of all mutually exclusive op-
tions that are not ruled out to x in the present context by the various preventing
conditions denoted by the y parameter.
Different conceptions of freedom may be supplied by different interpretations
of the parameters. Whether we interpret x as denoting an individual or a group
agent will give us a conception of individual or group freedom, for instance. And
different conceptions of individual freedom turn primarily on which constraints are
believed to be relevant. The primary difference between what List and Valentini
(2016) refer to as “freedom as independence” and the so-called liberal model of
freedom defended by Carter, Oppenheim (2004) Steiner (1983), and others is that
liberal theorists consider that one is free to do x just in case no one actually
interferes with one’s x-ing, whereas independence theorists consider that one is
free to do x just in case there is a robust absence of externally imposed constraints
on one’s x-ing, meaning that not only are there no constraints on our action, but
no one can easily impose such constraints (i.e., the nearest possible world in which
someone does impose constraints is quite distant). Capability theorists like Sen
(1990c), meanwhile, consider that one is free to x just in case one can, in fact, x
if one wishes to – i.e., just in case there are no constraints at all that prevent one
from x-ing.
Among theorists of the same school there are disagreements over which con-
straints are relevant: Oppenheim (2004, p. 278) argues that punishment and physi-
cal prevention are two distinct potential causes of unfreedom. Moreover, he argues
that the unfreedom to do a specific thing is a matter of degree – an unscalable
wall restricts my freedom of movement to a greater degree than a merely tall wall
that an exceptionally fit individual might climb. In contrast, Carter (1999, p. 219)
insists that physical prevention is the only (necessary and sufficient) possible cause
of one’s being unfree to do something, and, moreover, that this is not a matter of
degree: with respect to any particular action x, one is either free or unfree to do
it.
With this in mind, supposing we’ve agreed on a conception of individual free-
dom, what would it mean to measure an individual’s overall degree of freedom?
And why should we want a measure of freedom? A number of writers object
that the project of “measuring” a person’s overall degree of freedom is incoherent.
Oppenheim (1981, p. 172) asserts flatly that “there is no such thing as [overall]
freedom,” by which he means that there is only the freedom to do specific things,
with respect to particular agents who do not prevent us from doing them, but
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can be no meaning to the claim that one enjoys more-or-less freedom, simplicter,
than another. Oppenheim defends this view on many grounds; firstly, he notes
(Oppenheim, 1981, p. 418) that different people can be more-or-less free to do
specific things than others, and he is simply skeptical that trade-offs of specific
freedoms against other specific freedoms can be assessed in such a way that we
can meaningfully claim, say, that Canadians are freer than Americans. To put
things more precisely, Oppenheim seems to take the view that a certain kind of
unit comparability across freedom-types is needed to make sense of the notion of
overall freedom.
Secondly, Oppenheim’s skepticism seems partly grounded in an ontological the-
sis: “social unfreedom (and freedom as well) is not a “thing,” nor “being unfree”
a property.” Carter (1999, pp. 24-25) interprets Oppenheim here as saying that
freedom cannot be measured because it is not a particular – something located in
space-time with measurable properties, e.g., a hubcap – nor a measurable property
of particulars, like mass or caloric content. Kristjánsson (1996, p. 11) agrees with
Oppenheim on this point, arguing that “being free” isn’t a property because it is
really shorthand for some comparative relation, in just the same way that “being
tall” is not a property, but rather shorthand for being taller than so-and-so. Like-
wise, the implicit metaphysical assumption in Dworkin’s putative reductio that
freedom cannot be measured because it is not a commodity seems to be that only
particulars come in measurable amounts, and freedom is no particular. Or perhaps
another way to put Dworkin’s point is that freedom must come in units of some
kind, like commodities, if one is to make sense of the notion of having more or less
freedom.
Essentially, the challenge these objections present is the following: if you want
to assert things of the sort “Canadians are freer than Americans,” you must point
to some extensive quality of Americans and Canadians which the Americans have
more of, their having more of which explains and justifies your assertion. Carter
answers this challenge by arguing that freedom really is an extensive quality –
meaning that, as Carter (1999, p. 184) puts it: “it has an empirical counting
procedure. It is on the basis of the counting of individual units which have been
demonstrated to be of equal size (...) that we can say that one object possesses
more of’, or ‘much more of’, a certain extensive quality than another object.”
Thus, in just the same way that one’s tallness consists in one’s having more-or-
less of an extensive quality (vertical extension), Carter (1999, p. 26) argues that
one’s degree of freedom really does consist in one’s having more-or-less of some
extensive quality, and therefore that comparing which of two individuals has more
freedom comes down to measuring how much of this attribute each has. Again,
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Carter seems to buy into this idea that freedom must come in units if it is to
be measurable. His substantive view, roughly, is that one’s degree of freedom is
determined by how many specific actions one can perform and how extensive these
are over space-time.
Why should we be interested in measuring anyone’s overall degree of freedom?
A number of writers (e.g., R. Dworkin, 1977, and Kymlicka, 1990, pp. 145-151)
have argued that freedom has no value as such, and so we have no interest in mea-
suring how much of it anyone has; rather, we only care about whether individuals
enjoy specific valuable freedoms, such as freedom of speech, conscience, assembly,
etc., which we care about protecting because those are the freedoms that enable
people to live a good life, or because it is only by protecting those freedoms that
the state can show equal concern and respect for all citizens. This is what Carter
calls the “specific-freedom thesis,” and he counters it by arguing that freedom as
such is valuable; more precisely, he argues that freedom is “non-specifically” valu-
able – meaning that we have reasons for valuing freedom that do not reduce to
reasons for valuing the freedom to do any specific thing – and that this immedi-
ately motivates our interest in measuring it (Carter, 1999, p. 31). Note that to
say that freedom is non-specifically valuable need not imply that it is intrinsically
valuable: money is surely only instrumentally valuable, yet we can value having
more money without having yet any clear idea of what use we shall make of it,
thus we may value money non-specifically.
Carter offers the following four arguments in support of his claim that freedom
is non-specifically valuable. First, picking up on an example due to Berlin (1969),
he observes that the joy a prisoner feels upon being suddenly released, or that a
people feel upon overthrowing their oppressors, is well explained by imputing to
them a desire for freedom and the belief that they are now free to do many things,
but it is not necessary to impute to them the belief that now there is something
in particular that they value and are now free to do. As Carter (1999, p. 32) puts
it: “they value ‘being free to do things’ in a general, rather than in any specific
sense.”
Second, he points out (50-54) that freedom is non-specifically valuable in part
because of its instrumental value: freedom is an important means for realizing
valuable ends, but because our ends change, and we may be uncertain about what
our ends will be, we may care about having a substantial degree of freedom: when
the time comes, we will be free to pursue our ends, whatever these turn out to be.
Similarly, freedom as such may be a necessary means for achieving important social
goals – here Carter (46-50) has in mind most particularly Mill’s famous arguments
that freedom of speech is the best means of arriving at and disseminating the
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truth, and that the strongest protections on the individual pursuit of liberty are
the surest means of promoting the general welfare.
Third, Carter argues that, although liberalism is committed to affirming the
special value of certain specific freedoms, core liberal commitments also seem to
imply a concern for freedom as such. Fixing for a moment longer on the instrumen-
tal value of freedom, Carter (54) notes that while some liberal political theorists
such as Kymlicka claim that only the freedom to perform specific actions that
are themselves meaningful for individuals can be valuable, we are often not in a
position to say which options are meaningful to whom. Indeed, the central liberal
commitment to neutrality between conceptions of the good rather seems to pro-
hibit us from ruling on which freedoms are valuable. But then it seems liberalism
is required to see freedom as being non-specifically valuable.
Fourth, Carter argues that the value liberal theorists place on autonomy com-
mits them to the view that freedom is non-specifically valuable. Carter approvingly
cites Crocker (1980, p. 115), who argues that freedom is a “non-causal necessary
condition” for what he calls “the autonomy complex,” which is the valuable ca-
pacity to engage in certain behaviour “in many cases where their consequences are
negligible or even unfortunate”, including “many acts of risk taking, holding to
principle, sacrificing, compromising, admitting mistakes, and struggling through.”
And as Carter (1999, p. 59) notes the behaviours Crocker lists can “cover any aim
or action,” so to the extent that freedom is necessary for the capacity to engage
in such behaviours, it is freedom as such that is required, not merely freedom
to do some specific things. Thus, liberalism requires us to value freedom non-
specifically, because freedom is a necessary component of a good that liberalism
regards as intrinsically valuable.
Note that Carter’s view here is echoed by Raz (1988, pp. 408-409) when he
argues that it is necessary to have at least an adequate range of options to choose
from in order to live a good life, for without such freedom it is impossible to live
an autonomous life, a life of one’s own making. Hurka (2011, p. 143) makes similar
points, arguing that our way of life may be important to us because it is the way
of life we chose – in exclusion of others; it is valuable to have choices so that we
may say “yes” to this, but “no” to that, etc.. Indeed, the view goes at least as far
back as Mill (1885, chapter III, paragraph 3), who writes: “the human faculties
of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral
preference, are exercised only in making a choice.” For Mill, freedom is valuable
because it is necessary for the development of the valuable human faculties that
make life worth living. Carter even suggests that the early Rawls (1971, p. 440)
held this view because Rawls took liberty to be one of social bases of self-respect –
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one of the primary goods in his theory of justice. So Carter is in good company, and
this serves to motivate his project well enough: since freedom is non-specifically
valuable, it would be nice if we could measure how much of it people actually have,
especially since we often talk as though people need some degree of freedom.
1.1.2 Substance
Carter (1999, p. 170) defends what he calls the “empirical approach” to measuring
freedom, according to which “the extent of my freedom is a function of the extent
of action available to me.” He opposes this to the value-based approach, according
to which the extent of a person’s freedom at least partly depends on the value of
the actions available to them. As the starting point for his discussion, he takes





where Fi is the number of actions that i is unprevented from performing and Ui is
the number of actions that i is prevented from performing. The intuition behind
this formula is that you are freer the more actions you can perform, and less free
the more actions you are prevented from performing, with the understanding that
Fi +Ui is not necessarily the same for everyone. Of course, this assumption on its
own doesn’t suffice to justify the precise functional form of Steiner’s formula, but
let us bracket that issue for now – we will return to it in the next section – and
attend first to Carter’s response.
Carter, curiously, takes no issue with the substance of Steiner’s measure – in
particular, he doesn’t question whether Steiner’s formula is the only or uniquely at-
tractive “empirical” measure of freedom. However, he argues that the metaphysics
standing behind Steiner’s analysis are in need of clarification and elaboration. In
particular, Carter takes the central issue for Steiner’s approach to be the individua-
tion of acts, because depending on how acts are individuated it might turn out that
any individual can perform an infinity of acts, which would make Steiner’s formula
unworkable. And because Carter takes Steiner’s ranking rule to be substantially
correct, it follows that unless we have some canonical method of individuating
acts in a way that avoids the problem of infinite acts, individual freedom is not
measurable.
The problem of infinite acts is a recurring problem in the philosophical liter-
ature on freedom of choice (see e.g., Steiner, 1983 and Kramer, 2003, chapter 2,
for their discussion of the problem). In Carter’s presentation, the problem arises
out of a certain view in the metaphysics of action defended by Goldman (1970),
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according to which acts are individuated by the act-properties they instantiate
(e.g., the property of moving one’s arm); thus if two different act-properties are
instantiated, two different acts have been performed. But notice that by moving
my arm, I can instantiate multiple act properties (e.g., that of extending my arm
out of my window, or that of signalling for a turn); on Goldman’s view, this means
I have performed multiple acts at once. And here Carter’s worry is simply that
anything that we do may fall under an indefinite number of descriptions, thus
instantiating an indefinite number of act-properties, perhaps an infinity, and so it
is that Steiner’s formula would become useless, since the values of the numerator
and denominator would become arbitrary.
In order to counter this conclusion, Carter appeals to Davidson’s theory of
action, which is the principal rival of Goldman’s theory. On Davidson’s view,
every act that we ever perform is in fact identical with some bodily movement
of ours. That is, every act that we ever perform, says Davidson, is either the
act of moving our body in some way, or an act that we perform by moving our
bodies in some way, and because Davidson holds that any act that is performed by
performing some other act is identical to the act by which it is performed, it follows
that the only acts are bodily movements (Davidson, 1980). Thus, on Davidson’s
view, if by extending my arm, I extend it out of a window, and signal for a turn,
I have not done three things, but just one thing, of which three descriptions have
been given. This solves the problem of indefinitely many descriptions; counting
how many acts an individual is prevented or unprevented from performing comes
down to counting how many bodily movements they are prevented or unprevented
from making (Carter, 1999, p. 176).
This method of act-individuation nonetheless raises a new problem for Carter.
As he writes (178): “[i]f my available bodily movements have counterfactual conse-
quences which yours are prevented from having, we should like to say that I have
more freedom than you in this respect.” But if actions are identified with bodily
movements, the consequences of our bodily movements cannot count as additional
actions available to us. To get around this problem, Carter proposes that either
we simply count all the foreseeable consequences of our bodily movements as if
they were additional acts that we perform by moving our bodies (179), or, what
is equivalent (according to Carter), in counting how many bodily movements are
available to a person, we simply give acts that have longer foreseeable chains of
consequences greater weight in Steiner’s formula, in proportion to how extensive
over space-time are the events of which the act is the bringing-about (80). Thus,
for example, if I can cause an avalanche by clapping my hands, whereas you can-
not, then the act of clapping my hands grants me more freedom than the act of
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clapping your hands grants you in proportion to how much larger a region of space-
time is covered by my hands as they clap and the avalanche as it rolls down the
mountainside than is covered by your hands clapping (205). Since Carter believes
these two solutions to be equivalent (for reasons that need not detain us here), I
shall focus on the second solution as a description of his view.
One qualification here is needed. It is occasionally the case that two different
possible acts would bring about very similar events, which would have a degree of
overlap in their space-time coordinates. For instance, firing a gun with my right
hand and firing a gun with my left hand may both result in a bullet’s tracing
a particular trajectory through space-time and killing a man (193). Here Carter
argues that it would be to double count if we were to weigh each of these two
different acts by the physical extension of the events which they foreseeably cause
(189). Intuitively, firing a gun with my left hand and firing a gun with my right
hand seem like two ways of doing the same thing – two ways of bringing about the
exact same sequence of events. Thus, in order to avoid double-counting, different
weights must be assigned to acts which overlap in this way (190); in particular, if
any number of acts overlap, only one of these gets weighted by the extensiveness
of the overlap region.
Additionally, to avoid running back into the problem of infinite acts once it
is noted that the infinite divisibility of space-time implies an infinity of possible
bodily movements, Carter (184) suggests that we should measure space-time as
if it were granular. More precisely, he suggests that we should pick a smallest
unit of time and a smallest volume unit of space, thus obtaining a coarse-grained
grid of space-time; acts are then individuated by the regions of this grid which
they occupy, leaving each individual with only a finite number of acts to perform.1
In sum, according to Carter, the degree of freedom I enjoy is given by the ratio
of the number of “paths” (i.e., acts) I am unprevented from tracing across this
coarse-grained space-time grid by moving my body to the total number of paths I
could trace were I not prevented from doing anything, where each path is weighed
(avoiding double-counting in cases of overlap between different acts) in proportion
to the physical extension of all the events foreseeably caused by tracing this path
with my body.
1It’s not clear why Carter had to resort to this coarse-graining idea. If the weight that any
act is to have in the measure of overall freedom is anyway identical to its physical extension plus
the physical extension of all the events that it foreseeably causes, why couldn’t we dispense with
the idea of counting acts altogether, and simply declare that one individual’s degree of freedom
just is the area of space time that they and the events they could cause could ever occupy? We
don’t need space to be granular, after all, to measure its volume; nor time, to measure its length.
Double-counting wouldn’t be an issue here either.
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Naturally, Carter doesn’t expect that we go out in the world to make the phys-
ical measurements needed to determine the value of each individual’s Steinerian
ratio; instead, he suggests that good proxy measures for an individual’s extent of
overall freedom exist. For instance, he claims that the exchange value of an indi-
vidual’s resources holdings provides, plus the market value of their human capital
and other marketable skills, provides us with a good indicator of their freedom,
because more money generally translates to more available acts (1999, Chapter 10,
section 3). This measure is relatively easy to apply, but is obviously something of
a dummy measure, so Carter suggests that it can be refined by being combined
with an adapted version of the UNDP’s freedom-type metric.
First, Carter instructs us to develop a list of different specific types of freedom
– a list which he insists must be morally neutral, in the sense that the list must be
drawn up by some non-moralized selection procedure, and not limit itself merely
to those freedom types we happen anyway to think are especially valuable – and
then to weigh each freedom type by the share of one’s empirical freedom that
corresponds to the exercise of this freedom. More precisely, real numbers are to
be assigned to each freedom type, indexed to each individual, which are strictly
increasing in how large a share of one’s empirical freedom falls under the exercise
of this freedom-type, and strictly decreasing in the extent to which the exercise of
this freedom is limited, and the likelihood of this freedom’s exercise being limited
(Chapter 10, section 2). These numbers are to sum to 1 in the limiting case where
there are no preventing conditions on the individual’s freedom, and to 0 when
the individual has no freedom along any of those dimensions (286). Carter then
suggests that we simply add up the values of each freedom-type, and then multiply
the total “score” by the exchange value of the individual’s resource holdings (286).
Carter (286) explains this last move as follows: “[th]e basic intuition here, is that we
should first look at the agent’s personal resources – itself an indicator of various
preventing conditions or their absence – and then go on to ask what the agent
is prevented and unprevented from doing with those resources.” We will have a
critical look at the substance of this proxy measure later on, but for now, let
us simply note Carter’s claim that it will approximate the individual’s overall
freedom.
Carter believes the Steinerian analysis of overall freedom has a number of at-
tractions. For one thing, he argues that Steiner’s formula (suitably interpreted in
light of the above considerations) turns out to generate the comparative assess-
ments of overall freedom we find most intuitive. For instance, he argues that this
analysis will turn out to imply that having more qualitatively varied acts open to
us makes us freer, because the events that qualitatively similar acts bring about
1.2. The axiomatic approach 29
will generally overlap spatiotemporally to a much greater degree than the events
which dissimilar acts bring about. And thus, in light of the no double-counting
requirement, acts will be given greater weight in the Steinerian formula if they
are dissimilar from existing alternatives. Furthermore, he contends that this for-
mula has the great advantage of making freedom cardinally measurable (indeed,
measurable on an absolute scale), which will in turn permit us to assess which so-
cial states maximize aggregate freedom and to measure how equally the aggregate
quantity of freedom in the world is distributed. Finally, he argues (for reasons
that will be made clear in section 5) that the Steinerian analysis offers the only
value-neutral way of measuring individual freedom; that is, it is the only analysis
that is consistent with the claim that freedom is non-specifically valuable, and
doesn’t collapse the measure of freedom into the measure of its conduciveness to
the specific values that matter to us independently.
I am skeptical of Carter’s conclusions, but before criticising them, I turn to
a presentation of how the question of the measurement of freedom is treated in
welfare economics. I will highlight the three features of this approach which make
it, in my view, a preferable approach to the question of measurement than Carter’s
and Steiner’s.
1.2 The axiomatic approach
1.2.1 Method
Welfare economists start out with the same aims as before: we want to way to make
meaningful claims of the sort: “Canadians are freer than Americans,” “Cassandra
enjoys a greater degree of freedom than Aurelius”, or even “there is a more equal
distribution of freedom in Denmark than in Venezuela.” But unlike the authors
mentioned in section 1, welfare economists do not take the task of making sense
of such claims to be the task of finding some natural quantity in the world, one’s
having more of which somehow makes one more free, and which we have been
referring to all along in speaking about freedom; rather, they simply set out to
investigate what sorts of principles for ranking sets of alternatives make best sense
of our intuitive comparative judgments or are most normatively attractive.
On this approach, we start by defining X, the set of all possible options. X is
assumed to be finite, but otherwise no interpretation is imposed on what, exactly,
an option is. As Pattanaik and Xu (2015) explain, the way options are most
usefully specified may depend on the context: we may choose to think of an
option as a bundle of actions that an agent may perform, or as a pair composed
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of a bundle of actions and their attending consequences, or we may choose to
specify options as propositions that individuals can make true, and, depending
on our interests, we may also be satisfied with specifying options at a greater or
lesser level of granularity. For instance, we need not always care about how many
verbal utterances individual can make, but only whether they can criticize the
government.2
Now we define Z = 2X \ ∅ as the set of all opportunity sets, where an op-
portunity set is understood as the set of all mutually exclusive options that are
available to the individual (i.e., not ruled out to them by whatever set of con-
straints is considered relevant). Of course, one can consider whatever constraints
one wishes to be relevant in determining the content of each individual’s opportu-
nity sets, so any substantive conception of freedom (independence-based, liberal,
capability-theoretical, etc.) can be applied to fill in the details. It is assumed that
an individual’s degree of freedom is determined by their set of available alterna-
tives, we define %, a transitive and reflexive binary relation on Z, with  and ∼
denoting the asymmetric and symmetric parts of the relation, respectively. We
interpret A % B as “A offers at least as much freedom as B.” The aim now is to
propose intuitively plausible axiomatic constraints on % that will deliver a (prefer-
ably complete) ordering over Z. Standardly, a representation theorem is used to
show under what necessary and sufficient conditions a ranking over Z satisfying
certain axioms implies that one opportunity set offers more freedom than another.
Already we can note important contrasts between the two approaches. In
assuming X to be finite, the axiomatic approach assumes away the core worry
that motivates Carter’s approach. In refusing to impose a particular interpretation
of options, it reveals some disinterest in the issue of how, precisely, acts are to
be individuated – the issue at the heart of Carter’s proposal. Indeed, welfare
economists here are in the business of trying to rank sets of options, however
exactly options are conceived of.
Also, notice that while Carter and Steiner speak of measuring the freedom
of individuals, welfare economists speak of ranking sets of alternatives, and this
reflects a disagreement about what it means to measure freedom. As Carter (1999,
p. 184) himself notes, he takes the measurement of freedom to be the empirical
counting procedure of some extensive quality, whereas welfare economists take it
to be rather like the measurement of utility, that is, as the attempt to establish a
2Of course, if we specify options in this way, at the level of granularity we think relevant,
in terms of those features we think are salient, then the specification of the options is clearly
value-laden. But we shouldn’t make too much of this. For one thing, although we can specify
option in a value-laden way, we don’t have to. We could also individuate options as Carter wants
us to. The axiomatic approach itself imposes no interpretation at all on what an option is, and
is in this sense value-neutral.
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numerically representable ordering over fairly generally specified classes of objects.
This way of framing the project also sweeps away the sorts of concerns voiced by
Oppenheim and others: whether freedom is a property or a relation or a particular
is irrelevant to the question of what properties the ordering on Z should satisfy.
Finally, the locus of disagreement in both approaches is quite different: whereas in
section 1 the disagreement was metaphysical (is freedom a property or a relation?
Are acts particulars or instantiations of act-properties?), here disagreement focuses
on what makes someone more-or-less free.
A few examples will suffice to show this. One debate in the literature concerns
the role of preferences in establishing a ranking over Z. Pattanaik and Xu (1998),
for instance, propose that for any opportunity sets A, B and some option x ∈
X \ A, if some rational person could prefer x to every alternative in A and some
rational person could prefer at least one alternative in A to x, then A % B implies
A ∪ {x}  B. Otherwise, if no rational person could prefer x to any option in A
then A ∪ {x} ∼ A. This is an example of an axiomatic requirement that options
be minimally desirable for their addition to one’s available set of alternatives to
increase one’s freedom. Barberá and Godal (2010, p. 273) suggest yet a very
different role for preferences, in the context where it is uncertain which options in
the various sets one is ranking will remain available at the moment of choice. On
their proposal, one set offers more freedom of choice than another if it has a higher
“expected opportunity,” meaning roughly that it is the set with the best expected
set of alternatives remaining at the time of choice. This is intended to capture the
idea that it is best to have flexible sets of options, ones whose ability to provide us
with meaningful choice is relatively invariant under revisions in our beliefs about
the state of the world.
Other authors still have proposed constraints on % that give the diversity of
one’s options a role in determining how much freedom of choice these options
offer. Pattanaik and Xu (2000) and Bervoets and Gravel (2007), and Klemish-
Ahlert (1993) all propose different axioms for ranking sets purely in terms of
the diversity of their elements, all based on different interpretations of diversity.
This line of inquiry has sometimes yielded surprising results: van Hees (2004), for
instance, proves a number of impossibility results for ranking rules that attempt
to consider diversity. For instance, he shows that if X contains at least 4 elements,
no transitive ranking of Z exists satisfying the condition that A ∪ {x} offers at
least as much freedom as A ∪ {y} if and only if x is more dissimilar from the
element of A it is least dissimilar from than y is dissimilar from the element of
A it is least dissimilar from. I only mention this result for how surprising it is:
intuitively, x adds greater variety to your menu of choices than y, given that it is
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less similar than y to any of your existing alternatives. And this well illustrates
the value of the axiomatic approach: it can prove commonsense intuitions to be
untenable, forcing us to refine our pre-theoretical intuitions about what makes a
person more-or-less free.
I stated earlier that the axiomatic approach assumes that an individual’s degree
of freedom is determined by their opportunity set. It has therefore seemed to some
(e.g. Carter, 2004) that it cannot take account of the options one is prevented from
choosing in establishing rankings over Z. Carter (2004) sees this as a weakness in
the social choice literature, a failure to distinguish freedom, which makes essential
reference to what you are prevented from doing, and freedom of choice, which only
looks at what you can in fact do. To see that, contrary to Carter, it can, suppose
that we define for every set A ∈ Z an “anti-set” A∗ ⊆ X \ A, which, intuitively,
corresponds to the set of all acts one is prevented from performing. A∗ need not be
assumed to be A’s complement over X, as there may be acts that one is unable to
perform even though one has not been prevented from doing them. We can then
define:
Monotonicity-1: ∀A,B ∈ Z, |A∗| = |B∗| and |A| > |B| imply A % B
Monotonicity-2: ∀A,B ∈ Z, |A| = |B| and |A∗| > |B∗| imply B % A
1,2-Invariance: ∀A,B ∈ Z, B ∼ A ⇐⇒ |A| = |B| and |A∗| = |B∗|
In brief, we can require individual freedom to be increasing in the size (or
diversity, etc.) of one’s opportunity set, and decreasing in the size of one’s anti-
set. It is of course striking that axioms like Monotonicity-2 and 1,2-Invariance
are not really discussed in welfare economics. This may be because axioms like
Monotonicity-2 are inconsistent with an axiom that has found near-universal ac-
ceptance in the social choice literature, namely what Pattanaik and Xu (1990)
call “indifference between no-choice situations,” which requires that for any two
x, y ∈ X, {x} ∼ {y}. The intuition behind this axiom is simply that if you have
no choice about what to do, if you’re limited to doing just the one thing you can
do, then you just don’t have any freedom at all. Freedom requires choice. But as
it is not necessarily the case that |{x}∗| = |{y}∗|, this axiom rules out any ranking
of opportunity sets that depends on the size of these sets’ anti-sets. Of course,
this can be read as a reductio against the indifference axiom,3 but it may explain
why anti-sets aren’t usually considered.
3I see the force of the reductio as running in the opposite direction. Indifference between
no-choice alternatives is beyond compelling: it commands a Moorean certainty. Anyone who
would deny that two individuals each lacking any possibility for choice are equally (un)free has,
for my money, ipso facto blown a hole in their theory of freedom.
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1.2.2 Initial attractions
More could be said about the substance of particular ranking rules, but for our
purposes it will do well enough to have noted the core features and assumptions of
the axiomatic approach. I now outline three reasons why the axiomatic approach
is a more promising way of investigating what it is to be more-or-less free and who
has more freedom than the sort of approach taken by the theorists mentioned in
section 1.
Generality
First, because it imposes no interpretation on the concept of an option, it is more
flexible in its possible range of applications than the empirical approach. If we
are interested in comparing individuals’ degrees of overall freedom, we can think
of options as mutually exclusive lists of acts, where each item in the list is a
different sort of act. We can make the list longer or shorter according to how
much specificity we wish to pack into our comparisons. Then we run our preferred
ranking rule, and we obtain a ranking of opportunity sets that will tell us who is
freer than whom.
But suppose we found the specific-freedom thesis compelling, and that we were
only interested in comparing the extent of individuals’ freedom of speech, or free-
dom of worship, or other valuable sorts of specific freedoms. On the axiomatic
approach, there are fairly natural ways of making such comparisons: in the case of
freedom of speech, we could start by partitioning the range of possible speech acts
more-or-less coarsely into different types of speech – e.g., anti-government speech,
academic speech, religious speech, small talk, speech calling for collective action,
conspiracy theory speech, pornographic speech, hate speech; printed speech, pub-
lic speech, visual speech, etc. – and then conceive of options as speech act types
or bundles of speech act types. Each individual’s opportunity set is then deter-
mined by asking what speech act types they can perform, and then we can apply
whatever ranking rule we feel is best to compare who has more freedom of speech
than whom.
The empirical approach, by contrast, demands that we find some extensive
quality that can be measured by an empirical counting procedure, the having
more-or-less of which determines who has more or less freedom. It is not obvious
how to extend this analysis to specific types of freedom. Take again the case of
freedom of speech. Speech act types are not extensive qualities; they don’t come in
equally sized units of stuff measurable by physical instruments, so something else
would be required. And it would be a hopeless to list every speech act token than
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every individual could ever physically perform. This list may well be infinite, and
is certainly not enumerable in a human lifetime. Carter’s proxy measures have no
clear application either. Which fraction of the exchange value of an individual’s
total resource holdings should we take to be indicative of the extent of their freedom
of speech? If exchange-value metrics tell us anything at all about how free an
individual is, they can only point to how free they are overall, not how extensive
any of their specific freedoms are.
Carter’s second proxy measure doesn’t seem to me to be more helpful. Recall
that here the idea is to assign numbers to each freedom type according to how large
a share of one’s empirical freedom corresponds to the exercise of this freedom and
to how far the exercise of this freedom is restricted, then to multiply their sum by
the individual’s exchange-value score. This is all a bit perplexing. Carter tells us
that multiplying the freedom-type score by the exchange-value score is supposed
to tell us how much you can do with your resources. But surely the freedom to do
things with resources is itself a kind of freedom, or is included in other types of
freedom (whether you can or cannot afford a car may be relevant to our assessment
of your freedom of movement), so the extent of what you can do with your resources
must already have been assessed in the computation of the initial freedom-type
score. Perhaps Carter would disagree, but it’s hard to say since he doesn’t provide
us with a list of freedom-types, merely insisting that the list should be drawn up in
a value-neutral fashion. Moreover, even if we can avoid the appearance of vicious
double-counting, why are we multiplying? It’s certainly not self-evident that this
is the operation which tells us how much you can do with your resources. Why not
add the two scores, or take the factorial of their sum, or exponentiate one score
by the cubic root of the other?
But let’s bracket concerns over multiplication, and focus only on the freedom-
type metric. Carter doesn’t say much about how one should estimate the share
of overall empirical freedom different freedom types take up, so how does one
apply this method? As far as I can see, just in the case of free speech, we would
be required to guesstimate, for every speech act we could ever perform (possibly
an infinite list!), what bodily movements of ours would be identical with said
speech act, and what the counterfactual consequences of all those speech acts
would be, then to measure the extensiveness over space-time of these movements
and consequences, and finally to determine the Steinerian ratio of unprevented
acts to unprevented + prevented speech acts. This is a heroic task.
Of course, everything I’ve said here about freedom of speech goes for other
freedoms as well. The axiomatic approach offers us natural ways of establishing
comparisons in individuals’ degrees of freedom of worship, association, assembly,
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etc. But again it’s hard to see how the empirical approach could be applied to
establish comparisons of the extent of specific freedoms; it seems limited to making
comparisons of overall freedom. And yet if there are especially valuable types of
freedoms, we might care about being able to make comparisons in degrees of
specific freedoms. The axiomatic approach, then, promises to serve more of our
theoretical aims than the empirical approach, and this speaks in its favour.
Precision
A further methodological advantage of the axiomatic approach is that it allows
us (forces us, even) to state our assumptions precisely. The benefits of this have
already come through in the discussion above. For one thing, as Van Hees has
shown, attempts to articulate precise criteria for what makes one set of options
more diverse than another may force us to reconsider our intuitions about diver-
sity. This point holds quite generally: because the axiomatic approach works by
proving representation theorems, which establish that a binary relation on Z sat-
isfies certain axioms if and only if it ranks Z according to some particular rule, the
logical implications of our assumptions can be precisely studied, which makes it
easier to know which assumptions to weaken or reject. For instance, it is because
Pattanaik and Xu’s (1990) original (and apparently plausible) monotonicity and
composition conditions implied (absurdly, in their view) that A offers more free-
dom than B just in case |A| > |B| that they later come to reject these conditions.
And likewise the next chapter argues for the rejection of an assumption that most
theorists working within this approach have adopted.
More importantly, however, in not stating our assumptions precisely, we run
the risk of making conceptual errors, such as the error of confusing a scale of
measure that cardinally represents freedom (i.e., it allows comparisons in degrees
and differences in degrees of freedom) with a scale of measure that is itself cardinal
but represents freedom merely ordinally (i.e., it measures something cardinally,
but only allows comparisons in degrees of freedom, not degrees and differences
in degrees).4 And here I wish to scrutinize Carter’s claim that Steiner’s formula,
appropriately interpreted, offers a cardinal representation of overall freedom.
4This sort of error is familiar to us from the literature on the measurement of preference.
Suppose we assume that what is good for a person is to have their preferences satisfied, so that
the more their preferences are satisfied, the better-off they are. Von Neumann and Morgenstern
proved that if individual preferences satisfy certain conditions, then a cardinal representation
of those preferences exist. You might think this shows that personal goodness is therefore also
cardinally measurable. But as has been widely noted (see Ellsberg, 1954; Arrow, 1963; Sen,
1976; J. A. Weymark, 1991; Broome, 1991b), the mere fact that a cardinal representation of
individual preferences exists does not mean that this is the only representation of their preferences
that exists. The scale (utility, in the case of preferences) is cardinal, but it need not represent
cardinally what it represents.
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As mentionned previously, Steiner claims that each individual’s degree of free-
dom is “equal” to the value of their Steinerian ratio. In fact, however, it seems to
me that his formula only offers us an ordinal ranking rule. That is, his formula
can be used to order individuals by how free they are, but differences in Steinerian
scores have no meaningful interpretation. Recall that Steiner justifies his choice of
formula by invoking the principle that one can only be more (less) free to the extent
that (1) one can perform more (fewer) acts and (2) is prevented from performing
fewer (more) actions. Steiner presents his ranking rule as though it is the only
rule which satisfies (1) and (2), but in fact there are in fact many different ways of
ranking individuals in terms of how much freedom they have that are consistent
with assumptions (1) and (2).
For a start, any positive monotone transformation of Steiner’s formula will rank
individuals by their degrees of freedom in exactly the same way, and so trivially
satisfy (1) and (2). Moreover, there are many other rules which induce different
orderings but still satisfy conditions (1) and (2). For instance, we could just as
well say that i is freer than j just in case Fi − Ui > Fj − Uj. This second ranking
rule is consistent with (1) and (2), but whereas Steiner’s rule implies that there is
an upper limit to how free (Ui = 0) or unfree (Fi = 0) one can be, the rule I’ve just
proposed does not. Or else, consider the rule according to which i is freer than j






In this case, there is a lower bound on how free any person can be (Fi = 0)
but no upper bound. This might sound plausible. Matthew Kramer (2003, p. 359)
proposes yet another formula that is identical to Steiner’s, but where the numerator
is squared, arguing that since we should care more about what people can do than
what they are prevented from doing, it is necessary to square the numerator to
make increases in in people’s exerciseable liberties sufficiently more weighty in the
calculation of how free they are than increases in the number of things they are
prevented from doing. Kramer’s precise choice of exponent is arbitrary, but his
formula is consistent with the restrictions laid down by Steiner. In fact, the only
ranking rules that are ruled out by (1) and (2) are ones which permit for an agent
to be more free than another even though they are unprevented from performing
no more actions and are prevented from performing no fewer. In other words, (1)
and (2) on their own only imply a dominance-based partial order, which is not
terribly restrictive.
Steiner himself does not argue for an upper or a lower bound. He takes it for
granted that having more available actions must expand one’s degree if freedom,
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but does not claim that there is an upper bound to this. Likewise, he insists that
one should take account of the number of acts one is unfree to perform in assessing
an individual’s degree of freedom, and not “confine our calculation to summing
those actions which [they are] free to do” (Steiner, 1983, p. 74). Otherwise, we
would be guilty of confusing freedom with ability, says Steiner, and though an
individual may be free and able to perform more acts than another, they may also
be able but unfree to perform far more as well. To simply ignore the number of
acts the individual is unfree from performing in assessing their degree of liberty
“is to misconstrue the object of such an exercise” (75). Kramer (2003, pp. 360-
368) argues likewise that there’s just something special about humanly imposed
constraints that calls out for attention: a person who cannot walk more than 100
meters because others systematically assault her is unfree in a way that a person
who cannot walk more than 100 meters due to disability is not, and this form
of unfreedom must be represented in our measure. These arguments have some
force, but they are plainly just arguments for condition (2). Something more would
have to be said to establish that two individuals who are both unprevented from
performing any act, though one is free to perform far more, are equally free.
Maybe Steiner’s formula offers the best interpretation of the relation between
individual freedom and extents of available action, but there are substantive ques-
tions to be settled in deciding between different ranking rules. If I am prevented
from performing exactly as many acts as you, but am unprevented from performing
significantly more, aren’t I freer than you? This certainly sounds intuitive. Well,
according to the rules I proposed, then I am necessarily freer than you in the case
described, but not so on Steiner’s (if Ume = Uyou = 0). Or else, from the moment
that we accept that my degree of freedom decreases as the number of actions I am
unfree to perform increases, why must there be an upper bound on how much my
freedom can be made to decrease in this way, as Steiner’s rule implies?
Carter doesn’t consider these issues. He just asserts that Steiner’s measure,
suitably interpreted, offers a cardinal measure of freedom. But as we’ve now seen,
Steiner’s measure only offers an ordinal measure of freedom: any positive monotone
transformation of it generates the exact same ordering. For Steiner’s formula to
represent individual freedom cardinally, additional assumptions are required to
those which he imposed. Steiner himself does not make any such assumptions
explicit, so perhaps we should turn to Carter for illumination.
Carter talks at various points of freedom “being a function” of something or
other, and, in particular, he defends the view that “the extent of my freedom is
a function of the extent of action available to me” (Carter, 1999, p. 170). In ex-
plaining why freedom, so conceived, is cardinally measurable by Steiner’s formula,
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he says:
“The idea of measuring ‘extents of available action’ in terms the phys-
ical dimensions of the events agents are free to bring about allows, in
theory, for absolute, cardinal measurements. This is because space,
time, and matter are, as we saw in Chapter 7, ‘extensive’ qualities,
and therefore ones on which we can in theory perform concatenation
operations so as to be in a position to say ‘how much’ of those qualities
is present.” (270)
I take it that Carter is arguing the following: Steiner’s formula (suitably inter-
preted) measures one’s freedom cardinally because (i) it offers a correct account
of the relation between one’s degree of freedom and the extent of one’s available
action, and (ii) one’s extent of available action is cardinally measurable.5 This
reading seems to fit with Carter’s talk of freedom being “a function of” one’s ex-
tent of available action. If this is the right reading of the above passage, however,
Carter is simply mistaken. If all we assume is that freedom is strictly increasing
in the extent of one’s available action, then even if the extent of available action
is cardinal, Steiner’s formula does not measure freedom cardinally.
To see why, consider the following analogy: suppose individual welfare is
strictly increasing in their level of income. Income is cardinally measurable, but
even if we assume that income is the sole component of individual welfare, it does
not follow that to measure people’s income is to measure their welfare cardinally.
If all we know is that people’s welfare is an order-preserving function of their in-
come, then all we learn from the fact that I earn $10 and you earn $20 is that
5A different way of reading this passage is that Carter is identifying freedom with extents of
available action, and telling us that freedom is cardinally measurable because extents of available
action are cardinally measurable, in the same way that temperature is cardinally measurable
because temperature just is mean molecular kinetic energy, and mean molecular kinetic energy
is cardinally measurable. In other words, when we speak of a person’s freedom, or their degree
of freedom, and when we make claims like “Canadians are freer than Americans,” we are actually
obliquely referring to a ratio of regions of space-time. On this reading, Carter would be (trivially)
correct that Steiner’s formula measures freedom cardinally.
This is not a very plausible reading; “freedom” and “the ratio of acts one is unprevented
from performing to the sum of the acts one is unprevented from performing and the acts one is
prevented from performing” are not synonymous expressions, nor is “freedom” a proper name for
a physical magnitude (like “temperature”), so why should we believe they co-refer? Ordinarily,
when two non-synonymous expressions are discovered to co-refer, it is because these expressions
are definite descriptions which pick out the same object on the basis of different properties; “the
morning star” and “the evening star” were discovered to co-refer when it was found that the first
light to shine in the night sky was also the last light to go out. But “freedom” isn’t a definite
description of ratios of areas of space-time; it’s a somewhat vague concept which intuitively has
to do with how capable one is to do, be, have, become things that are worth wanting. But there
are different interpretations of the relation between one’s freedom and the set of things one can
do; this is why I think Carter and Steiner are best interpreted as offering an interpretation of
this relation.
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you are happier than I – we do not learn that you earn twice as much well-being
as I do, though you earn twice as much money. Steiner’s formula could only be
taken to measure freedom cardinally if it was assumed that freedom is not only
increasing, but also strictly linear in the areas of space-time one can influence,
and why should we believe that? It would contradict commonsense intuitions
about the importance for freedom of having a diversity of nontrivial options (Raz,
1988, p. 376). And mightn’t freedom, like welfare with respect to money, exhibit
diminishing marginal returns to influenceable areas of space-time?
Fruitfulness
A final methodological advantage of the axiomatic approach is that it focuses our
attention where it needs to be: on substantial questions about what principles
are most normatively appealing as interpretations of the “offers at least as much
freedom as” relation, rather than on largely orthogonal questions about ontology
or the metaphysics of action. As we saw earlier, Steiner and Carter neglect alter-
nate ways of measuring individual freedom, even though many other ranking rules
are consistent with their assumptions, and there are substantial questions to be
settled about which rule is best. In contrast, this is where all the critical attention
is focused in welfare economics, with the predictable result that a wilderness of
different ranking rules have emerged, all expressing different commitments about
the role of preferences and diversity in the measurement of freedom.
And this diversity of views is surely a good thing. It is a serious question
which sets of axioms are most compelling, and if different sets of axioms are all
compelling in different ways, we must decide whether to come down hard on the
side of one set of axioms, abandoning some of our intuitions along the way, or to
accept that we have many competing but equally adequate conceptions of what
makes a person more-or-less free. Even if we think that we ultimately ought to
pick one set of axioms, having a wide variety of compelling alternatives to consider
may make us less dogmatic about what the correct ranking rule is, it may reveal to
us new possibilities we hadn’t considered, and the general back-and-forth nature
of arguing for one set of axioms against another may help us make better sense of
our intuitions and of what matters. Likewise, even if we find one ranking rule on
the whole more attractive than others, we may nonetheless have greater confidence
in the rankings that it implies when other ranking rules that we find compelling
agree with it.
To focus instead on questions in the metaphysics of action is simply not to ask
the right questions, if what we are interested in is to develop a measure of freedom.
Consider some analogies. Would it be appropriate to demand of consumer choice
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theorists, before they started the business of offering hypotheses, proposing mod-
els, making predictions, etc., about individual choices over consumption bundles,
that they first settle the question of whether bundles of goods are to understood
as substances with properties, or instead as bundles of property intensities and
location properties? Would it be appropriate, in formal epistemology, to subor-
dinate the question of how agents should update their beliefs about the possible
states of the world to the question of whether these states are to be understood
in modal realist fashion, as referring to other actual worlds in parallel universes,
or instead merely as propositions expressing counterfactual scenarios, in Kripkean
fashion? These may be important questions, but they are separate questions from
the ones of interest in each case, and it seems to me that the question that is of
interest to us when we are trying to make sense of claims like “Canadians are freer
than Americans” is: “what, in general, makes anyone more-or-less free than anyone
else?” This is just what the axiomatic approach invites us to do.
1.3 Freedom, Carter, and diversity
In fact, not only are questions in the metaphysics of action not the questions of
concern when we are interested in the measurement of freedom, but the role Carter
gives to metaphysics in defining his position ends up working as a straightjacket:
it forces him to stipulate that an individual’s degree of freedom does not depend
on the diversity of their available options. This is a problem because, as Carter
acknowledges, it seems very obvious that the diversity of one’s options has a lot
to do how much freedom one enjoys – indeed, he believes the biggest challenge
for his view is to recover this intuition. Citing an example from Norman Daniels,
he notes that someone with a choice between 21 different brands of detergent
does not appear to have significantly more freedom than someone with a choice
between 7 different types of detergent. Likewise, citing an example from Pattanaik
and Xu (1990, 2000), he notes that it seems false to say that the opportunity
set {travel by car, travel by train} offers no more freedom than the opportunity
set {travel by blue car, travel by red car}. Yet a naïve reading of Carter’s view
suggests that this is just what his empirical approach implies, because diversity is
not a feature of the spatiotemporal extensiveness of an act.
Carter, however, points out that the 21 brands of detergent only provide us
with 21 ways of doing the same thing: the events we can causally generate with one
brand of detergent (e.g., washing our clothes) overlap to a very substantial degree
with the events we can causally generate with any other brand. Likewise, the set of
events that travelling in a blue car allows us to bring about (e.g., moving our body
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from point a to point b along route c) overlap to a much more significant degree
with the set of events that travelling in a red car allows us to bring about than
the events that travelling by train do. Thus Carter believes he is able to recover
our intuition that one is freer the more diverse one’s options, without breaking his
“empiricist” commitments.
Unfortunately, I do not think that Carter’s analysis takes him very far. Al-
though in the two cases just mentioned, similarity and overlap went together, it is
not, in general, either a necessary or a sufficient condition for two acts’ being more
(less) similar that the events they allow us to bring about overlap to a greater
(lesser) degree. One shouldn’t therefore expect much covariance between the two,
nor in general expect the one to be explained by the other.
1.3.1 Sufficiency
Consider the following example: my experience of many Italian cities has been
that the only restaurants within a reasonable price range that one can find are
pizzerias and pasterias. Do the options in the set {eat at pizzeria a, eat at pizzeria
b, ... eat at pizzeria z} overlap spatiotemporally to any substantial degree? No:
the different pizzerias are in different buildings, which occupy different regions of
space-time; if I went to eat at pizzeria a, I would sit in a different chair, at a
different table than I would be at pizzeria b, or c, use different cutlery, etc.
Compare this choice situation to the choice situation one faces in a highly
cosmopolitan city, where multiple culinary traditions co-exist. There the typical
person’s opportunity set with respect to dining options might be {eat at Korean
restaurant, eat at Vietnamese restaurant, eat at Thai restaurant, eat at pizzeria,
eat at deli, eat at French restaurant, eat at Irish pub, eat at Korean-Swedish fusion
restaurant, eat at Peruvian restaurant, etc.}. Even if there are no more restaurants
to choose from in this hypothetical cosmopolitan city than in my hypothetical
Italian city, it is perfectly obvious that the menu of choices on offer here exhibits
considerably more diversity. Yet the acts of eating at pizzeria a and pizzeria b
do not overlap more than the acts of eating at Siam Kitchen and eating at Seoul
Food ; in fact there may be much less overlap between the first pair of acts, if the
two pizzerias are far apart while Siam Kitchen and Seoul Food are right next door
to each other. Clearly, that two acts overlap to a lesser degree does not imply that
they are more dissimilar.
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1.3.2 Necessity
Nor is the converse true: dissimilar acts may significantly overlap spatiotemporally.
Just consider information technologies. Without turning my nose away from my
computer screen, I can watch a movie, read a paper I found on Jstor, grade my
students’ essays, read about the history of hubcap manufacturing, play chess, listen
to music on Youtube, etc. These are all very different activities, requiring different
skills, satisfying different interests, inducing very qualitatively different mental
states in me, but each activity overlaps significantly over space-time with every
other: as far as my bodily movements are concerned, these activities mostly consist
of my sitting around in the same spot, and the events that I bring about (e.g.,
causing some bits to flip from 0 to 1) will tend to overlap in their spatio-temporal
dimensions as well.
The extent of spatiotemporal overlap between available acts thus appears to be
a poor indicator of their diversity. Given that it is neither necessary nor sufficient
for one opportunity set A’s being more diverse than set B that there be less
overlap in the acts that A makes available to us, one shouldn’t expect a very
tight connection between diversity and overlap. But if our degree of freedom
closely tracks the diversity of our options, then Carter’s approach risks seriously
misrepresenting who enjoys greater freedom than whom. The axiomatic approach,
by contrast, allows us to give the diversity of one’s options a much more direct role
in our assessments of overall freedom. Many such measures have been proposed
(Weitzman, 1992; Pattanaik and Xu, 2000; William Bossert, Pattanaik, and Xu,
1992; Baumgärtner, 2006; Bervoets and Gravel, 2007; Pattanaik and Xu, 2008;
Hees, 2004; Nehring and Puppe, 2009), and indeed I will propose my own in
chapter 4.
1.4 Carter’s objection
If what I have argued so far is correct, then we have reached a provisional case in
favour of the axiomatic approach. For this case to be truly probative, however,
we must confront the empirical approach on the ground where it is strongest.
And indeed, the most important advantage that Carter claims for the empirical
approach, in my view, is that it is the only approach to the measurement of freedom
that is consistent with the thesis that freedom is non-specifically valuable.
Carter attributes the view that a new freedom must be “significantly different”
from one’s previously available freedoms to contribute significantly to one’s overall
freedoms to philosophers like Sen (1990), Arneson (1985), and Charles Taylor
(1985). Taylor, for instance, argues that freedom is only important to us because
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we are purposive beings. One person should only count as freer than another if
one is free to pursue a greater range of purposes, and more important purposes.
Or perhaps more precisely, an additional option only contributes to our freedom
if it makes the pursuit of an additional purpose available to us, and it contributes
all the more to our freedom the more important this purpose is.
Carter argues that this “value-based” approach collapses into the thesis that
only specific freedoms matter, and that these are the only freedoms we care about
making available. His argument builds on a previous argument due to Kymlicka.
In brief, the value-based approach, as Kymlicka and Carter interpret it, just says
that if the freedom to do x is important to us, given our interests, then having
the option to do x increases one’s overall freedom: because freedom is valuable
and therefore we have an interest in providing everyone with the largest possible
share of freedom, consistent with everyone else’s having an equally large share,
this gives us reason to try and make option x available to each person, consistent
with everyone else’s right to have x. The problem, Kymlicka notes, is that if the
freedom to do x is important, then we already have a compelling reason to make
this freedom available to everyone; we can altogether dispense with this talk of
overall freedom, as it plays no role in justifying the sorts of freedom expansions
that the value-based approach licenses. But this, Carter argues, is just to deny
that freedom is non-specifically valuable: if we only have reason to value additional
options because these options themselves are valuable, then freedom as such cannot
be valuable. But since freedom as such is valuable, this is a reductio against the
value-based approach.
There is a gap in this argument. Carter explicitly sets out to debunk the
thesis that an additional option must be “sufficiently dissimilar” from one’s ex-
isting options to be freedom-expanding; but his and Kymlicka’s argument seem
directed against the view that an additional option must be valuable to count as
freedom-expanding. I’m happy to grant that measures of freedom which directly
reward opportunity sets for providing individuals with better options and better
opportunities to live good lives do confuse the specific value of freedom with its
nonspecific value (I’ll argue as much in chapter 4). But an argument against this
sort of measure does no work against one that rewards dissimilarity. Certainly, we
can reach for measures of dissimilarity that aren’t in themselves measures of value:
you might, for instance, consider that two options are more dissimilar from one
another the more likely it is that any given individual would fail to be indifferent
between them, or the greater the expected intensity of someone’s preference for
one over the other. Neither of these measures tell us anything about how good
the options being considered are, and they make for good measures of the intrinsic
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dissimilarity of two options, insofar as we should expect pairs of options to elicit
more polarized value judgements the more intrinsically dissimilar they are.
I think it is now safe to conclude that the rejection of Carter’s empirical ap-
proach does not force us back into the arms of the specific-freedom thesis. Appeals
to dissimilarity are not hopelessly value-laden, and the need for a measure of free-
dom is as pressing as ever. We can therefore rest at ease in following the axiomatic
approach.
Summary
Freedom matters in many ways, and we have strong intuitions that some people
are freer than others – indeed, that some peoples are freer than others. The
need for a measure of freedom, for a way of making our everyday commonsense
comparative judgements meaningful and testable for truth. Carter’s empirical
approach, emerging partly as a response to the sorts of objections that Dworkin,
Kristjánsson, Oppenheim, and others raised against the possibility of measuring
freedom, offers one way of meeting this need. The axiomatic approach offers
another, and, I argue, a better way.
Methodologically, the virtues are all on one side here: the axiomatic approach is
more flexible, its assumptions are more precisely stated, more easily examined and
criticized, and its focus is on the most salient question, namely, what constraints
on the “offers at least as much freedom as” relation offer the best interpretation of
the relation between one’s available options and the degree of freedom they provide
us with. The empirical approach, by contrast, largely ignores this question, and
instead yields metaphysics a central place in the analysis; this leads Steiner and
Carter to draw what seem to be hasty conclusions regarding the uniqueness and
cardinality of their proposed measure, and ends up straightjacketing Carter into
denying the relevance to the measurement of freedom of the diversity of options
open to individuals. Not only is it implausible to deny that this is relevant, but to
deny it as a matter of definition (since it is Carter’s definition of an option that
rules such concerns out) seems particularly problematic. And since the axiomatic
approach survives unscathed what I take to be Carter’s main criticisms of any
non-empirical approach, this completes the case for the axiomatic approach.
Of course, none of this is to say that the axiomatic approach and all the as-
sumptions that underlie it are beyond reproach, or that philosophy has no distinct
contribution to make to its development. Indeed, the focus of the next chapter
will precisely be to challenge one of the most central assumption of the axiomatic
approach, on the basis of philosophical considerations on weakness of will.
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Chapter 2
Weakness of Will and the
Measurement of Freedom
Weakness of will often seems to get in the way of freedom of choice. Many ofus have had the experience of being presented with an option so tempting
that it felt impossible to resist, and this despite having resolved to do otherwise,
or despite our better judgement. Of course, temptation is rarely so strong that it
simply cannot be resisted. Nonetheless, in many circumstances, temptation makes
it much harder to choose certain courses of actions over others. And in such
circumstances, there may be uncertainty as to whether we will succeed in carrying
our intentions through, if we resolve to do so. The question then arises: how does
one factor in weakness of will when assessing how much freedom of choice agents
are afforded by given sets of alternatives?
Standard approaches to the measurement of freedom are surprising poorly
equipped to answer this question. Numerous philosophers have of course argued,
persuasively, that motivational foibles like weakness of will are fetters on human
freedom, most notably Charles Taylor (1985). However, the implications of this
insight have largely gone unnoticed among those theorists who are interested in
the measurement of freedom. In particular, although much has been written on
how preference orderings over given sets of options and the degree of dissimilarity
between these options affect the amount of freedom of choice that they offer, the
thought that different options that are available might be more or less accessi-
ble has received little attention in the measurement literature. Indeed, as I will
show below, existing approaches by and large simply rule out the possibility of un-
equally accessible options. As a result, these approaches overestimate how much
freedom of choice certain sets of alternatives offer. My concern in this chapter will
be to outline a new approach to the measurement of freedom that takes seriously
differential option accessibility due to weakness of will.
I proceed as follows. In section 2, I review some of the more influential ap-
proaches to the measurement of freedom of choice. These approaches share a
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common feature: the way in which sets of alternatives are defined implies that
they admit of no degrees in accessibility other than fully or non-accessible, and
this will imply that two agents with the same nominal set of options are equally
free. In section 3, I turn to the problem of weakness of will. I explore a series
of examples in which the strength of an agent’s will makes a crucial difference to
how free they are. This turns out to be a sore point for existing approaches to the
measurement of freedom, because they are unable to take account of the impact
of strength of will on freedom. In section 4, I discuss and rebut three objections to
my claim that weakness of will reduces freedom by making options less accessible.
The first alleges that “internal” constraints like weakness of will are not relevant to
the measurement of freedom. The second that the effect of weakness of will is to
make our options worse, not less accessible. The third that the effect of weakness
of will is to make certain courses of action unavailable to us, not merely less acces-
sible. In section 5, I propose a new way of representing the set of alternatives that
is available to agents, which incorporates a measure of the degree of accessibility
of each option. Finally, in section 6, I show how my framework may be used in
particular cases by applying it to issues regarding the ethics of nudge.
2.1 Standard Approaches to Measuring Freedom
Following my arguments in the previous chapter, I will be working within the ax-
iomatic tradition in this chapter, though all the critical points that I raise here
generalize to the so-called “empirical approaches” as well. Thus we begin with a
finite set X of options, a set Z of opportunity sets, and we define %, a transitive,
nonsymmetric, and reflexive binary relation on Z, such that for any two opportu-
nity sets A and B, A % B is interpreted as “A offers at least as much freedom as
B.” Our aim is to investigate what constraints to impose on % .
It is important to underscore that all the options in X are mutually exclusive:
two options are mutually exclusive if they cannot be performed in conjunction,
if the individual cannot choose to do both. When we say that individuals lack
free speech under totalitarian regimes, we do not mean to imply that there are
specific utterances that they are prevented from making, but rather that they
cannot, say, criticize the government and then also go on to pursue their life as
normal. What makes them less free than citizens of liberal democracy is that
certain conjunctively possible courses of action that are possible for free citizens
are not possible for them. Likewise, if you are being mugged at gunpoint, and have
to choose whether to give up your money or your life, the one thing you cannot do
is walk away with your life and your money. Accordingly, numerous theorists (e.g.,
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Carter, 1999, chapter 7; Pattanaik and Xu, 2015) have stressed that options must
be understood as conjunctively possible courses of actions that an individual can
complete in sequence, and of course any two different sequences of conjunctively
possible actions define two different options.
Many of the most influential measures of freedom developed within the ax-
iomatic approach were proposed by Pattanaik and Xu (1990), Pattanaik and Xu
(1998), Pattanaik and Xu (2000), Pattanaik and Xu (2008), and Pattanaik and
Xu (2015). The different ranking rules they propose illustrate the many ways one
can use this framework to measure freedom of choice. In their original (1990)
model, for example, they propose three restrictions on the “offers at least as much
freedom as” relation. First, anyone who only has one option has no freedom of
choice. Second, one always has more freedom of choice with two options than just
one option. This is a very weak version of the fairly natural intuition that more
options means more freedom of choice. Third, giving two people an identical addi-
tional option does not alter how much freedom they have relative to one another:
if John is freer than Smith to begin with, then John remains freer than Smith if we
give them both the option (which they previously lacked) to go skydiving. Each
of these three assumptions seems initially plausible, but the only ranking rule over
Z which satisfies all three is the “simple cardinality rule:” for any two opportunity
sets A and B, A % B if and only if A contains at least as many elements as B.
As Pattanaik and Xu themselves point out, this rule is ná’ive – indeed, they
present it as a kind of impossibility result. Nevertheless, this rule provides a very
natural starting point for measures of freedom, insofar as having more freedom of
choice seems to be a matter of having more choices (of a suitable kind, perhaps),
and indeed this rule has been the prototype for every rule that has followed.
Crucially for my purposes, it has a key feature in common with every other model
that has been proposed since: for any possible option x and any opportunity set
A, either x is a member of A, or x is not a member of A – opportunity sets are
defined as classic sets, and set membership is bivalent. Of course, the bivalence of
set membership implies that if you and I can choose from the exact same options,
then we are equally free; this, I will argue, is problematic.
Newer approaches have of course been proposed which improve significantly on
the simple cardinality rule. For example, Pattanaik and Xu (1998) note that the
simple cardinality rule seems objectionably insensitive to the quality of the options
one has to choose from. Here they explicitly follow Sen (1993: 531) who suggests
that if you already have interesting life options that are open to you, your freedom
of choice does not increase if you are given the additional option of being beheaded
at dawn. Likewise, if you are at a car dealership and are hesitating between several
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options, Sen claims your freedom does not expand if you are now given the option
of buying a car that is identical to one already on offer, except for a defective
gearbox. The lesson Sen draws from this is that an individual’s preferences over
the options that are available to them matter to how much freedom those options
offer them. In consequence, numerous authors have proposed to impose some sort
of minimal desirability criterion on opportunity sets. Pattanaik and Xu (1998,
p. 182), for instance, propose that an additional option should only be counted
as freedom-expanding if and only if it is such that at least some rational persons
could prefer it to its available alternatives (see also Sudgen and Jones, 1982; Parfit,
1981, chapter 1, footnote 39; Puppe, 1996; and Foster, 2011 for further discussion).
This restriction looks like a clear improvement over the previous rule, but it does
not change the fundamentally bivalent character of opportunity set membership.
This feature remains even when ranking principles are refined in other di-
rections. For instance, numerous authors have emphasized that one’s degree of
freedom depends crucially on how diverse one’s options are. This point has been
emphasized by Charles Taylor (1985), who argues that freedom only matters to
us because we are purposive beings, and so one should only count as freer than
another if one is free to pursue a greater range of purposes, and if one is free to
pursue more important purposes (see also Arneson, 1985 and Raz, 1988, pp. 408-
409). Accordingly, various authors have proposed ways of ranking sets according
to how diverse they are. The simplest such proposal comes from Pattanaik and
Xu (2000), who essentially propose to rank opportunity sets by how many types
of options they contain, where an option type is a set of available options that
are all similar to one another (see also Pattanaik and Xu, 2008; Bervoets and
Gravel, 2007; Hees, 2004 for further interpretations). This approach again seems
to improve upon the simple cardinality rule, but bivalence remains an implicit
assumption. Things are not different, incidentally, under the “empirical approach”
defended by Carter (1999) and Kramer, 2003, where bivalence is in fact “promoted”
to an explicit assumption.
The key problem with the general approach in this literature was anticipated by
Berlin (1969, p. 130), when he claimed that the extent of an individual’s freedom
depends not only on “how many possibilities are open to, them;” but also on “how
easy or difficult each of these possibilities is to actualize,” and “how far they are
closed and open by deliberate human acts.” One way of cashing our Berlin’s
insight is to say that options may be more-or-less accessible to individuals, even as
they are available to them. The problem that this lesson poses for the traditional
models comes out clearly when we consider cases of weakness of will.
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2.2 The Problem Posed by Weakness of Will
2.2.1 What is Weakness of Will?
We all frequently confront temptation. When we succumb to it contrary to our
better judgement, then, according to the orthodox view on the subject, we display
weakness of will (e.g., M. Smith, 2003; Pettit, 2003; Stroud, 2003). More precisely,
according to Davidson’s (1969) seminal analysis, weakness of will is an intentional
action, motivated by some strong present urge, yet contrary to the individual’s
all-thing-considered better judgement. A standard case of weakness of will, on
this account, is that of a dieter, who judges that she ought to stick to her diet,
but nonetheless splurges on cream puffs and cheese cake. Or a smoker who judges
that they ought to quit, but still reaches for the next cigarette.
Discussions on the impact of weakness of will on individual freedom generally
presuppose this orthodox view of weakness of will. However, as I will argue later,
this makes the resulting analyses undesirably narrow, as there are other plausible
views on the table. Richard Holton and Berridge. (2013, p. 77), for example,
has articulated a heterodox but nonetheless influential view according to which
weakness of will really consists in over-readily or irrationally reconsidering one’s
resolutions, where a resolution is understood as a future-directed intention which is
formed precisely for the purpose of overcoming one’s anticipated future inclinations
to act contrary to one’s intention. On this view, it is irrational to revise one’s
resolutions if we do so under the pressure of just the urges which our resolution
was formed to defeat, and no new decision-relevant information has come to light.
Holton’s view is partly motivated by the fact that many of what we consider to
be paradigmatic cases of weakness of will are typically preceeded by what Holton
(2006, p. 98) calls “judgment shift”: those who give in to their urges and break
their resolutions typically first come to judge that it is better, after all, to do
so. A common example: you swear to quit smoking, hold fast for a while, then
an oblivious coworker offers you a smoke, and at first you resist, but then say to
yourself: “ah, well, why not just one? One cigarette won’t kill me. In fact, I’d
enjoy it, and I can still quit tomorrow!” Then all resistance fades, and you cave
to the urge to smoke. This smoker clearly displays weakness of will, and yet he
doesn’t appear to be acting against his better judgment.
To avoid committing myself in advance to any particular view, I will consider
“weakness of will” to be a cluster concept, covering a range of irrational moti-
vational foibles. All I will assume is what empirical psychology tells us: first,
that weakness of will (or “failure of self-control,” among psychologists, e.g., Fu-
denberg and Levine, 2012) manifests as a conflict between some present urge and
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some antecedent motivation (e.g., better judgment, resolutions, etc.), and which
may hinder our ability to act on certain intentions. Second, that it is typically
cue-driven, in that these urges usually don’t form spontaneously, but rather in
response to environmental stimuli (Holton and Berridge., 2013). Addictive desires
are the most vivid case in point: addicts become sensitized to certain cues as-
sociated with past drug use, and subsequent exposure to those cues immediately
results in very strong motivational responses, even in former addicts who have
not used for a long time (see Robinson and Berridge, 2003). This is why addicts
who have long been sober are much more likely to use drugs in the future than
individuals who have never used drugs before. Also, more salient cues typically
trigger stronger urges (Holton, 2006, p. 97).
By contrast, strength of will – the capacity to recruit the motivation to defeat
one’s present urges – is generally thought to be enabled by the use of a distinctive
cognitive capacity, willpower, which is effortful to employ but enables us to enforce
our better judgment and commitments in the face of contrary desires (Holton, 2006,
p. 112).
There are two dominant models in the experimental psychology literature on
how this faculty operates. The “cognitive depletion” model of willpower, pioneered
by Muraven, Diane, and Roy F. Baumeister (1998), interprets willpower as a kind
of cognitive resource which we call upon at will to recruit the motivation to carry
through our resolutions. This resource is limited in supply over the short term, and
“spent” in resisting temptation (this is felt as the exertion of effort), so that previous
use of our willpower leaves less available for subsequent use in the short term.
Individuals can thus progressively exhaust their willpower, making future attempts
at resoluteness less likely to succeed. The phenomenon of “ego depletion” is often
cited as providing evidence for this view. To cite just one example, the experiments
of Muraven, Diane, and Roy F. Baumeister (1998) seemed to show that forcing
oneself to resist temptation in one period makes one less likely to persist in one’s
efforts to complete a difficult or frustrating but completely unrelated task in the
next period. In their initial study, forcing oneself to eat radishes instead of the
more tempting chocolates made one less likely, in the subsequent period of the
experiment, to persist in one’s efforts to solve puzzles. This was taken to show
that willpower is depleted with use.
This is not to say that every case of abandoning one’s resolutions is a case of
having exhausted one’s willpower; it is surely quite common for people to give into
temptation without ever calling upon their willpower to resist the urge to yield
(“I know I resolved not to eat chocolate cake, but things are different today: I’m
on vacation!”). As Rizzo (2016, p. 22) puts it, willpower is just another scarce
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resource: we can choose how to allocate it across different consumption bundles,
but there is a hard cap on how much we can buy. Importantly, individuals can
become better at exercising their willpower. According to Vohs and R. Baumeis-
ter (2004), the more one succeeds in being resolute, and the more one cultivates
certain habits of plan-making, the easier it becomes to recruit motivation going
forward (if one is keeping the resource metaphor in mind: training can give you
more motivation-recruiting-bang for your effort-of-will-buck). This interpretation
has many adherents in behavioural economics (see for example Rizzo, 2016; Vohs
and Heatherton, 2000; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012), and was until recently the
orthodox view.
In recent years, however, the “attentional myopia” model of willpower has
emerged as a major rival theory. On this interpretation, weakness of will arises in
situations when our attention narrows on the most salient cues (due to cognitive
stress or prior sensitization), which suggest resolution-violating behaviours (see
Mann and Ward, 2007, p. 280 and Michael Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012, p. 452).
Cognitive load makes us susceptible to temptation, on this view, not because com-
plex cognition consumes willpower, but because the way we typically deal with
cognitively demanding situations is by focusing our attention on the most salient
features of that situation (Mann and Ward, 2007, p. 281). So for example, one
experiment conducted by Mann and Ward (2007, pp. 281-282) found that dieters
who performed cognitively demanding tasks consumed twice as much milkshake
right afterwards when placed in a room containing salient food items than when in
a room containing conspicuously placed scales and dieting books, whereas dieters
who performed cognitively low-load tasks were significantly less influenced by cues.
Strength of will is interpreted on this view not as a cognitive resource, but
as a skill in refocusing one’s attention. Elkins-Brown, Teper, and M Inzlicht
(2017) argue that it is possible to recruit the additional motivation to maintain
one’s resolutions in the face of temptation by refocusing one’s attention on cues
which prompt self-control (e.g., to think about how the action would be socially
inappropriate), in particular through exercises of mindfulness, which make one
more receptive the cues which would otherwise lack salience. It’s been found,
for example, that those who practice meditation experience better outcomes in
smoking cessation (see Elwafi et al., 2013; Y. Y. Tang, R. Tang, and Posner,
2013) and alcohol use (see Bowen et al., 2006) than control groups, and there
is some evidence to suggest meditation may be an effective treatment for drug
abuse disorders Chiesa and Serretti, 2014. Elkins-Brown, Teper, and M Inzlicht
(2017, p. 5) argue this is because “mindfulness meditators are better prepared to
acknowledge moment-to-moment affect that signals the need for self-control.”
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There is substantial evidence for both dominant views, but, regardless of which
model has got the details right, there are some broad-stroke conclusions that come
from the experimental psychology literature. First willpower is a cognitive re-
source or skill which we can call upon to recruit the motivation necessary to defeat
resolution-inconsistent urges. Second, some agents are better than others at lever-
aging this faculty. This is well attested to by the fact that individuals can train
themselves to better resist temptation, for example by practicing mindfulness ex-
ercises, or cultivating habits of plan-making. And, third, cognitively demanding
tasks and exposure to temptation temporarily undermine one’s ability to subse-
quently recruit additional urge-defeating motivation (see Muraven, Diane, and Roy
F. Baumeister, 1998; Mann and Ward, 2007; Holton, 2006).
2.2.2 Problem Cases
Let us now look at some cases. Consider first Weak-willed Willy and Resolute
Regina. Suppose that every night for a whole week, both have the choice between
four alternatives: completing job applications, solving logic problem sets, working
on their essays, and going out to drink with friends. In other words, their oppor-
tunity sets are identical. Both would love nothing more than to go out with their
friends, but have resolved not to because this would adversely affect their capacity
to meet urgent deadlines with respect to their work, and they both judge that
meeting these deadlines is more important than enjoying themselves that week.
Regina, being resolute, is pretty consistently successful in recruiting the motivation
to resist temptation, and she is very skilled at shifting her attention towards cues
that facilitate self-control. She is quite reliable: if she says she’ll do something,
or that she judges that she ought to do it, it’s generally a sure bet that she will.
Willy, by contrast, is a flake, generally unsuccessful in resisting temptation when
it presents itself, and unskilled at refocusing his attention. He is almost always
carried away by his present urges to renege on his previously stated intentions and
judgements.
The first thing to observe here is that on standard constructions of opportunity
sets, Willy and Regina are equally free. In every relevant respect, after all, their
opportunity sets are the same: the options in both sets are equally many and
diverse, they are all desirable, and present Willy and Regina with the exact same
sorts of opportunities. There’s nothing one can do that the other cannot (it may
be more or less difficult, or more or less pleasant, but they both can do it). Thus,
on the traditional picture, they simply cannot be unequally free. But this looks
like a mistake. Indeed, whatever the outcome of this case, I submit that Willy
is less free than Regina: either he expends his willpower reserves more quickly,
2.2. The Problem Posed by Weakness of Will 53
less efficiently than she does in attempting to be resolute, or he is simply far less
skilled at shifting his attention to recruit the motivation to defeat his urges. Sure,
he may well succeed in standing firm in the face of temptation, but there is a clear
sense in which he is much less able than she of doing so.
But in what sense does this make Willy less free? Charles Taylor (1985, p. 220)
argues that we “experience our desires and purposes as qualitatively discriminated,
as higher or lower, noble or base, integrated or fragmented, significant or trivial,
good and bad.” And what it is for an end to be qualitatively superior (inferior), on
his view, is for it to be the sort of end that we desire to (not) desire. Of course, as
he observes, what we actually desire and what we desire to desire can come apart,
thus we may upon occasion pursue base goals instead of ones we deem worthier
– this is just what it is to be weak-willed. But to be driven by one’s defects to
pursue base ends is ipso facto to be constrained in one’s ability to pursue the ends
one truly finds worthwhile, and this is injurious to our freedom, Taylor insists.1
Taylor seems to me to have gotten something right here: motivational defects
like weakness of will constrain freedom because they make us less capable of pur-
suing certain aims. That said, this on its own remains quite vague (what is it for
a person to be more-or-less capable, for instance?), and in some respects Taylor’s
analysis lacks generality. For one thing, it is very much tied to the orthodox view
of weakness of will, and cannot be extended to non-standard views. If, as Holton
argues, weakness of will is often characterized by the reevaluation of what we are
initially disposed to regard as base desires into acceptable, even worthy ones, then
it cannot be in those cases that our freedom is constrained because we are unable
to pursue ends we find worthwhile. Rather, in such cases, it is our ability to carry
out our resolutions that is impaired.
This point bleeds into a further one. For Taylor, weakness of will is a restriction
on freedom only because it makes us choose lesser options over better ones; this
analysis might seem too value-laden. It suggests a view on which something only
constrains our freedom if it make us worse off, in some way. Isn’t the problem
more generally just that susceptibility to temptation undermines one’s ability to
act on certain aims and intentions, regardless of whether those are ones we strongly
1There are other influential views one could consider on how internal constraints impair
individual freedom. Crocker (1980, pp. 36-43) and Christman (2001), for instance, both argue
that heteronomy impairs freedom, and that the less autonomous one’s decision to φ, the less free
one was not to φ. Taylor’s analysis is particularly salient for us, however, because his account is
explicitly concerned with explaining how weakness of will constrains individual freedom, unlike
Crocker’s or Christman’s. And indeed, their analyses have no obvious application to the present
case. The paradigm cases of heteronomy Crocker considers are cases of impaired consciousness
and coercion, while for Christman the autonomous character of a decision depends on the desires
driving the decision being formed by a process the individual would not have resisted had they
attended to it; by either author’s lights, Willy and Regina might both count as fully autonomous.
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identify with? A workaholic might desire to desire to work; nonetheless, workaholic
compulsions plausibly impair one’s freedom to relax and go on vacation. A more
value-neutral analysis of constraints is needed to account for these kinds of cases,
one which allows constraints to be either good or bad, and only requires that they
make one less capable (we will return to the issue of value-neutrality in section
4.2).
In light of the above considerations, I propose the following analysis of Willy
and Regina’s situation. Willy is less free than Regina because although all four
options are available to both of them, Willy’s work options are less accessible
to him, in the sense that, conditional on his intending to work, he is less likely
to successfully enforce his intention and actually work than Regina is likely to,
conditional on her intending to work. It is as though, in forming the intention to
work, Willy and Regina both take out a lottery ticket which gives them a particular
chance of successfully working, and a particular chance of failing and choosing to
go out instead; because Willy is weak-willed, his ticket gives him longer odds of
success. This analysis is more precise than Taylor’s, as it cashes out in terms
of conditional probabilities the sense in which Willy is less capable than Regina
of enforcing his practical attitudes. But it is also more general, as it is plainly
value-neutral,2 and does not assume a particular picture of weakness of will, only
that it is a foible which may hinder our ability to act on certain intentions, but
which may be overcome by an effort of willpower, and which some are more adept
at overcoming.
This analysis also happens to be congruent with the sort of analysis which
2Carter (1999, pp. 153-155) discusses a proposal very similar to mine, on which we must
assign numerals between 0 and 1 to each option we are externally unconstrained from performing,
based on the degree of internal constraint, with “1” representing complete internal freedom to
perform it, and “0” the complete internal unfreedom to perform it. Carter dismisses this proposal
on the grounds that the only way to distinguish internally constraining and non-constraining
desires is by reference to the value of the purposes that these desires hinder. Since I defend
a version of this view, I feel I must make a couple points in response: first, it is unclear in
Carter’s treatment how the numbers are to be interpreted. He is led to consider this view by
the thought that we ought to measure “the internal unfreedom of an agent to do x in terms
of her propensity to do some other thing,” which invites a probabilistic interpretation of the
numbers. However, he goes on to argue that the degrees of internal constraint represented by the
numbers “would appear to correspond to the ‘strength of will’ that is required to overcome them,”
and he quotes Flathman (1987) taxonomy of involuntary behaviours, ordered by their degree of
involuntariness, as offering a possible measure of the degree of internal constraint on an individual.
This suggestion is nonprobabilistic, and leaves mysterious how one arrives at a cardinal measure
of the strength of efforts of will. My approach has the virtue of clarity: internal constraints have
an unambiguous interpretation in terms conditional probabilities. Second, and more importantly,
it is false that a notion of internal constraint must be objectionably value-laden: my own proposal
makes no reference to values or preferences, only intentions and conditional probabilities. Carter
is therefore too quick to reject this approach.
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Manley and Wasserman (2008) argue ought to be given of all dispositional prop-
erties. A dispositional property is the property of behaving in a certain way if
certain conditions obtain. More precisely, Manley and Wasserman (2008, p. 76)
argue that an object is disposed to behave in a certain way when a given stimulus
condition obtains if and only if the object would behave in that way in suitably
many cases where the stimulus condition obtains. And accordingly, one object is
more disposed to behave in a certain way than another if and only if the first object
would exhibit the behaviour of interest in more cases where the relevant stimulus
condition obtains than the second object would. Importantly, some dispositions
require no specific stimulus conditions: if one is prone to anger in any situation
whatever, one is irascible. Being strong willed is arguably a similar sort of dis-
position: it is to be reliably disposed to act on one’s intentions (whatever those
are) in suitably many cases, notably in cases of temptation. It would follow, on
Manley and Wasserman’s analysis, that to be more-or-less strong-willed is just to
be more-or-less likely to successfully enforce one’s intentions, whatever those are.
This is just what I’ve argued. Thus a general analysis of dispositions supports
my view of why weakness of will is a constraint upon freedom: it depresses one’s
chances of enforcing one’s intentions.
Note that we can extend my analysis to other cases. Consider a person suffering
from intense depression who is trying to hide her condition. Such a person can,
usually, muster the will to go to work, attend social events, go out with her friends,
and so on; it can feel like drowning, but she may succeed in hiding her condition if
she’s determined. Sometimes, however, her will fails, and she will wake up to find
she can’t get out of bed. She may believe that the best thing for her right now
is to try and maintain a “normal” social life, and she may know that staying in
bed all day will only make her feel worse about herself, but still she fails to recruit
the motivation to unmoor herself from her bedposts. Our patient is arguably not
weak-willed – she is not driven by some strong desire to act against her better
judgment or to break her resolutions – but is rather prey to what Aquinas called
accidie, or the total loss of motivation. Nonetheless, she would rightly view the end
of her depression as a liberation, and for the same reason as before: not because it
affords her any more options, but because it restores to her control over her choices.
Once it is no longer a battle of uncertain outcome to recruit the motivation to get
out of bed, to go to work, or to make dinner, she can once again count on herself to
act on her practical attitudes (i.e., intentions, resolutions, better judgments, etc.).
Going further, my analysis suggests Willy might have more freedom if his
friends were out of town, leaving him with only the three work options. Free
from temptation, free from the constant, painful battle to maintain his resolution
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which he wasn’t guaranteed to successfully carry out, he now has no trouble at
all setting priorities between work tasks and delivering quality work on time for
all his deadlines. The loss of his tempting option may therefore leave Willy with
more freedom, by making his remaining options more accessible. This is difficult to
make sense of under standard approaches to the measurement of freedom: there’s
nothing that Willy can do now that he couldn’t do before, no outcome that he can
achieve now that he couldn’t achieve before – much to the contrary: there’s less
he can do now – so it looks very much as though we’ve simply removed an option
from him, and standard monotonicity assumptions imply that this never increases
one’s freedom.3
We can draw some preliminary lessons here. The degree of freedom offered
by one’s opportunity set depends, first, on whether choosing any of the options
on offer requires one to recruit any motivation to defeat one’s urges to choose
otherwise; second, on how strong-willed the agent is, that is, how capable they are
of recruiting motivation; and third, on what other options are available. A fourth
important factor is the salience of one’s options. This is brought out clearly in the
case of addiction.
Consider Perseus and Cassandra, two cocaine addicts who successfully complete
their detox program and return to their homes. They both resolve never to do
drugs again, they are equally strong-willed, and face the same constraints, so that
the same options are available to them. Anything the one can do, the other can
as well. We can even assume that they share the same preferences and value the
same alternatives. On any standard measure of freedom, they are equally free.
The only difference between the two is that while Perseus still lives in his old flat
where he is regularly exposed to drug cues, Cassandra has the foresight to move
to a part of town where she does not face any such cues (though it’s a short drive
to a dealer). In other words, Cassandra and Perseus have the same (or very nearly
the same) opportunity set, yet I contend that Cassandra will have more freedom
of choice when she gets home from detox than Perseus.
Indeed, given that Perseus is exposed to various drug cues, the possibility of
doing cocaine will be very salient to him, triggering his addictive desires. Plainly,
the attentional myopia model of willpower predicts that his attention will narrow
on the salient behavioural cues in his environment, which are very suggestive of
cocaine, especially if he is ever under conditions of cognitive stress. And on resource
models of willpower, resisting the pull of his addictive desires will very seriously
3Pattanaik and Xu (1998) are an exception here; if an option dominates every other option in
a set under every rational preference ordering, then removing that option might increase one’s
freedom. Clearly though, this is not the situation here, so their monotonicity assumptions would
likewise imply that that removing Willy’s fourth does not increase his freedom.
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deplete his willpower reserves, requiring a great deal of effort. On both models
then, resisting his addictive desires is extremely difficult, and he is not all that likely
to succeed anyway. In contrast, since Cassandra is not exposed to these cues, her
addictive desires are not triggered, and so she will have no difficulty in maintaining
her resolution to stay clean. Hence, despite the fact that Perseus and Cassandra
have identical opportunity sets and are equally strong willed, the simple fact that
the “wrong” option is made salient to Perseus and not to Cassandra means that
the former has less freedom of choice, and for the same reason as before: because
of his addictive desires, he is less capable of making certain choices, and so some
of his options are less than fully accessible to him.
The point that these examples have laboured to bring out is simply this: op-
tions admit of degrees in accessibility, and what it is for an option to be more-or-less
accessible is simply for it to be the case that, conditional upon your intending to
perform it, you are more-or-less likely to perform it, successfully enforcing your
intention. Motivational defects like weakness of will clearly inject great hetero-
geneity in people’s capability to make choices, and standard approaches to the
measurement of freedom are oblivious to these distinctions. To more meaningfully
compare individual freedom requires a framework that captures the heterogeneity
in the capability of different agents to do, be, and have things worth wanting.
2.3 Objections
Before going on to propose a new model, I consider three responses to the argument
I’ve put just put forward. Some will be skeptical that weakness of will really
does impose any constraint upon individual freedom. Others might concede that
weakness of will is a constraint, but argue that this is either because weakness
of will somehow impairs the value of our choices, or because it actually rules out
altogether certain conjunctive courses of action. Let us look at each in turn.
2.3.1 Negative freedom
Recall that proponents of negative conceptions of freedom, such as Oppenheim
(1981), Miller (1983), Steiner (1994), and Carter (1999) and Kramer (2003) claim
that one is free to φ if and only if one is not prevented from φ-ing by another
(through deceit, coercion, etc.). There is a very sharp distinction on such views
between being unable to do something and being unfree to do it. Nature constrains
us in all sorts of ways, but does not thereby make us want for freedom. Paraplegics
are not unfree to climb mountains, though they cannot do so. Accordingly, a first
58 Chapter 2. Weakness of Will and the Measurement of Freedom
response to my argument might be that Willy and Perseus are not in any way less
free than their female counterparts, nor does depression constrain one’s freedom,
because weakness of will is a feature of one’s psychology, not a barrier to choice
imposed on us by others.
As stated, this claim is surely too strongly put. True, in my previous examples,
weakness of will seems to act as an internal constraint. But weakness of will can
arise through many different processes, some of which have their origin in the
deliberate behaviour of others, and in those cases it looks much more like an
external constraint. Suppose I tempt an addict by waving bags of cocaine under
their nose, thereby triggering their addictive desires and making it exceedingly
difficult for them to go on about their business as they had planned; is it I, or
defective brain chemistry, that constrains our addict’s ability to stay clean? Or
suppose I am a terrible boss who creates a hostile, oppressive work environment,
leading some of my employees to become so depressed that they miss days of work;
is it I, or my employee’s own unfortunate but natural tendency to depression, that
now binds them to their beds?
In cases like these, I act like a polluter: I am introducing temptations and
sources of cognitive stress into the social environment, triggering difficultly resisted
compulsions in others who, but for my behaviour, would be considerably more
capable to do what they wanted to. This is not so different from how, by poisoning
the soil with heavy metals, industrial waste dumping impedes our freedom to build
houses, grow crops, raise farm animals, or procure drinking water. These acts of
pollution clearly interfere with the decisions of others, and constrain what they
may do.
In fact, we can quickly construct much more chilling scenarios than ones in-
volving pollution. Imagine, for instance, that a megacorporation uses sublimi-
nal messaging or highly aggressive advertising and propaganda to manufacture
addiction-like desires in us, which it then triggers at its convenience to manipulate
our behaviour, in contravention to our better judgements and resolutions. These
desires may well be resistible, with enough strength of will, but it is clear that
the corporation is interfering with our choices, curtailing our freedom. But what
is remarkable in this case is that the corporation is controlling us by exploiting
our susceptibility to weakness of will. This and the pollution scenario reveal that
even if one insists that the only genuine constraints on freedom are those imposed
on us by others, one must concede that there are cases in which weakness of will
(and related motivational defects like depression and compulsion) are constraints
imposed on us by others. Thus, at least in those cases, the proponent of negative
freedom must care about how weakness of will constrains our freedom, and what
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my treatment of this question shows is that they must give up bivalence.
Finally, it isn’t clear that the distinction between internal constraints and ex-
ternal constraints is well-formed. Suppose I fall into a pit trap and cannot get
out. My freedom is curtailed in this case, but is this because I face the external
constraint that the pit was dug too deep, or because I face the internal constraint
that I cannot jump high enough? Likewise, is the constraint Willy faces purely an
internal one? He only struggles to be resolute, after all, because he’s tempted by
his friends’ decision to go out to the pub. It looks as though whenever a person
is unfree to do something, this is always due to the joint impact of internal and
external factors. Thus external factors, in particular, cannot on their own prevent
anyone from doing anything; they require the cooperation of internal factors. This
makes it difficult to articulate a coherent picture on which one is free to φ just in
case there are no “external constraints” on one’s φ-ing. For this reason, I submit it
is better to side with Sen, and accept that you are free to φ just in case you can,
in fact, φ.
This isn’t to deny that there is a morally salient difference between the situation
of a person who is barred from attending university by the State because she is
a woman, and the situation of a person who simply can’t afford tuition. But the
difference, I think, is that one is a worse form of unfreedom than the other, not
that one is a case of unfreedom and the other a case of something else. Likewise, to
take an example from Kramer (2003, p. 367), it is much worse to be unable to walk
more than a hundred meters because one has been assaulted than to be unable
to walk more than a hundred meters because of a disability. There is a relevant
contrast between these two cases. But as Sen (2009, p. 306) emphasizes, there is
already a morally salient contrast between being capable of doing something and
being incapable of doing it. It is this second contrast which is of greatest interest
to us when we aim at a measure of freedom: we want to know how capable people
are. And with this in mind, the problem posed by weakness of will becomes
particularly salient, as weakness of will does constrain individuals’ capabilities,
however it arises.
2.3.2 The value of options
Of course, one might accept everything I’ve just said, but contest my explanation
of how weakness of will constrains individual freedom. Numerous theorists have
defended what Carter (1999, p. 170) refers to as a “value-based” account of freedom,
according which one’s degree of freedom is determined, in some robust way, by
the value of one’s options; accordingly, a critic might object that the real reason
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weakness of will constrains individual freedom is that it somehow impairs the value
of one’s opportunity set.
Sen (1990c), Arneson (1985), and Crocker (1980), and others have argued that,
all else being equal, an individual has more freedom of choice than another if their
options are better. “Better” can be interpreted either subjectively, as reflecting the
individual’s own preferences or value judgments, or objectively, as reflecting some
impartial assessment of how good the options are. As we saw earlier, Taylor deems
you freer than I if you can pursue the aims you desire to desire and I cannot, so his
is a subjective interpretation. Sen (1990), similarly, argues that if you and I both
only have one option, but you like the one you have and I do not like mine, then
you must be seen to enjoy a greater degree of freedom. In contrast, Raz (1988,
p. 409) takes a more objective view, arguing that (“positive”) freedom is expanded
by whatever expands autonomy, which is expanded in proportion to (among other
things) the diversity of options which one has and which allow one to develop all
of one’s mental and physical abilities Raz (1988, p. 376).
In any case, if one is going to rely on preferences or value judgments to (par-
tially) determine the degree of freedom offered by a set of options, then it becomes
necessary to specify options in terms of all the features that are relevant to our
assessment of these options, and here it might be argued that the way in which I
specified the options in section 3 was incomplete. I alleged that Willy and Regina
both have the same work options, but in fact (so the objection goes) the options
available to Regina are: “work on problem sets without exerting willpower,” “work
on essay without exerting willpower”, etc., while the options available to Willy:
“struggle to overcome temptation and work on problem sets”, “struggle to over-
come temptation and work on essay,” etc. Accordingly, when Willy’s friends leave
town, it’s not that options which were previously available became more accessi-
ble, it’s rather that the options “struggle to x,” “struggle to y”, “struggle to z ” were
replaced with the options “do x without struggle,” “do y without struggle,” “do z
without struggle.”
Redescription on its own doesn’t get us very far, since Willy and Regina still
have equally many options to choose from,4 which seem equally diverse, and it
4This may seem surprising at first glance: Willy cannot do x, y, or z without struggling,
whereas Regina can, so doesn’t it follow that she disposes of more options than Willy? But
notice that just as Willy can’t do x, y, z, without struggling, Regina can’t choose to struggle-to-
do-x, y, z – she can only choose to do x, y, or z without struggling, since there’s nothing for her
to struggle against – whereas Willy can choose to struggle-to-do-x, y, z. It’s not as though, being
strong-willed, she can choose between doing x without struggle and doing x by struggling. If it
requires no effort of you to turn down a friend’s offer of a cigarette, you can’t make yourself have
to struggle to turn it down. So both Willy and Regina have a choice of exactly three options,
differing only in how strenuous an effort of will they require in order to be carried out.
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seems rationally permissible for both Will and Regina to choose any of their avail-
able options. However, once options are appropriately redescribed in this way, the
following explanation for why Willy is less free than Regina becomes available:
it is not that his options are less accessible to him than Regina’s are to her, but
rather more simply that her options are preferable, insofar as they require less of
a struggle. Similar explanations are available for Perseus and Cassandra, and for
our depressed patient. What addiction and depression do to a person is not to
make certain courses of action less accessible to them, but merely to make cer-
tain courses of action altogether impossible without struggle and torturous effort.
Thus bivalence is saved: options are either available or they are not, full stop,
and weakness of will only impacts our freedom by making our options more-or-less
valuable.
There are two reasons why it would be a mistake to pursue this strategy. Firstly,
tying the degree of an individual’s freedom this tightly to the value of their options
risks eliding the distinction between the amount of freedom one has, and the value
of that freedom to us. This is a contrast worth preserving, because in order to have
a clear-eyed view of what trade-offs we are making in weighing freedom against
other values, it pays to have a measure of freedom that does not make one’s degree
of freedom dependent on the extent to which it promotes other values, with which
it may compete.5 The value of one’s options of course matters – greatly, in fact
– but having more freedom isn’t primarily a matter of achieving better outcomes,
it’s a matter of being more capable of doing, having, being, and becoming things
which we have (at least minimal) reason to value.
Accordingly, when confronting the case of Willy and Regina, the critical ques-
tion is not which of the two has the better options, or who achieves the most
desirable outcomes, but which of the two is most capable of achieving ends that
one might have reason to value. I claim Regina to be more capable. She is the
one who has the most control over what she ultimately does: if she judges that
deadlines don’t really matter, she can choose to go out, but if she judges that she
ought to solve problem sets, or resolves to do so, she is capable of reliably enforcing
her judgements and commitments. My approach gives us a way of asserting that
5Note that the ranking rule mentioned in section 2 according to which an option only con-
tributes to your freedom if at least some rational person could prefer it to its available alternatives,
while obviously not entirely value-neutral, nonetheless preserves this distinction. This view al-
lows an option to count as freedom-expanding even if no one actually prefers it, and it explicitly
denies that, all else being equal, having better options makes you freer: an individual with three
terrific option is exactly as free as an individual with three middling options (or even three bad
options), provided any of the three middling options could be rationally preferred to the other
two. Accordingly, this ranking rule would fail to imply that Willy is less free than Regina (see
footnote 3), unless one accepts my proposal to reject bivalence.
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Regina is freer than Willy without committing ourselves to any judgement regard-
ing the value of their options, and this is an attractive feature of the approach.
Secondly, even if we do accept the value-based view, it is at most a partial story,
because options are not necessarily worse if they are more effortful. Some people
may find that there is great value in having to struggle to get what they want, and
that having easy choices cheapens the value of what is obtained; they may place
greater value on certain options precisely because they require more willpower.
Nietzsche (1968, TI, 92), for instance, reserves high praise for those individuals
locked in a constant struggle to overcome themselves and their limitations:
“That one has become more indifferent to hardship, toil, privation, even
to life. The man who has become free... spurns the contemptible sort
of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women,
Englishmen and other democrats. The free man is a warrior... One
would have to seek the highest type of free man where the greatest
resistance is constantly being overcome.”
Willy, likewise, perhaps because he is an avid student of Nietzsche, may spurn
the ease with which Regina goes through life, never prey to her passions or expe-
riencing the pain of self-struggle, and he may thus prefer his own more effortful
opportunity set. Indeed, Willy may object to any paternalistic intervention that
would remove temptation from his sight, arguing that it would rob him of his
struggle, of his chance to triumph over himself. Still I insist that he and individ-
uals like him are, in at least one respect, less free to choose than they would be
if they were not required to recruit any willpower in order to choose any of their
actions: when Willy reaches out to choose to do what he has resolved to, he is
likelier to find his reach too short, and choose otherwise in the end. Whatever the
impact of an option’s effortfulness on that option’s desirability, there is in any case
a separate impact on how much freedom this leaves one with.
2.3.3 Conjunctively possible courses of action
Finally, a critic might object that my analysis misunderstands the mechanics of
weakness of will, as they are revealed to us by the experimental literature. More
precisely, it might be argued that weakness of will ought not be understood as
a probabilistic constraint on one’s ability to carry out certain courses of action
conditional on intending to carry them out, but rather as a ruling out of certain
classes of conjunctive options.
What the ego depletion experiments purportedly reveal is that if one uses one’s
willpower in one period to resist temptation, then it becomes much less likely that
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one will resist temptation in the next period; one possible interpretation of these
findings is that one is fundamentally limited in how much motivation one can
recruit over a given period of time, with some being more limited than others. So
suppose I believe I ought to do x and y, but that I am in addition also very strongly
tempted to do z, and that the timeframe in which these options are performable is
limited in such a way that I can only perform two of x, y, and z in sequence; doing
what I think I ought (and have resolved to do) means not doing what I really most
want to do. If I have the will to overcome this temptation, then my opportunity
set is {(x, y), (x, z), (y, z), (y, x), (z, x), (z, y)}, but if performing x and y (in any
order) requires me to recruit more motivation than I am actually capable of, then
in fact my opportunity set is {(x, z), (y, z), (z, x), (z, y)}.
If we now return to the Willy and Regina scenario, then, on this view, the
correct explanation for why Willy is less free than Regina is that since Willy
is weaker willed than Regina, there is less motivation that he is able to recruit
over any given period of time than she is. His “willpower budget” over a given
time horizon is smaller. And therefore, if he recruits the motivation to resist
temptation on one night, he will have less willpower left to “spend” going forward
than Regina, meaning that some possible courses of action which would be open to
her (counterfactually, at least) would not be open to him. In this way, bivalence is
saved: weakness doesn’t make options less accessible, it just makes some options
unavailable.
In reply to this objection, I would point out that the idea of a literal willpower
budget can only be meaningful on the resource model of willpower. On the at-
tentional myopia model, cases like Willy’s and Regina’s break down in purely
probabilistic terms: being more-or-less skilled at recruiting motivation by refocus-
ing one’s attentions just is a matter of being more likely to act on one’s resolutions
and to follow one’s better judgement. If the resource model turns out not be em-
pirically adequate, then this “budget constraint” idea cannot explain why Willy
appears to be less free than Regina. My proposal, however, is compatible with
any substantive view of willpower. After all, it’s worth reminding ourselves that
whether or not they reveal the existence of a literal willpower budget, ego deple-
tion experiments certainly suggest that depleting one’s willpower reserves makes
it less likely that one will succeed in being resolute going forward.
Perhaps it will be replied here that if one isn’t guaranteed to succeed in carrying
out a particular course of action, then one isn’t free to carry it out at all, but only
free to try to carry it out. On this proposal, the only difference between Willy and
Regina is that one is likelier to carry out courses of action that they are both free
to try to carry out. It would follow that Regina really isn’t freer than Willy to do
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anything. Weakness of will can only make a difference to how free people are if it
makes a difference to how many courses of action they can be guaranteed to carry
out if they try.
This would be a very radical reply. Only necessary propositions have a proba-
bility 1 of being true, and there is simply no course of action which it is necessarily
true that we would succeed in carrying out if we tried. It would follow, on this
reply, that none of us is free to do anything, only to try to do things. But anyone
can try to do anything: I can try to flap my arms and fly to the seventh moon of
Jupiter, and so can you. Are we all equally free then? This would be an unfor-
tunate conclusion. Rather than admit to this, I suggest we simply accept Berlin’s
view that our freedom depends both on how many possibilities are open to us,
and on how easy or difficult these possibilities are to actualize – and I propose to
explicate the sense in which possibilities can be easier or harder to actualize in
terms of conditional probabilities, which requires giving up bivalence.
2.4 Fuzzy Freedom
I now present my view on how freedom of choice should be measured. There
is actually a simple way of capturing the idea that options may be more-or-less
accessible to an agent, and this is to represent opportunity sets as so-called “fuzzy
sets,” where the membership of an element in the set is not bivalent. I show below
that this will allow us to generalize the models canvassed in section 1 so that they
yield the intuitively correct rankings in the problem cases laid out in section 2.
But first, some definitions. I define an opportunity set as a pair (X,m), where
X is the set of all possible options, assumed finite, andm is a membership function,
which assigns a value (called a membership grade) of between 0 and 1 to every
element in X. Z∗ shall denote the (classic) set of all such pairs. For any set A, µA
denotes the membership function of A, and A’s cardinality (noted |A|) is just the
sum of the membership grades of all its elements. Now, ∀x ∈ X, x is called:
Fully accessible in the (fuzzy) set A if µA(x) = 1
Not available in the (fuzzy) set A if µA(x) = 0
Partially accessible in the (fuzzy) set A if 0 < µA(x) < 1
Representing opportunity sets as fuzzy sets is extremely natural as an extension
of the approaches discussed in section 1. The concept of a fuzzy set is simply a
generalisation of the concept of a set – classic sets are degenerate fuzzy sets in which
all elements are assumed to have a membership grade of either 1 or 0. Fuzzy sets
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retain the concept of cardinality, and all classic set operators have fuzzy analogues;
the only difference is that the device of fuzzy sets allows us to explicitly represent
the idea that options admit of degrees of availability. Intuitively, this is just what
membership grades denote.
It’s an attractive feature of this approach that we are free to interpret the
membership grades in different (not necessarily competing) ways. For example,
we can interpret them as denoting distances from possible worlds: the larger an
option’s membership grade, the further away the nearest possible world in which
it isn’t available. This interpretation would fit republican or independence-based
conceptions of freedom, such as those defended by Pettit (2001) and List and
Valentini (2016), according to which an individual is free to φ if and only if there
is a robust absence of externally imposed constraints on their φ-ing (i.e., the nearest
possible world in which constraints are imposed is quite distant). Following my
arguments in section 2, however, I propose to interpret membership grades as
conditional probabilities. In other words, I interpret m(x) as the chance that an
agent can successfully choose x if they intend to.
Obviously, the value of m(x) will depend on several factors; agents always face
particular constraints (physical and mental limitations, poverty, lack of skills or
education, geographic isolation, coercion, etc.) that simply rule out particular
options, and as we saw earlier there are other factors which conspire to make
options less accessible (whether these options require the recruitment of motivation
to be chosen, how much motivation is required, how strong-willed the agent in
question is, what other options are available, and how salient each option is),
without ruling them out entirely. Accordingly, a set’s membership function is
actually an n-argument function, where each of the n arguments denotes one factor
that impacts option accessibility.
Note that the value of an option’s membership grade need not track very closely
how effortful it is to choose that option: if you are iron-willed, and you always
succeed in choosing as you resolve to or as you judge you ought, even when faced
with such temptation as requires strenuous effort from you to resist, then my
approach might count all your options as fully accessible. This seems right: if
you can always overcome temptation when you want to, then temptation is no
constraint upon your freedom. You may prefer to be rid of temptation, but then
being exposed to temptation simply means that the level of welfare you achieve
is lower than it might otherwise have been, not that you are any less capable of
doing, being, or choosing anything. Likewise, if you are incredibly weak-willed,
and abandon your resolutions as soon as it becomes hard to maintain them, then
the membership grade of some of your options will be very low. Again, this seems
66 Chapter 2. Weakness of Will and the Measurement of Freedom
right.
Observe also that while it is the problem of weakness of will that motivates my
proposal, my framework is perfectly general. It imposes no constraint on the list of
factors that can be included as arguments of a set’s membership function, nor does
it require the inclusion of any particular factor, and it allows for flexibility in the
way that we can represent the impact of these factors that we do include on people’s
freedom. Notably, my framework permits us to include external constraints among
the arguments of a set’s membership function, and to represent the effect of these
constraints as that of merely diminishing the accessibility of an option. Remember
that because standard approaches to the measurement of freedom assume bivalence
in set membership, it is impossible for a constraint upon one’s freedom to be a
constraint unless it entirely rules out certain options. But consider the following
case devised by Garnett (2007, p. 438): you wake up in a room, and you find the
door is locked by a padlock whose combination you don’t know. Is the option to
leave the room available to you? Intuitively, it’s hard to say: on the one hand, all
you need to do to get out is put in the right combination, but on the other hand,
if all you can do is guess at possible combinations it looks like you may never get
out. My account deals with this case rather elegantly: the option to get out is
available to you, but not very accessible, because, conditional on your intending
to put in the right combination (whatever it is) and get out, the chance that you
will do so is vanishingly small. And naturally, if you are somehow able to narrow
down the list of possible combinations, then my analysis implies that your freedom
has just increased substantially, since the chance that you will get out soon, given
that you intend to, has just increased.
This analysis of probabilistic external constraints is interestingly distinct from
other analyses that have been proposed. Carter (1999, p. 191) also argues that
a measure of freedom must incorporate probabilistic judgments in some way, but
his proposal is that we make an individual’s freedom increasing in their expected
number of options. The expected number of options available to an individual is
simply the sum of all possible options, discounted by the unconditional probability
of there being an externally imposed preventing condition on the option which
makes it fully unavailable. Importantly, this proposal retains bivalence, in that for
any option x and any opportunity set A, either x is fully in A or x is not in A,
it’s just that there’s some uncertainty over which A will in fact be yours. This
proposal has substantively different implications than mine, for the simple reason
that the presence or absence of a preventing condition on my φ−ing need not be
probabilistically independent of my intention to φ.
Imagine that I have a sworn enemy who is a mind-reader, and who will attempt
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to prevent me from carrying out whatever intention he reads in me. In that case,
the conditional probability that there will be a constraint on my φ-ing, given that
I intend to φ, will be much higher than the conditional probability that there will
be a constraint on my φ-ing, given that I don’t intend to φ. So there being a
constraint on my φ−ing is not probabilistically independent of my intending to
φ. In this situation, for any φ, the chance that I will do φ, given that I intend
to, will be very low, since there is in that case a high chance of a preventing
condition. In contrast, for any φ, the unconditional probability of there being a
preventing condition on my φ-ing may be quite low, since my enemy won’t bother
to impose constraints on my φ−ing if they don’t discern in me any intention to
φ. It’s only if I intend to φ that the chance of there being a constraint on my
φ-ing increases. Carter’s proposal would imply in this case that I enjoy a good
deal of freedom, almost as much, in fact, as if I had no enemy bent on thwarting
my will; my proposal, however, implies that I enjoy very little freedom, in the
sense that anyone with a very small number of fully available options would enjoy
greater freedom than I. And this, in fact, seems right. So not only is my analysis
of probabilistic external constraints different than Carter’s, it has more plausible
implications.6
Most importantly, however, my framework also allows us to refine the standard
ranking rules surveyed in section 1 in ways that are sensitive to the heterogeneity in
the capacity of individuals to carry out their choices. To see this, just suppose that
in the case of Willy and Regina, all four of Regina’s options are fully accessible,
but Willy only has one fully accessible option (going out to drink) and his three
work options are only partially accessible. Let % be defined over Z∗, the fuzzy
analogue to the simple cardinality rule now tells us that for any two opportunity
sets A and B belonging to Z∗, A % B just in case |A| ≥ |B|.
Let A,B denote, respectively, Regina and Willy’s opportunity sets. Whereas
the simple cardinality rule would tell us that A ∼ B, since Willy and Regina
both have four options available, the fuzzy cardinality rule tells us that A  B,
because |A| = 4 > |B| > 1. And if we assume that by depriving Willy from the
choice to go out drinking, we increase the membership grade of his three work
6Matthew Kramer (2003, p. 175) also argues that the ascription to an agent of the freedom
to φ must carry “a probabilistic qualification” indicating what the chances are that the agent
will enjoy that freedom, however he nowhere states explicitly how chances are to be interpreted,
or what form exactly the qualification is to have, so he is difficult to locate in this conversation.
That said, since he is a proponent of pure negative freedom, like Carter, and believes that one
is unfree to φ just in case other agents impose preventing conditions on one’s φ-ing that make it
impossible for one to φ, I feel it is fair to impute to him the same view as Carter regarding how
the uncertainty of there being constraints on one’s actions should affect the measure of one’s
freedom. To the extent, then, that Kramer and Carter agree with each other, my view is also in
disagreement with Kramer’s.
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options, the fuzzy cardinality rule tells us that Willy’s freedom increases provided
that the change in the sum of the membership grades of the three work options
is greater than 1. This rule will also rank Cassandra’s opportunity set as offering
strictly more freedom than Perseus’s. Thus the fuzzy cardinality rule generates
more intuitively correct rankings than the simple cardinality rule.
Any other ranking rule can similarly be generalized to an ranking rule over
Z∗. It is easy, for instance, to incorporate a minimal desirability constraint on the
formula above, by stipulatively assigning a membership grade of 0 to any option
which fails to satisfy the desirability constraint. Considerations of similarity can be
incorporated in similar fashion. A extremely simple proposal might run as follows:
instead of counting how many (minimally desirable) options in an opportunity
set, we could count how many (minimally desirable) option types there are, and
identify the membership grade of each option type with the membership grade of
the most accessible option token of that type.
There is much to be said in favour of my proposal, then, to represent oppor-
tunity sets as fuzzy sets. It is a natural generalization of the existing approaches
to the measurement of freedom, but the great advantage of this approach is that
is allows us to take account of the fact that options may be more-or-less accessi-
ble. As demonstrated, it allows us to reach more accurate measures of individual
freedom.
2.5 Application
One of the main motivations for developing a measure of freedom is that the
concept of freedom is central to many debates in political philosophy and public
policy. In this section, I briefly explore how one might try to use my framework
to generate new insights into old questions by applying it to the ethics of nudge.
Nudging consists in changing the way in which choices are presented to people
so as to induce them into making choices that are better for them, or that are
thought to be better for society. Crucially, nudges operate by exploiting people’s
reflexive choice habits, their unconscious, irrational tendencies to choose in partic-
ular ways when choices are presented to them one way rather than another (Bovens
2009). No steps are taken to remove any options from individuals, nor to impose
any burdens on individuals who rationally choose the behaviors we are aiming to
discourage, nor to provide them with new information that might cause them to
consciously revise their behaviours (though nudging may supplement information
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campaigns).7
The no-burden requirement is a bit ambiguous, but what Thaler and Sunstein
(2003), for example, have in mind is that we shouldn’t make it more expensive or
more time-consuming to engage in the sort of behaviour we’re trying to discourage,
because this would make it impossible for individuals to engage in it and spend
this money or time on other things. In a way, then, the no-burden requirement
can be interpreted as re-emphasizing the crucial point that nudges must not make
any previously available option unavailable, where options are conceived here, as
before, as conjunctively possible courses of action.
A paradigm case of nudging is save more tomorrow, which was a program
proposed by Thaler and Benartzi (2003) to increase employee’s contributions to
their 401(k) retirement plans. Under this plan, employees were asked some time
before receiving their next pay raise whether or not they wanted they wanted
to commit this raise to their pension plan, as opposed to being asked once they
received their raise. This plan tends to greatly increase savings rates: in the first
company to participate, savings went from 3.5% to 11.6%. As Bovens (2009)
explains, save more tomorrow exploits two design flaws in human psychology:
first, the endowment effect. People find it harder to part with what they already
have than with what they don’t yet have. Second, people find it harder to resist
temptation than to make provisions for the future so that they aren’t tempted
at all. Employees do remain, of course, free to choose either way. So, although
nudging is paternalistic, to the extent that we are attempting to guide people’s
behaviour in ways that we judge to be best for them, Thaler and Sunstein (2003)
argue that it is a benign, “libertarian” form of paternalism, because it does not
reduce the available range of choices.
Thaler and Sunstein’s argument has proven controversial. Hausman and Welch
(2010), argue that the “libertarian” credentials of nudges are dubious, because
though nudges do not remove options, they may undermine individual control
over their choices and evaluations, by making individuals act in ways that reflect
the social engineer’s designs, not the individual’s. Bovens (2009, p. 218), likewise,
though he supports some nudges, is more circumspect than Thaler and Sunstein,
arguing that nudging is problematic if it aims to make us choose in ways that are
not in line with our actual preferences. He gives the example that society may be
better off if I am nudged not to place an additional fishing boat in already over-
fished waters, but that I may be worse off for being so nudged. This case raises
some concerns, he believes, because we are being nudged to choose in ways that
7Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and Sunstein (2019) actually count providing individuals with
information as nudging them, but Bovens (2009) and Hausman and Welch (2010) argue that this
is a mistake.
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are aberrant, out of touch with our overall judgements of what is in our interest
Bovens (2009, p. 213). In contrast, he argues that nudge is much less worrisome if
it brings our agency into better alignment with our preferences; notably, in cases
where we are limited by ignorance, weakness of will (I will come back to this in
a minute), status quo bias, or some irrational queasiness from making the choice
that best fits our preferences, nudge may induce us to choose in the way that, on
reflection, we judge is best.
My framework offers a rather new perspective on this debate. As I will show, it
is not in general true that nudge doesn’t affect the degree of individuals’ freedom.
In particular, it is certainly false to claim that nudging never reduces individual
freedom. More surprisingly, however, my framework implies that in some cases,
nudge may actually expand individual freedom. Indeed, the most attractive nudges
will be those that do expand individual freedom.
Consider first Thaler and Sunstein’s response to the objection that nudging is
paternalistic. If the main reason that paternalism is objectionable is that it curtails
the freedom of individuals against their consent (Arneson, 1980), then it won’t do
to point out that nudge does not restrict the range of choices available to agents: as
we’ve seen, this is no guarantee that nudging does not restrict individual freedom.
Consider, for instance, the “Don’t mess with Texas” campaign, which aimed to
reduce littering by saturating road signs and advertisements in radio and in print
with the phrase “don’t mess with Texas,” often featuring popular celebrities like
Stevie Ray Vaughan in their ads to drive the slogan home. As Hausman and
Welch (2010, p. 134) point out, although the campaign was informational (it ran
and continues to run educational campaigns to teach Texans about the harms
of littering), its central slogan and messaging “attempted to create a machismo
image for those who don’t litter,” in essence exploiting Texans’ self-image to make
them want to not litter. As any standard model of behaviour in the economics of
identity (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000a) would predict, the effect of successfully
portraying some behaviour as being prescribed by individuals’ conception of their
identity will be to generate a desire to engage in it.8 This desire, of course, may
run contrary to one’s better judgment or to one’s resolutions, and for this reason
it may diminish one’s freedom of choice if motivation needs to be recruited to
overcome it.9
What this example shows is that Thaler and Sunstein’s “no substantial burden”
8More precisely, in Akerlof and Kranton’s terms, individuals will suffer a loss of identity-
related utility if they behave against the behavioural prescriptions which they take to follow
from having the identity they ascribe to themselves – e.g., “real Texans don’t litter.”
9Perhaps this example isn’t so troubling, as the aim was only to reduce littering, but suppose
instead it had been to induce Texans to mass-purchase useless and expensive consumer goods.
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requirement does not suffice to guarantee that nudging does not restrict freedom.
Rather, two conditions must be met: (1) that no option be ruled out, nor (2) be
made less accessible. These conditions are not met in the case of the “don’t mess
with Texas” campaign. But if both these conditions are met, then my approach to
the measurement of freedom implies that individual freedom is not restricted by
nudging.10 The charge of paternalism thus loses some of its sting, as Thaler and
Sunstein claim, though in fewer cases than they hoped.
More surprisingly though, and more interestingly, my framework implies that
in some cases nudging may actually expand individual freedom. Here again we
turn to cases of weakness of will. In save more tomorrow, the reason individuals
are more prudent if asked before rather than after receiving their raise is that at
tafter they are exposed to a source temptation (i.e., the check in their hands), but
not at tbefore, and so they more competently manage their spending decisions at
tbefore. The nudge, in this case, consists in nothing more than removing a source of
temptation from decision-makers by changing the time at which they must make
their decision, thus making the option to save their next raise towards retirement
more accessible, without in the interim making it any harder for them to spend
their money in other ways or changing how they may choose to spend it. In
this case, a fuzzied cardinality-based ranking implies that nudging will expand
individual freedom of choice, and this should take the sting out of the charge of
paternalism. Given, then, that nudges which are limited to removing sources of
temptation increase individual freedom, these will be the most attractive sorts of
nudges.11
I should note that I am not the first to argue that nudge may expand freedom
in cases of weakness of will. Sunstein (2019, p. 63) also defends this claim. How-
ever, on his view, it is because nudges allow individuals to achieve outcomes they
prefer that they may expand individual freedom. Plainly, this explanation com-
mits Sunstein to a strongly value-laden measure of freedom. Being free, Sunstein
tells us, is (in part) a matter of actually achieving preferred outcomes. What is
distinctive about my claim is precisely that it is couched in a value-neutral account
10In some cases, nudging might decrease the accessibility of some options and yet also increase
the availability of others; for instance, by making unhealthy food choices in a cafeteria less salient,
I may reduce the force of temptation they exert on dieters, but obviously this will increase the
salience of healthy food items, and if people have an irrational tendency to pick the most salient
options, this could decrease the accessibility of the unhealthy options. In this case, the overall
effect on freedom could be a wash, though strictly speaking (2) is not satisfied. We can perhaps
reformulate it as the condition that no option be made less accessible without compensating
increases in the accessibility of other options.
11A potentially more chilling implication of my approach is that subliminal messaging could
also be freedom-enhancing, if the subliminal messages were designed to manufacture desires that
helped us overcome weakness of will. Perhaps implanting in people a desire to be resolute would
make them better at resisting temptation.
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of what it means to be more-or-less free to pursue a given course of action. And
this, I submit, makes my conclusion more surprising than Sunstein’s: it is not news
that exploiting certain features of people’s psychology may make them better off
– that much was already clear from examples like save more tomorrow – but it is
somewhat surprising that this could make them more capable agents.
In sum, by looking at the ethics of nudge through the lens of my framework,
we are better able to judge when nudging is compatible with freedom. More could
be said by looking at additional cases, but I hope this brief discussion has shown
why my framework might be of interest in particular cases.
Summary
Cases of weakness of will reveal that measuring individual freedom requires us
to take account of the heterogeneity in the accessibility of options. Because the
assumption of bivalence is baked into extant measures of freedom, they lack the
machinery with which to take this heterogeneity seriously. Thus, otherwise attrac-
tive ranking principles generate bizarre rankings in cases where weakness of will
gets involved.
My proposal resolves this problem. Representing opportunity sets as fuzzy
sets allows us to model the fact that option accessibility admits of degrees. And
in redefining the domain of the “offers at least as much freedom as” relation to
the set of all “fuzzied” opportunity sets, we can generalize the standard models so
as to both preserve what is attractive about our preferred ranking rules, and also
generate the intuitively correct rankings in the problem cases involving weakness
of will. This framework has the advantage of being at once more precise in its
treatment how weakness of will constrains human freedom than other accounts,
while remaining perfectly general, providing an attractive analysis of constraints
that applies equally well to internal constraints as to external ones. Finally, this
framework’s appeal also lies in its potential for new insights into other problems, as
illustrated in the case of the ethics of nudge, and as we will see in the next chapter,
where I apply this framework to define measures of freedom that are sensitive to
how robust one’s opportunities are to counterfactual interventions.
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Fuzzying Modal Conceptions of
Freedom
In The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen (2009, p. 306) draws our attention to twodifferent contrasts in relation to individual freedom. First, there is the contrast
between being capable of doing something, and being incapable of doing it. This is
the contrast which Sen’s capability approach aims to capture, and he illustrates it
by comparing the situation of a disabled person, Alice, who needs help to perform
various tasks but has no one to help her, say, because local gangs scare off aid
workers from coming to the neighbourhood (case 1), with that of Alice’s situation
when there are no gangs and some local charity or social security program organizes
caregivers to help her do what she could not previously do (case 2). Second, there
is the contrast between being independent of the will of others, meaning that
others could not hinder one’s purposes if they tried, and being dependent on their
will, in which case they could. This is the contrast which the republican model
of freedom aims to capture (Pettit, 2012), and Sen illustrates it by comparing
Alice’s situation in the previous two cases with Alice’s situation in a case where
she employs well-remunerated servants who obey her commands (because they are
dependent on her) and allow her to do what she wants to (case 3).
Importantly, according to Sen, the capability approach does not register any
difference in the second and third cases – in both cases Alice can do what she
previously could not – but neither does the republican model register any difference
in the first and second – in neither case is Alice independent, since she can be
hindered by the will of others (and in fact is, in the first case). Since both models
of freedom generate inconsistent assessments of who has more freedom than whom,
much debate has taken place over which offers the best conception of freedom. Sen
(2009, pp. 307-308), however, invites us to see both approaches as complimentary
rather than competing. Both approaches capture one contrast that is central to
how we think about freedom, and are blind to another. Freedom is an inescapably
plural concept, and it is not desirable to reduce it to one unitary interpretation.
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Sen’s insight invites the following inference: if it is undesirable to impoverish
our concept of freedom by limiting ourselves to a single interpretation, it should
likewise be undesirable to impoverish the measure of freedom by insisting on a
single measure. I argued in Chapter 2 that opportunity sets should be represented
as so-called “fuzzy” sets, and I hinted that the membership grades which define set
membership in fuzzy set theory might admit of two different interpretations, one
probabilistic, and another modal. Having treated the probabilistic interpretation
in Chapter 2, in this Chapter I explore the modal interpretation, and I argue that
it provides an attractive measure of republican freedom – indeed, it provides an
attractive way of measuring freedom on any view of freedom which takes modal
considerations seriously, and this is a class of views which also includes freedom-
as-independence, and even some interpretations of the liberal view of freedom.
My plan is as follows. In section 1, I lay out the republican model of freedom
in greater detail, contrasting it briefly with the liberal and independence models,
and show how modal considerations matter on all three of these views. In section
2, I leverage a Lewisian account of counterfactual semantics to construct a (par-
tially) cardinal measure of distance over possible worlds – this is, to my knowledge,
the first such measure ever proposed – and I show that this measure allows us to
construct a further measure of how robustly available an option is. This second
measure gives a meaningful modal interpretation to membership grades, and this
allows us to define measures of freedom that helpfully characterize the commit-
ments of modality-sensitive conceptions of freedom. This is, to my knowledge,
the first modality-sensitive measure of freedom, and therefore the first measure to
capture republican concerns. In section 3, finally, I reflect on the contrast between
the measures developed here and those developed in Chapter 2, and concludes that
Sen is right to insist on the plurality of freedom.
3.1 Republicanism and Independentism
Pettit (1997) introduces the republican conception of freedom as the view that
freedom consists in being undominated. Someone dominates another, according
to Pettit (1997, p. 52), when they have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in
their choices. Accordingly, one is free to the extent that others cannot arbitrarily
interfere in our choices (through physical coercion, threats of violence, blackmail,
manipulation, etc.). This conception of freedom has three essential features.
First, it is negative, in the sense that it considers that one is free to φ just in
case there is an absence of constraints imposed by others on one’s φ-ing. Second,
the conception of constraints at issue here is a modal one. For Pettit, it is not
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enough that no one actually interfere arbitrarily with our choices – they must not
even have the possibility of doing so. The absence of constraints on our φ-ing must
be robust. List and Valentini (2016, p. 1048) helpfully clarify this requirement:
“[F]or an agent to be free to do [φ], the following must be true: for each
possible world w within a sufficiently large class of worlds accessible
from the actual world, there exists some possible world w′, accessible
from w, in which the agent does [φ]. It is important to emphasize the
double modality here: the possibility of doing [φ] must exist not only
in the actual world, but for each world w within a relevant class of
worlds accessible from the actual world.”
The classic example of a person who is not robustly free in the sense required here
is that of a slave with a kind, non-interfering master. The master, we can suppose,
lets the slave do what they will, does not force them to do any work, and even
gives them an allowance – think Dr. King Schultz from Django Unchained, who
buys Django and keeps him as a slave just long enough to track down the Brittle
Brothers, but who pays Django for his service, does not force him to do anything
against his will (both want to kill the Brittle brothers), and frees him afterwards,
as promised. In this context, the slave is not being interfered with, nor is he even
likely to be interfered with, but they clearly remain fettered in intolerable bondage,
since it would be the easiest thing in the world for the master to assert their power
and interfere with them at will. By merely retaining this power of absolute control,
slave owners carve unjustifiable inroads into the freedom of their victims.
It is worth noting that for Pettit, the freedom to φ presupposes the capacity to
φ, not merely the absence of constraints, but it is only the absence of constraints on
one’s φ-ing which he requires to be robust, not our capacity to φ. Thus, supposing
you can in fact φ, you count as free to φ, on Pettit’s view, just in case, in none
of the worlds within the relevant modal base, does anyone impose rob you of
this capacity. Note that this is consistent with you not having the capacity in
each of these worlds. There may be nearby worlds in which you break a leg and
thereby become unable to scale a mountain, but that in itself does not impair your
freedom in the actual world. List and Valentini don’t express any view about this
asymmetry, so I shan’t impute it to them.
Third and final, Pettit’s conception of freedom is moralized. Only the arbitrary
power to impose restrictions on others is injurious to their freedom. If, although an
official has the power to interfere with the choices of others, their use of this power
is constrained by procedures designed to take account of the interests of the target
of the restrictions, then the restrictions they impose do not count as freedom-
restricting (Pettit, 1997, p. 55). This is the crucial point of contrast between
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Pettit’s republican model of freedom and List and Valentini’s independence model
of freedom, which is non-moralized, and holds more simply that one is free to φ
just in case there is a robust absence of constraints on our φ-ing.
List and Valentini (2016, p. 1049) argue that we should not moralize our notion
of constraint, because it is an important desideratum of a conception of freedom
that it pick out those constraints (either actual or possible) which stand in need
of justification. Authority and power are not self-justifying, even if they are them-
selves subject to procedural constraints and exercised with an eye to the interest
of those who are subject to them. The independence model of freedom recognizes
this, and marks all forms of power and authority as sources of unfreedom. In a
way, List and Valentini suggest that freedom works as a kind of conceptual alarm-
system: observing that, say, a policy or an institution infringes upon individual
freedom (or would infringe upon it if implemented) should serve to give us pause,
force us to scrutinize the reasons that speak against or in favour of said policy or
institution, etc. The republican conception of freedom, by refusing to count justi-
fied constraints as constraints at all, builds too much into its analysis of freedom
from the get-go to serve this important alarm-system function.
The heavy emphasis on robustness that is common to both republican and
independence conceptions is supposed to be what sets them apart from the more
classical liberal conception of freedom defended, most prominently, by Steiner,
Carter, and Kramer. As we’ve seen, the liberal view holds that you’re free to φ
just in case there are no actual constraints on your φ-ing; if someone can easily
impose constraints on your φ-ing, but doesn’t, this isn’t supposed to constrain
your freedom. And this is borne out by Carter’s measure of freedom, which is an
increasing function of the ratio of the expected number of acts you can perform to
the expected sum of the number of acts you can perform and the number of acts
you are prevented from performing. This measure trivially implies that a slave
with a kind master enjoys as much freedom as a free person, provided the master
is unlikely to interfere; this shows why, according to List and Valentini, the liberal
conception of freedom is inadequate.
And yet, at the same time, Steiner, Carter, and Kramer all evince a concern
for so-called “subjunctive” constraints. That is, they all concur that if there are
currently no preventing constraints on your φ-ing, but there would be preventing
constraints on your φ-ing if you attempted to φ, then you aren’t free to φ. But
note that this concern for counterfactually dependent constraints isn’t captured
by their measures of freedom. Carter’s measure of freedom depends on expecta-
tions, not conditional expectations: options are discounted by the unconditional
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probability of being unavailable, not their conditional probability of being unavail-
able, given that you intend to exercise them. And as we saw in the last chapter,
the unconditional probability of there being preventing constraints on my φ-ing
might be very low, even if the conditional probability that I would be unable to
φ were I to attempt to φ is very high. In these situations, Carter’s measure im-
plies I enjoy considerable freedom to φ, but this flies in the face of the concern for
counterfactually dependent constraints.
One way of capturing this concern is in the way I did last chapter, where we
essentially “discount” your freedom to φ by the conditional probability that you
will fail to φ, given that you intend to φ. But another way of capturing the concern
for subjunctive constraints is through a weak modal safety condition: you are free
to φ if and only if you can φ (i.e., the option to φ is available) and, moreover, this
isn’t simply by complete chance, e.g., by mere dint of the fact you don’t happen
to want to φ. Thus being free to φ requires that φ-ing remains an available option
in nearby worlds. This would amount to accepting List and Valentini’s definition
of what it is to be free to φ, but making the modal requirement very weak, thus
preserving a contrast with republican and independentist views, which typically
impose very strong modal safety constraints. This is a non-standard interpretation
of the liberal conception, but one which captures an avowed concern of liberals that
is not captured by their own measures.
In sum, modal considerations are salient on a broad range of major views on the
nature of freedom. Therefore, a measure of freedom that is sensitive to modality
seems necessary if one wishes to carry out a sensible comparison of who enjoys
more freedom than whom.
3.2 Modality and freedom
3.2.1 The distance between possible worlds
Before we can define a modality-sensitive measure of freedom, we first need a
measure of robustness. List and Valentini explain what it is for an option to
be robustly available, simpliciter, or fully robustly available: it is for it to be
available in every world within some sufficient distance d from the actual world.
But presumably, if an option isn’t available in every world that is within d of
the actual world, it will nonetheless be more robustly available the further away
from the actual world is the nearest possible world in which it isn’t available. To
validate the claim that some option is more robustly available than another, we
need some way of assessing the distance of possible worlds from the actual world.
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In many cases, these assessments are intuitive enough. To come back to the
issue of the slave and the non-interfering master, it’s clear that although the master
may allow the slave to φ, the world would not have to be very different for the
slave to be unable to φ – the master could simply change their mind – and this is
what allows us to say that the slave is not robustly free to φ. And again, it’s worth
remembering that while the master might not be likely to change his mind, it would
be easy for him, and this is why the slave is not robustly free to φ: it’s too easy for
someone to prevent them from φ-ing; their ability to φ is not resilient to changes
in the world. In contrast, if we consider a citizen of a robust liberal democracy
currently engaged in a protest movement, it’s clear that the world would have had
to be quite different for this citizen to have been unable to protest the government.
So the world in which the free citizen is interfered with is more distant from the
actual world than the world in which the slave is interfered with. In fact, the
nearest world in which the free citizen is censored seems much more distant from
the actual world than the world in which the slave is interfered with. Our intuitions
in this case are so sharp that they suggest a cardinal notion of “distance between
possible worlds.” In other cases, it’s less clear which is the nearest possible world:
is the world in which Bernie Sanders won the 2015 democratic primary and then
beat Donald Trump closer or farther away from the actual world than the world
in which Bernie won the primary but lost the general election?
The seminal treatment on assessing the distance of a world from the actual
world comes from Lewis’s (1979) account of similarity between possible worlds.
Following Stalnaker (1968), Lewis invokes the concept of similarity between worlds
in order to validate counterfactual statements. According to Lewis, counterfactual
propositions of the form “ if A were the case, then B would be the case” (denoted
A −→ B) are true if and only if there is some possible world in which A and
B are both the case which is more similar to the actual world than any world in
which A was the case but B failed to be the case. Thus, according to Lewis, the
counterfactual “if Nixon had pressed the button, then there would have been a
nuclear war” is true because there is a world in which Nixon pressed the button
and there was nuclear war which is more similar to the actual world than any
world in which Nixon pressed the button but no nuclear war ensued (Lewis 1979:
465).
This analysis is intuitive: when we reason counterfactually, we ask ourselves
what we would expect to have happened, given our knowledge of the laws and
other background conditions, had some counterfactual event occurred. In effect,
we’re asking ourselves what the world would look like if we changed the least
about it that was necessary for it to have been the case that the counterfactual
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event occurred. And indeed, if you think that C would have occurred had A been
the case, but you learn that in fact B would have occurred instead, what you’ve
learned is that the world is different from how you thought it was.1
What determines the similarity order? Lewis’s answer to this question is much
more controversial than his truth conditions (see e.g., Slote, 1978; Edgington, 1978;
Wasserman, 2006; Kment, 2006), and boils down to the degree to which two worlds
agree on laws and facts.2 Thankfully, we don’t need to get into the weeds of what
determines the similarity ordering, since most of Lewis’s critics don’t disagree
that some considerations do determine a (partial) similarity ordering. What is
important for our purposes is that if Lewis’s analysis of counterfactuals is on the
money, then we can construct a (partially) cardinal distance measure of possible
worlds from the actual world representing their degrees of dissimilarity, meaning
that not only can we rank possible worlds according to how distant they are from
the actual world, but we can also rank differences in distance from the actual world.
The full procedure is described and illustrated in appendix A; I only summarize
the main results here.
The basic idea is that since true counterfactuals are validated by facts about
which worlds are more similar than which to which others, we can infer, from
the (infinitely large) body of true counterfactuals, a preorder D on the set W of
possible worlds, ranking possible worlds by dissimilarity from the actual world wa,
and a preorder DD on W ×W , ranking pairs of worlds by their difference in dis-
similarity. The existence of this quaternary relation follows from the semantics of
embedded counterfactuals (see appendix), and the demonstration of its existence
is significant, metaphysically, because it expresses cardinal relations of world sim-
ilarity. This should come as a surprise to metaphysicists, who have generally held
that world-distance is (at best) ordinal (Morreau, 2004). We can therefore define a
1A study by Stanley, Stewart, and Brigard (2017) attests to the intuitive character of this
analysis, strongly suggesting that judgements of comparative world-similarity play a large role in
judgements of plausibility in counterfactual simulations. I should note that Stalnaker’s analysis of
counterfactuals, which also invokes the concept of world-similarity, gives counterfactuals different
truth-conditions, and some philosophers prefer Stalnaker’s, but I am focusing on Lewis here
because his analysis has been more influential. This is innocent enough: the argument I run with
Lewis’s truth-conditions could equally be run with Stalnaker’s.
2In the Nixon example, although we haven’t had a nuclear war – and in this respect the actual
world is more similar to the world in which Nixon’s button-pressing didn’t cause a nuclear war
– for Nixon’s pressing the button to have failed to cause nuclear war, widespread violations of
natural law would have had to occur (the missiles were magically filled with confetti instead
of nuclear payloads, the launch system suffered a mysterious malfunction...). Moreover, Lewis
goes on to explain, although the series of events that would have followed a nuclear strike would
be quite different from the series of events that actually took place, the series of events that
would have taken place had Nixon pressed the button but failed to launch a war would also have
diverged, if only slightly, from the actual series of events (he would have left digital prints on the
button, the click of the button would have been preserved on tape, his thought process would
not have been the same, etc.), barring further, gratuitous violations of natural law.
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distance function d :W → R representing both relations, and, if we set d(wa) = 0,
then d is unique up to positive affine transformations. Our function d has as many
arguments as there are dimensions of similarity, so if there are n dimension, W is
isomorphic to the n-dimensional Euclidean space En.
I should confess that the construction described in the appendix assumes that
D and DD are both complete, that is, that there is a unique, fully determinate
similarity order to be inferred from the body of true counterfactuals. This would
not sit well with most metaphysicists. World-similarity is notoriously vague, due
to the context-dependence of counterfactual semantics: as Lewis points out, there
are ways of filling in the details of counterfactuals that might make it true that if
Caesar had led the U.S. side in the Korean war, he would have used nukes, but
other ways of filling in the details that make it false. Lewis’s analysis thus implies
different rankings of similarity and differences in similarity between possible worlds
under different resolutions of the underlying vagueness. Each of these possible
rankings would be complete, but on pain of arbitrariness in our choice of similarity
relations, and therefore in our choice of distance function, a possible world w can
only be unambiguously more dissimilar from the actual world than some possible
world w′ if every admissible dissimilarity relation agrees on it. Therefore, world-
distance can only be measured by a family D = {d1, d2, ...} of distance functions,
each unique up to positive affine transformations.3
3.2.2 Another fuzzy proposal
We can now turn to defining a modality-sensitive measure of freedom. Following
List and Valentini’s definition, let’s assume that if an option is available in every
world within a sufficiently large neighbourhood of the actual world, then it is
maximally robustly available. More precisely, let N be a convex subset of W with
a least upper bound, meaning that there is a world w such that any world further
out from the actual world than w does not belong to N , and assume that if some
world w belongs to N , then any other possible world w′ which is not further away
from the actual world than w also belongs to N . We then say that if an option
3This holds even on an epistemicist theory of vagueness (Williamson, 1992). According to
epistemicism, all predicates, including modal predicates like “would’ve used nukes,” actually do
draw sharp boundaries, and their apparent vagueness is due only to our own (unimprovable)
ignorance of where exactly their extension lies. Epistemicism implies that actually counterfactu-
als aren’t really vague, and therefore there are unique relations D and DD. Nonetheless, under
epistemicism, we can’t know what the unique relations are, we only know that they are members
of some more-or-less large family of possible relations, each of which is consistent with what we
do know about counterfactual facts. Or in other words, we only know that w1 is, say, at least
three times further from the actual world than w2 if every admissible distance function agrees
with this assessment.
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is available to an agent in every world within N , then the option is maximally
robustly available to the individual. If, in contrast, the option is not available in
the actual world, then it is minimally robustly available. Finally, if an option is
available in the actual world, but not in every world in N , let us assume that the
degree of robustness with which it is available is linear in the distance from the
actual world of the nearest possible world in which it isn’t available any longer.
This last requirement is not obligatory: an alternative would require that ro-
bustness be linear in the measure of the largest connected set S ⊆ N that only
includes the actual world and worlds in which the option is available. In other
words, in the representation of W as a euclidean space, S is the largest geometric
shape you can draw around the actual world that includes only worlds in which
the option is available, and the measure of this set is its n-dimensional area.
I am unsure which of these two alternative formulations is best; the first fits the
intuition that an option is more robustly available the larger the minimal change
you would have to make to the world to make it unavailable – i.e., the harder it is
to render it unavailable – while the second fits the intuition that an option is more
robustly available the more ways there are of changing the world without making
the option unavailable – i.e., the more resilient your option is to perturbations in
the way the world is. Both formulations capture something important about our
intuitions regarding robustness, but they disagree.
The second interpretation has one significant advantage, which is that it squarely
avoids a problem raised by Carter and Shnayderman (2019) for modality-sensitive
measures of freedom: there is always, say Carter and Shnayderman, a very nearby
but highly unlikely world in which you are killed and are thereby robbed of all
freedom, thus if we measure robustness by the distance from the actual world of
the nearest possible world where some option isn’t available, then it turns out all
our options are equally unrobustly available, which is a pathological result for a
modally-sensitive measure of freedom. On the second interpretation, this problem
doesn’t arise, because even if there is a very nearby world in which neither x nor
y are available, the largest connected set of worlds (including the actual world) in
which x is available might still be very large, and (much) larger than the largest
connected set of worlds (including the actual world) in which y is available.
Of course, Carter’s worry only applies with full force to List and Valentini’s
unmoralized conception of freedom; one could also deal with the objection by
defaulting back to a republican view and saying that it’s not the nearest possi-
ble world that matters, but the nearest possible world where someone arbitrar-
ily/uncontrollably/unconstitutionally robs you of some option. In this case, the
first interpretation offers a perfectly workable measure of robustness for republican
82 Chapter 3. Fuzzying Modal Conceptions of Freedom
applications. So perhaps the first interpretation works best for republicans, and
the second for independentists, who cannot draw on the arbitrariness criterion, and
who anyway were the target of Carter’s objection. For simplicitly, I will assume
the first interpretation, but nothing in what follows hangs on this choice.
From here, as in 2, I define an opportunity set as a fuzzy set; that is, as a pair
(X,m) where X is the set of all possible options, and m denotes a membership
function that assigns a membership grade of between 0 and 1 to every element in
X, in this case denoting the element in question’s degree of robustness. Thus a
membership grade of 0 indicates that the option is not available in the actual world,
a membership grade of 1 indicates that the option is available in every possible
world belonging to N , and a membership grade of n : 0 < n < 1 indicates that
the ratio of the distance d(w) of the nearest possible world w in which the option
isn’t available to the least upper bound of N is n. Since distance between possible
worlds is cardinally measurable (along any particular membership function) and
the “zero-one” I’ve used to calibrate the measure of robustness preserves interval
differences, differences in membership grades respect differences in distances of
possible worlds from the actual world. Z is the (classic) set of all opportunity sets.
Because there are many admissible measures of distance between possible
worlds, there are accordingly, for any set A ∈ Z, many admissible membership
functions. Let MA = {µA1, µA2, ...} be the family of admissible membership func-
tions for A. With respect to any membership function µAi ∈ MA, the cardinality
of A is
∑
x∈X µAi(x). Finally, let % denote a binary, transitive, reflexive, and
nonsymmetric relation on Z, interpreted as the “offers at least as much freedom as
relation,” with and∼ denoting its asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively.
It may be asked why robustness is here defined with respect to some bounded
space N rather than the whole space W of possible worlds. Quite simply, it is
because robustness is bounded, but distances between worlds are not: there is a
limit to how robustly available an option can be – a limit that is reached if it is
available in every possible world – but there is no limit to how far from the actual
world a possible world can be. And unfortunately, if there is no limit to how far a
possible world can be, one cannot simultaneously require that the robustness with
which an option is available increase linearly in the distance from the actual world
of the nearest possible world in which it is not available and that there be a limit to
how robustly an option can be available. But we need both assumptions to define
membership grades that cardinally represent robustness. We could consistently
require that an option be maximally available if and only if it is available in every
world in W , and that robustness increase in the distance of the nearest possible
world in which options aren’t available, but then membership grades can only
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ordinally represent robustness of availability. Note that in this case |A| ≥ |B| if
and only if µAi(x) ≥ µAi for all x ∈ X and all µAi ∈ MA, µBi ∈ MB. So we’re
left picking our regret: either sacrifice generality for precision of measurement, or
insist on maximum generality and settle for ordinal measurements of robustness.
I have opted for the first route. This is not entirely for reasons of convenience.
There may be independent reasons for wanting to restrict the “size” of the neigh-
bourhood in which robustness is assessed. List and Valentini already emphasize in
their definition that the possible worlds with respect to which we assess robustness
have to be “accessible from the actual world.” The thought seems to be that it
only matters that an option isn’t available to you in some other possible world
if that world could be or could have been brought about by someone’s voluntary
actions or by natural chance, and in a way that doesn’t contravene natural law. It
doesn’t matter to your assessment of your freedom, for example, that the option
not to go to church isn’t available to you in a possible world where a malevolent
deity forces you to go to church. Robustness of availability is only an interesting
concept insofar as it enables us to compare how well feasible alternative social ar-
rangements protect individual freedom, so it is quite natural to restrict the space of
possible worlds with respect to which robustness is assessed to those worlds which
are “accessible” from ours. And it is fairly natural to think that there is a limit
to how different from the actual world a possible world could be while remaining
accessible from it.
With these preliminaries in hand, we can at last define modality-sensitive mea-
sures of freedom. For illustrative purposes, I’ll allow myself two simplifying as-
sumptions, to be suspended shortly: first, that individual freedom is increasing in
the number of options that are actually available. Second, that individual freedom
is linearly increasing in the robustness with which one’s options are available – so,
in particular, I’m assuming that an increase of r in one option’s membership grade
is “compensated for” by a decrease of r in another option’s membership grade. In
other words, I’m assuming that the amount of freedom offered by opportunity sets
is increasing in their cardinality. Of course, we don’t want the ranking that %
induces over Z to depend on arbitrary choices of membership functions for each
opportunity set, so I will further assume that A outranks B if and only if A out-
ranks B under any admissible choice of membership function for either A or B.
The modality-sensitive analogue to Pattanaik and Xu’s (1990) simple cardinality
rule thus states that for all A,B ∈ Z, and for all µA ∈MA, µB ∈MB:
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There are, naturally, many ways of refining this rule. If we drop my first sim-
plifying assumption, we can embed a concern for the desirability or the diversity of
options in the specification of %. More interesting for the present context though,
is that if we drop my second simplifying assumption, we can require that the degree
of freedom offered by an opportunity set be strictly increasing and concave over
the membership grade of its elements, as opposed to linearly increasing. Thus,
increases in the robustness with which options are available would matter more
the less robustly available the options were to begin with.
One could go on, but the basic idea is, I hope, clear enough: under any plausible
conception of freedom that is sensitive to modal considerations, individual freedom
will depend (in some way) on how many options are available to the individual,
and on how robustly these options are available. And representing opportunity
sets as fuzzy sets offers attractive ways of modelling this dependence. There are
very important and instructive contrasts, however, between the robustness-based
definition I’ve offered here of membership grades, and the probabilistic definition
I offered in 2 – contrasts which validate Sen’s assertion that freedom is an in-
escapably plural concept. So it is worth discussing some of these contrasts, and
this is the task to which I now turn.
3.3 Modal or probabilistic fuzziness?
The most obvious advantage of defining membership grades modally, as repre-
senting the distance of the nearest possible world in which some course of action
isn’t available to the individual, rather than probabilistically, as representing the
chance that the individual would perform the course of action in question if they
intended to, is that the modal definition captures the sorts of intuitions motivat-
ing the independence conception of freedom, whereas the probabilistic definition
cannot. The chance that a slave with a kind, non-interfering master would φ, con-
ditional on the slave’s intending to φ, need be no different from the chance that a
free person would φ, conditional on their intending to φ. Thus a probabilistic def-
inition of membership grades is unable to register the important contrast between
the slave’s situation and the free person’s situation.
However, under a modal definition, since the nearest possible world in which it
is impossible for the slave to φ is much nearer to the actual world than the nearest
possible world in which it is impossible for the free person to φ, the membership
grade of the slave’s option to φ will be much closer to 0 than the membership
grade of the free person’s option to φ. If this holds generally across the options
that are available to each, then the fuzzy cardinality of the slave’s opportunity
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set is well inferior to the cardinality of the free person’s opportunity set, thus the
simple modal cardinality rule would trivially rate the free person as freer than the
slave.
Likewise, to come back to Sen’s original example, the probabilistic definition
may indeed fail to capture any interesting contrast between Alice’s situation when
she is dependent on the goodwill of others to do what she wants, and Alice’s
situation where she employs well-paid helpers, and has the means to employ other
helpers should hers decide to leave. Provided the people Alice is dependent on
really are committed to helping her and likely won’t drop her on a whim, the
probability that Alice would successfully carry out whatever courses of action she
might intend need not vary across these situations. The modal definition, however,
does register the important contrast between Alice’s dependence in the first case,
and her independence in the second: if Alice can only φ with the aid of helpers,
then much more would have to go wrong with the world for Alice to be unable to φ
even though she has the means to afford help (market mechanisms would have to
fail in an impressive way, or some elaborate conspiracy would have to be at play)
than would have to go wrong with the world for Alice to be unable to φ when she
is dependent on charity for help (however unlikely it is, gangs reappearing or a
whim on the part of the helpers is all it would take).
Perhaps more surprisingly, some measures of freedom-as-independence – for
example the simple cardinality rule – also succeed in capturing the contrast to
which Sen alleged that modal conceptions of freedom are blind. An option that
is available to you in the actual world is more robustly available to you than an
option that is not available to you in the actual world, for the simple reason that
if x is actually available to you, then the nearest possible world in which it isn’t
available must be at some distance from the actual world. Accordingly, under
any measure of freedom-as-independence, the membership grades of options that
are in fact available will be greater than the membership grades of options that
are not at all available. Thus, such measures of freedom will register a difference
between Alice’s degree of freedom in the case where she has no one to help her, and
Alice’s degree of freedom in the case where she is dependent on the help of others.
The probabilistic definition also registers a difference here, of course, but it is a
uniquely attractive feature of the modal definition that it recovers our intuitive
sense that Alice’s freedom expands continually as we move through all three of
Sen’s cases.
The attractions are not all one-sided, however. A major motivation in the
previous chapter for going probabilistic on the measure of freedom was that doing
so allows us to represent the fact that available options may admit of degrees
86 Chapter 3. Fuzzying Modal Conceptions of Freedom
in accessibility. If you and I can both φ, but, conditional on my intending to
φ, I am likelier to φ than you are, conditional on your intending to φ, then,
I argued, the option to φ is less accessible to you than to me, and you must
accordingly be judged less free than I am to φ. The probabilistic definition of
membership grades guarantees this judgement. But, obviously, if membership
grades are interpreted modally, then the contrast between your situation and mine
washes out: the nearest possible world in which some option isn’t available to me
may be as distant from the actual world as the nearest possible world in which that
option also isn’t available to you. The trouble is that for every possible world in
which the option is available to the both of us (and notably in the actual world),
it is less accessible to you – but this fact cannot be represented here since no
information about probabilities is embedded in the measure of robustness. Under
the modal definition, therefore, the membership grade of my option to φ is the
same as the membership grade of your option to φ.
A second and deeper problem for the modal definition is that it violates INS,
the indifference between no-choice situations, which, recall, requires that any two
singleton opportunity sets offer equally little freedom. Intuitively, if you and I are
both free to do only one thing, if we both have no choice about what to do and
are simply forced to do the only thing we can do, we must enjoy equally little
freedom. Under the fuzzy set-theoretic representation of opportunity sets, this
condition requires that if only one element in the universe X receives a non-null
membership grade, then we are both equally (un)free. The probabilistic definition
of membership grades satisfies this constraint, because if x is the only option that
receives a non-null membership grade, its membership grade is necessarily 1: if x is
the only thing you can do, then the probability you will do x is necessarily 1 (and a
fortiori the probability you will do x conditional on your intending to do x is also
1). However, on the modal definition, the membership grade of x is not necessarily
1, or any constant value: even if x is the only thing you can actually do, there may
be possible worlds where you cannot do x (but can do other things instead) and
this world may be more distant from the actual world than the nearest world in
which I cannot do the only thing which I can currently do. Carter and Kramer’s
measure of freedom violates INS as well, so this cannot be taken as a knock-down
objection against a modality-sensitive measure of freedom, but it is a serious cost
to pay.
Finally, there is the more practical difficulty that rules for ranking opportunity
sets which, under a probabilistic definition, induced a complete order over Z, are
not guaranteed to induce a complete ordering over Z under a modal definition.
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Under the probabilistic definition of membership grades, there is only one admis-
sible choice of membership function for any opportunity set, for the simple reason
that chances are sharp: the probability that I will φ, conditional on my intending
to φ, has a definite value. Thus, in ranking opportunity sets by their cardinality
(or by some other rule suitably sensitized to diversity or quality considerations),
% orders Z by the real numbers, which is a complete order. But since there are
multiple admissible choices of membership grades for any opportunity set under
a modal definition, and we must require that % rank A over B just in case A
outranks B under every admissible choice of membership function, a cardinality-
based ranking rule will not induce a complete order over Z if there is even a single
pair of sets A,B ∈ Z such that |A| > |B| under one choice of µA, µB and |B| > |B|
under a different choice of µA, µB. An unacknowledged cost, then, of sensitizing
our conception of freedom to modal considerations, is that our measure of freedom
loses precision. This problem becomes particularly acute if we interpret robustness
ordinally, for then one can only say that one opportunity set offers more freedom
than another if, with respect to every admissible membership grade, it strictly
dominates the other, and this is bound to be an extremely rare occurrence.
Summary
Lewis’s analysis of counterfactuals and the framework of fuzzy set theory per-
mit important breakthroughs in the measurement of freedom. Lewis’s framework
makes talk of the robustness with which options are available well-founded, as
well as epistemically tractable. Fuzzy set theory offers us a natural language in
which to express the commitments of modality-sensitive conceptions of freedom,
by allowing us to define rankings over sets of options that are appropriately sensi-
tive to how many options are available to individuals and how robustly available
these are. Seeing as no one has ever before proposed either a cardinal measure of
distance on the set of possible worlds or a measure of republican freedom, I take
these to be the chapter’s main contribution.
As for the question of whether the independence conception or the capability
conception of freedom is the correct conception of freedom, it seems Sen still gets
the last laugh. Although modality-sensitive measures of freedom turn out to be
more powerful than he suggested, being capable of capturing all relevant changes in
A’s situation throughout Sen’s three examples, they remain blind to another con-
sideration which is highly salient in comparative assessments of freedom, namely,
how capable people are of doing the things they can do. Meanwhile, alternate
measures of freedom which are sensitive to this consideration are in turn blind to
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the modal dimension of assessment of individual freedom. And no single measure





In the previous two chapters, we have been exclusively focused on the questionof how to measure freedom. So far we’ve seen that the extent of a person’s
freedom seems to depend on how many options they have, how accessible they
are, and how robust they are. This chapter aims to conclude our exploration
of what determines a person’s freedom, by considering how the quality and the
diversity of our options bear on the extent of our freedom. By the end, I hope to
arrive at a tentative final statement of what, I think, makes a person more-or-less
free. However, this chapter also marks an inflection point in the narrative of our
exploration, as in the course of discussing the role of option quality and diversity on
the measurement of freedom, we will be brought to consider what makes freedom
valuable, in the first place. And this will become our new topic of concern for the
next two chapters.
It is a vexed subject for both philosophers and economists as to whether the
quality of one’s options affects how much freedom of choice they offer. Numer-
ous philosophers in the liberal tradition (e.g., Carter, 1999; Kramer, 2003; Hurka,
2011; Bader, 2018) exclude quality considerations from their measures of freedom.
These authors are often motivated by the conviction that restrictions on individ-
ual freedom should be justifiable to those individuals in terms that presuppose no
contentious moral judgements. In contrast, others have argued that one is freer
when the options one has are better, in the sense of being preferred by the indi-
vidual, or reasonably preferable by someone similarly situated (e.g., Taylor, 1985;
Sen, 1990c; Pattanaik and Xu, 1998). These authors are guided by the thought
that a person is freer the more capable she is of living the sort of life that someone
might reasonably want to live. If we compare people’s freedoms simply by counting
how many options people have, we will be unable to recover important intuitive
data; for example, everything else being equal, countries which protect important
freedoms protect freedom more than countries which do not. There is something
to both approaches, but they don’t sit well together. My aim is to develop a
view of how to measure freedom and of why freedom matters, which gives both
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intuitions their due. As a first step, I present a new way of taking account of the
quality of options when measuring freedom, based on the capacity of those options
to provide individuals with the standing to be held responsible, rather than on
anyone’s preferences. This measure, I argue, improves in key respects on existing
quality-sensitive measures of freedom.
Quality-based accounts of the measure of freedom are of two different kinds.
One view, associated with Sen (1990c), Taylor (1985), and Suppes (1987), is that
the more intensely an individual might reasonably desire some option, or the better
off they would be if they chose it, the more this option contributes to their freedom.
An obvious problem with this view is that if two individuals each have only a single
option, but one of those options is better than the other, then the person with the
better option has more freedom of choice. Thus someone with no choice could
have more freedom of choice than another!
The second view, associated with Sudgen and Jones (1982), Puppe (1996), and
Pattanaik and Xu (1998), is that an additional option has to be at least o.k. to
count as freedom-expanding; beyond that options don’t expand your freedom just
because they would make you better off if you chose them. Of these proposals,
that proposed by Jones and Sugden was most influential: they argue that if one of
your alternatives is so bad that no reasonable agent could strictly prefer it to your
remaining alternatives, then this option cannot contribute to your freedom. Any
option which could be reasonably preferred to its alternatives, however, does count
as freedom-expanding. This idea avoids the problem with Sen’s view, since options
are not increasing rewarded for being increasingly desirable, while also capturing
to some degree the intuition that expansions in freedom must be associated with
expansions in one’s ability to live lives one might want to live. Unfortunately,
this view has the absurd implication that an individual who receives an additional
option that’s so good that all reasonable persons must prefer it to its alternatives
thereby loses all their freedom.
The problems with both views are ultimately traceable to the fact they analyse
option quality in terms of preferences. The responsibility-based approach I defend
is a novel interpretation of option quality; it will allow us to construct new measures
of freedom which are positively responsive to option quality, are strictly increasing
in the number of options, and imply that any two individuals with only one option
are equally (un)free. Moreover, the measures I develop are also relatively non-
prejudicial in their value assessments.
However, I will ultimately argue that what is actually being measured when we
account for option quality in the way I propose is not the extent of people’s overall
degree of freedom, but rather the intrinsic value of freedom, i.e., the value freedom
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has in itself, over and above its value in enabling us to pursue other ends which
we happen to value for independent reasons. Indeed I will argue that my account
of option quality connects naturally with arguments for thinking that freedom is
intrinsically valuable, and consequently offers an attractive way of measuring how
intrinsically valuable each individual’s freedom is. So while I take the liberal view
that option quality considerations have no role in the measurement of freedom, I
make camp with Sen and Jones and Sugden in thinking these considerations have
a critical role in explaining why we should care about freedom as an end in itself,
and not merely as a means for helping us achieve the aims we care about.
My argument is structured as follows. After briefly motivating Jones and Sug-
den’s preference-based criterion of minimal desirability in section 1, and showing
that measures which incorporate this criterion have the troubling implication that
more options may mean less freedom, I defend in section 2 a responsibility-based
conception of option quality. I discuss two ways of incorporating this new concep-
tion of option quality in the measure of freedom: first in the form of a minimal
desirability constraint (à la Jones and Sugden), and second in a more continuous
fashion that recognizes gradations in option quality (à la Sen).
In the process of building these measures, I also present a new way of measuring
the diversity of a set of options, and fold this into my measures of freedom. Raising
the issue of diversity might seem like an unnecessary detour when quality is the
topic of the day, but it is in fact necessary to stave off a powerful objection one
could otherwise level against my proposed measure. And besides, philosophers and
economists often draw a tight connection between the diversity of one’s options
and their quality, to the point that the two concepts are often cashed out in terms
of each other, so it makes sense to comment on how diversity and quality relate
to each other on my conception of option quality. The resulting measures are
quality-sensitive, diversity-sensitive, strictly increasing in the number of available
options, non-prejudicial in their value assessments, and imply that minimal choice
implies minimal freedom.
In section 3, however, I argue that while the diversity of one’s options is relevant
to the degree of freedom they afford us, the quality of one’s options is not – this is an
unusual but consistent combination of views, given that quality considerations play
no role in the measurement of diversity as I interpret it. Consequently, my quality-
sensitive measures of freedom are best interpreted as measures of the intrinsic value
of freedom, and indeed I argue that they provide very attractive ways of measuring
the intrinsic value of freedom.
Throughout this chapter, I bracket accessibility and robustness concerns. I
therefore assume the standard setup in which we have a set X of possible options,
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and the “offers at least as much freedom as” relation, noted%, is defined over the set
Z of nonempty subsets of X. Opportunity sets are classic sets. In my concluding
remarks, however, I will attempt to bring all the considerations we’ve treated so
far together and offer some suggestions as to how they may all be combined.
4.1 Preferences and minimal desirability
Sudgen and Jones (1982) offer the following veil of ignorance type argument for
their criterion of minimal desirability: in assessing whether some additional option
is desirable or not in some situation, we should abstract from any knowledge
we might have about this particular individual’s preferences, and ask ourselves
instead what, given our general knowledge about human desires, a person similarly
situated to this individual might prefer. Through successive application of this
procedure we draw up a list of preference orders that reasonable persons in the
individual’s circumstance might have, and apply a unanimity criterion: an option
is not minimally desirable if and only if no reasonable person in this situation
could prefer it to its alternatives.
Why take this line? For a start, we may be ignorant about the individual’s
preferences, and want to avoid prejudicing the criterion of minimal desirability in
ways inimical to the individual’s actual preferences; veil-based reasoning has the
benefit of non-prejudiciality. But more importantly, as Rawls (1971, p. 223) and
Scanlon (1998) argue, there is a need in political and moral philosophy to assume
a general lack of specific knowledge about individuals’ ends, and to admit in our
deliberations as permissible any preference profile consistent with a general desire
for the sorts of things every person has a reason to value. Imposing any more
specific restrictions might license real restrictions on freedom incompatible with
the interests of persons.
There are two points to note about this criterion of minimal desirability. First,
it is opportunity set relative. In other words, there may be some x ∈ X and
some A,B ∈ Z such that x is minimally desirable in A but not in B. Second, the
notion of reasonableness invoked here is stronger than the standard Humean notion
of rationality, which is typically seen to impose only consistency constraints on
choice, but not substantive restrictions on what may be preferred to what (Bradley,
2018). Here, though, an option is reasonably preferable to its alternatives just in
case a preference for that option would be intelligible to us, and not bizarrely
unmotivated, like a general preference for avoiding pain on Tuesdays more than
pain on Wednesdays (this example is drawn from Parfit (1981); see also Anscombe,
1957; Brooome, 1999a).
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Although Jones and Sugden were the first to introduce this notion of minimal
desirability, they did not take the next logical step of devising a ranking rule over
Z which builds on this criterion. Pattanaik and Xu (1998) do, however. Define
maxA as the set of all elements in A that are ranked first by some preference order
that a reasonable person may have, then Pattanaik and Xu propose: A % B ⇐⇒
|maxA| ≥ |maxB|.
At first blush, this rule seems attractive. If no reasonable person could prefer
some options to their alternatives, you might think they’re so valueless it doesn’t
make sense to include them in the measure of freedom – it would be like counting
monopoly dollars as part of your income – and therefore what this measure says
is that you are freer than I am iff there’s more you are free to do, ignoring the
options that don’t count. Unfortunately, this rule has the odd implication that
if you start with n options, each of which could be preferred to its alternative
by some reasonable person, and you then receive some additional option which
strictly dominates it under every reasonable preference ordering, then you must
have strictly less freedom now than before. This seems wrong. Giving people
valuable new opportunities while leaving the old ones intact doesn’t make them
less free to choose what to do or how to live. It may make the choice less interesting,
insofar as if it is a no-brainer that you ought to choose x, then you don’t have to
engage any of the critical faculties of discrimination, sensitivity, and judgement
that ordinarily contribute to making the act of choice worthwhile. But it does not
follow from the fact that an expansion of the choices available to one makes choice
less interesting that it diminishes one’s freedom.1
4.2 A responsibility-based account of quality
What drives this unfortunate result is that Jones and Sugden’s criterion of minimal
desirability relativizes desirability to the opportunity set. This is not surprising,
since the standard of minimal desirability is defined in terms of preference, which
is a comparative evaluative attitude. Preferences don’t admit of good and bad
options, only better and worse ones, and so do not allow for a standard of minimal
desirability that applies across opportunity sets. But this is exactly the kind of
standard we require to avoid the pitfall of Pattanaik and Xu’s view while still
discounting “valueless” options. I propose that instead of preference, we reach for
a noncomparative evaluative attitude, such as approval, to define the standard of
minimal desirability.
1Xu and Puppe (2000) propose a different rule that ranks sets by their share of maximal
elements in their union, which solves the problem highlighted here. However, this ranking is not
in general transitive, so I will not discuss it further.
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Approval is a concept that appears in the literature on voting systems (e.g.,
Brams and Fishburn, 1978; Merrill, 1979). It is a subjective, non-comparative
evaluative attitude to the set of candidates (in our case, options) which divides it
into two subsets – that of candidates the subject approves of, and that of candidates
they disapprove of (note that one or the other subset could be empty). What
makes approval noncomparative is that whether some option meets the standard
is invariant to what alternatives it is being compared to. The standard itself,
however, may be either comparative (e.g., approve of x iff x is close enough in
value to some top possible alternative) or noncomparative (e.g., approve of x iff x
commits no injustice). It is related to preference in that what is approved of must
be preferred to what is not approved of.
I propose that an option is approval-worthy if and only if it is the sort that
always provides standing for responsibility when it is an available alternative in a
non-singleton opportunity set. Pettit and Hoekstra (2018, p. 78) argue that our
practices of holding each other responsible – in blaming wrongdoing and praising
good action – are sensitive to the number and quality of people’s options. We
hold responsible only those who had a choice about what to do, unless they were
also antecedently responsible for their lack of choice; also we don’t tend to blame
people for wronging others when their only alternative was to do something which
would have been overly costly to themselves. Whether some option is too costly
or not can depend on context: you may be excused for telling a white lie when
you stand to have your arm broken for telling the truth, but you are not excused
from murder when you stand to have your arm broken for refraining. At the
same time, some options are attractive enough in the eyes of society, or at least
so trivially costly, that they could never excuse even minor wrongs: if your only
alternative to doing x is to enjoy a pleasant all-expenses paid vacation to New
Zealand, then you can be held responsible for x-ing, no matter what x-ing is. Our
practices of holding each other responsible implicitly establish a division in the
space of options between those options which are “good enough” to always provide
standing for responsibility, and those which are not.
Observe that the existence of “good enough” options follows from the assump-
tions that (1) X is finite and that (2) an option provides standing for responsibility
if and only if, according to common standards of assessment, x is not horribly worse
than its alternatives. This is because, if we represent common standards of assess-
ment by a (not necessarily complete) weak preference relation R defined over X,
it is a consequence of the fact that X is finite that a maximal set of alternatives
X = {x ∈ X|∀y ∈ X,¬yPx} exists. No x ∈ X will ever be worse, let alone
horribly worse, than any of its alternatives, so it must always be responsibility
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conferring. Also, any option that is not horribly worse than any of the elements
in X will necessarily also count as good enough.2
The standard of approval being suggested here is of normative interest: it is
important for individuals to have the standing to be held responsible. Fitness
for responsibility is what allows us to enter into other kinds of morally valuable
relations, like friendship and contracts, and to express certain values like love and
care. Love, characteristically, can only be expressed through acts which one has
freely chosen over alternatives which are good enough that one could have been
held responsible for choosing them instead of performing the act of love. I don’t
show you love by whisking you off to a romantic getaway if I was threatened at
gunpoint to do it, but I do show you love by whisking you off to a romantic getaway
if I could have gone fishing with the guys instead. This criterion doesn’t assume
a lack of knowledge about individuals, but nor should it: it is the standing to
be held responsible in society as it actually is, not as it might be behind the veil
of ignorance, which matters to us. Moreover, note that because shared practices
of holding each other responsible presuppose common standards of assessment,
the value assessments which underpin our practices may safely be assumed to be
widely shared. Thus, if one were compelled by the thought that the extent of
freedom depends partly on the quality of the options, but wanted to remain non-
prejudicial in one’s value-assessments, a plausible view to adopt would be that
approval-worthy (interpreted here as meaning “responsibility-conferring”) options
expand individual freedom more than disapproval-worthy ones.
Having established approval as the appropriate standard, let us defineM⊂ X
as the set of all minimally desirable alternatives in X. Consider now the following
conditions on %:
(INS) Indifference between no-choice situations: ∀x, y ∈ X, {x} ∼
{y}.
(SM) Strict Monotonicity: ∀x, y ∈ X, {x, y}  {x}.
(MM) M-Monotonicity: ∀A,B ∈ Z, if |A ∩M| = 2 and |B ∩M| = 1
then A  B.
(S) Stability: ∀A,B ∈ Z, and ∀x, y ∈ X such that either x, y ∈ M or
x, y /∈M, A ∪ {x} % B ∪ {y} ⇐⇒ A % B.
(SM) is a very weak version of the principle that more choice means more
freedom – it just requires that some choice implies more freedom than no choice.
2Even if X were infinite, the existence of good enough options would be guaranteed provided
there is a least upper bound on how good an option can be, which is plausible enough.
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This applies even when one or both of the options fails to pass the standard of
approval, because even if the additional option doesn’t always give standing for
responsibility it does give you some freedom of choice. Any plausible measure of
freedom should imply (SM). (MM), meanwhile, requires that a person with two
minimally desirable alternatives has more freedom of choice than a person with a
single minimally desirable alternative, regardless of how many other options they
both have. This just encodes the key intuition behind minimal-desirability-based
measures that options which don’t pass the minimal threshold are of negligible
value.
(INS) seems like a sine qua non condition on a measure of freedom. If two
people both have no choice about what to do, then neither can be said to enjoy
more freedom than the other. Perhaps surprisingly, this condition is highly con-
tested. Notably, Steiner (1983), Carter (1999), Carter (2004), and Kramer (2003)
argue that your freedom is not merely increasing in the number of actions you can
pursue, it is also strictly decreasing in the number of actions you are physically
prevented from doing. (INS) rules this out, because if you and I are both forced to
do x, but if forcing you to do x ipso facto prevents you from performing more acts
than forcing me to do x does (e.g., because I’m disabled), then (INS) ranks us as
equally (un)free, but Steiner & co. would rate you as less free. I’m inclined to re-
gard this as a reductio against their view. An able-bodied slave and a slightly less
able-bodied slave, both forced to slave without any choice about anything, strike
me as equally unfree. The able-bodied slave may be deprived of more freedom,
but at the present time both slaves enjoy equally little freedom.
A different sort of objection to (INS) comes to us from Amartya Sen (1990c,
pp. 470-471), who argues, à la Hobbes (1994, L: 79), that a person who is forced
to do what they anyways prefer to do and would have done without compulsion
(e.g., walk home normally) is freer than someone who is forced to do what they
would rather not (e.g., walk home by hopping on one leg). However, it seems to
me that what we have here is a conception of voluntariness, not freedom. It is a
fairly plausible view of voluntariness on which an action is done voluntarily just in
case it is the act one would have done had one been free to choose to do otherwise.
But note that this view presupposes a notion of freedom on which freedom requires
actually having choice (for a defense of this view, see Oppenheim, 1981). Indeed
Sen’s own explanation crucially appeals to the fact that “I would choose to walk
given the choice.” But then I am inclined to say that in Sen’s example the subject
is not free to choose how to go home in either situation, although in the second case
she voluntarily returns home in the way she was forced to. These considerations
justify retaining (INS).
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That leaves (S), which requires that if you and I both receive an additional
option that is minimally valuable, or both receive an option that is not minimally
valuable, then I now enjoy at least as much freedom as you do just in case I already
enjoyed at least as much freedom as you did. This condition, unfortunately, is not
very attractive: if x is very dissimilar to my existing alternatives, but quite similar
to your existing alternatives, it is plausible that x makes a greater contribution
to my freedom than to yours (G A Cohen, 1978; Arneson, 1985; Sen, 1990c;
Pattanaik and Xu, 2000; Dowding and Van Hees, 2009). To see this clearly, note
that I seem to have greater freedom of choice if I have the freedom to buy any one
of ten differently-coloured but otherwise identical sedans than if I merely have the
freedom to purchase any one of ten completely identical sedans. In both cases, I
have equally many options to choose from, but intuitively I have more to choose
between in the first case than in the second, since I can choose the colour of
my car. One could, I grant, insist that while the quality of my options matters,
their diversity does not, but this would be odd because the whole motivation for
getting away from just counting how many options people have was to arrive at
a measure of freedom that recovers more intuitive data. Accordingly, the next
section develops ranking rules which are sensitive both to quality and dissimilarity
concerns, and therefore violate (S), but for now, before we add any more bells and
whistles, I think it is worth getting clear on the logic of how a ranking rule can
register concerns for minimal desirability, in isolation of other considerations. So
consider:
Theorem 4.2.1. % satisfies (INS), (SM), (MM), and (S) iff, for any two A,B ∈
Z: A  B ⇐⇒ max{1, |A ∩M|} > max{1, |B ∩M|} or (max{1, |A ∩M|} =
|max{1, |B∩M|} and |A| > |B|). And moreover A ∼ B ⇐⇒ max{1, |A∩M|} =
max{1, |B ∩M|} and |A| = |B|
The proof is in the appendix. This ranking rule orders opportunity sets via a
two-step procedure: sets are first ordered by the maximum over 1 and the number
of minimally valuable alternatives they contain. In the case of ties, they are then
ranked by the total number of options they contain. Note that if we simply ordered
opportunity sets by the number of minimally desirable alternatives they contained,
and then resolved ties by counting the number of remaining options, that (INS)
would be violated. This rule has the attractive implication that receiving an ad-
ditional option always expands your freedom. It is sensitive to the thought that
options which pass minimal standards of review expand your freedom more than
options which do not – to the point that no additional number of not-minimally
valuable options can make up for the loss of a single minimally valuable option.
It’s also a very tractable measure: all we need in order to apply it is to be able
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to distinguish between options that are always responsibility conferring and op-
tions that aren’t. These are fairly coarse-grained judgements, so less information
is needed to reach them, and we can hope they will be fairly widely shared, since,
being coarse-grained, they will be less sensitive to differences in individual dispo-
sitions to make judgements. If we can further sensitize this measure to diversity
concerns, we’ll have a decent candidate for a measure of freedom. This is the task
to which I now turn.
4.2.1 Incorporating diversity
We start with a dissimilarity function δ : X × X −→ R+ which orders pairs of
options by how dissimilar they are to each other. Possible interpretations of δ are
that it orders pairs of options by (1) how likely any given individual is to fail to
be indifferent between them, (2) how intensely any given individual is expected to
prefer one to the other, or (3) how similar the possible world in which you exercise
one option is from the possible world in which you exercise the other. Next, we
define a function d : X −→ Rn ordering all the elements in X according to how
dissimilar they are to some arbitrary x0 ∈ X, chosen as reference, along each of the
n possible dimensions of dissimilarity. Thus d associates to every possible option
an n-tuple (i.e., a row of n numbers) which define its coordinates in a Cartesian
grid of origin x0, and the only constraint we impose on d is that the euclidean
distance between any two options x, y equal δ(x, y). Thus what d gives us is really
a geometric representation of option dissimilarity, where options are represented
as points in an n-dimensional space, and spatial relations between these points
represent dissimilarity relations.
This construction makes sense if (but only if) we assume that dissimilarity is
cardinal, i.e., we can meaningfully compare magnitudes of differences in dissimi-
larity between pairs of options. This is reasonable on each of the interpretations of
d I’ve suggested. Probabilities of failing to be indifferent between any two options
are cardinally measurable. More controversially, many have argued that intensities
of preference satisfaction are as well (Adler, 2011; Greaves, 2017), and I argued
in the previous chapter that world-similarity is too (see also Krodel and Huber,
2013). Note that if we interpret dissimilarity in terms of preference, then the n di-
mensions of dissimilarity can be interpreted as the n arguments of people’s utility
functions, while if we interpret dissimilarity in terms of similarity between possi-
ble worlds, then they are naturally interpreted as the n dimensions along which
world-similarity varies.
It is worth highlighting that dissimilarity, as I am thinking of it here, is not
a qualitative concept. This is important because many philosophers, and most
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notably Garnett (2016) and Carter (1999, p. 121), argue that any assessment of
dissimilarity must be value-laden, because it must presuppose a point of view on
which differences among options matter. Not so. None of the three interpretations
of option-dissimilarity that I suggested in the previous section require evaluative
judgements. The two preferencist interpretations are grounded entirely in descrip-
tive facts about how likely individuals are to prefer one option to another, and how
intensely. These measures certainly assume a particular picture of what dissimi-
larity between options is, namely, the propensity to provoke divergent evaluative
responses. But this is a metaphysical judgement, not an evaluative one. Likewise
world-similarity, which denotes the extent to which two possible worlds “agree”
about the way things are, is determined by descriptive facts about which coun-
terfactuals are true, at least on the standard Lewisian model of counterfactual
semantics (Lewis, 1979).
We’re now in a position to propose a philosophically well-grounded diversity
function. Very roughly, we would like a measure of diversity to reward opportunity
sets for having more options, but also for “dispersing” their options more widely
over Rn. There’s an elegant way to do both. We associate to every possible option
an n-dimensional Gaussian function – i.e., a bell curve that reaches its peak at
the exact point where the option is located in Rn – and we then take the integral
over Rn of the maximum value assigned to any point by the family of Gaussian
functions.
To visualize this clearly, imagine nailing an elastic sheet over a flat surface,
and then deforming the sheet by placing narrow pegs underneath it; locally, the
sheet will reach a peak wherever we place a peg, then flatten out as we move away
from it (though without ever becoming completely flat). A single peg thus turns
our sheet into a two-dimensional bell curve. Now clearly, if you place more pegs
underneath the sheet, you deform it more. Moreover, the further you drag these
pegs away from each other, the sheet becomes less and less flat over more of its
surface, reaching multiple peaks in multiple places, and only gradually flattening
out. In this image, pegs represent the coordinates of options in Rn, and the empty
space between the sheet and the surface it’s nailed to is our integral.
We can state this all precisely. Let g : R→ R be the function g(t) = e−t2 . Fix
an integer n ≥ 1. Given z ∈ X and d(z) ∈ Rn, let gz : Rn → R be the function
gz(x) = g(‖x− d(z)‖).




max (ga1 , . . . , gak) .
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D is a novel way of measuring diversity.3 And it can be shown (see appendix)
that this diversity function satisfies the four following attractive and philosophi-
cally significant conditions.
(M) Monotonicity: if A ⊂ B then D(A) < D(B).
(D) Dispersion: for any set A and any option x ∈ A such that d(x)
does not lie within the convex hull K of A, if H is a hyperplane that
does not intersect the interior of K, then D(A∪ {x}) strictly increases
as d(x) moves away from the convex hull of A along a line that is
orthogonal to H.
(C) Continuity: if x, y are two elements inA then limd(x)−→d(y)D(A) =
D(A \ {x}).
(TI) Translation Invariance: if there is a bijection f : A→ B such
that for all x ∈ A, d(f(x)) = d(x) + c, where c is some constant vector,
then D(A) = D(B).
(M) says that each additional option you receive strictly increases the diversity
of your choices. This is attractive, since you retain all your previous options (so
your opportunities can’t well now be less diverse), but you’ve now got some new
option that differs in some way from those previously available alternatives.
(D) is a condition that rewards opportunity sets whose elements are more
dispersed over Rn. Very roughly, it requires that as you “drag” one point from
some set further and further away from the clump where the other points in the
set are located, the set of points becomes more dispersed overRn. We can visualize
this very clearly in one dimension: suppose you plot two bell curves on a graph,
both with the same variance and integral (i.e., their peak is at the same height
and the area under each curve is the same) but slightly different mean values (i.e.,
they reach their maximum at different albeit nearby points). The two bell curves
therefore overlap with each other over most of their area, which shows that their
peaks are not very dispersed over the real line. But now imagine that I “pull” the
peak of one of the two bell curves away from the other. Then the total area of
overlap between the two bell curves will diminish, and they will jointly cover a
larger area, mirroring the fact that their peaks are now more dispersed over the
real line.
3See Weitzman (1992), Pattanaik and Xu (2000), William Bossert, Pattanaik, and Xu (1992),
Baumgärtner (2006), Bervoets and Gravel (2007), Pattanaik and Xu (2008), Hees (2004), and
Nehring and Puppe (2009), for alternative approaches.
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(C) and (TI), finally, are mostly technical properties of F , but they are nonethe-
less plausible and have philosophically significant interpretations. (C) requires that
an option which differs from another alternative only to an infinitesimally small
extent can only make an infinitesimally small marginal contribution to the diver-
sity of your opportunity set. This condition is attractive for two reasons: first,
continuity is generally an attractive condition of value functions, because this is
necessary for the existence of solutions to optimization problems. If, say, we care
both about individual diversity of opportunity and individual happiness, but those
two goals compete to some extent and we have only finite resources with which
to pursue them, then, although we may disagree on the optimal allocation of re-
sources, we can at least guarantee the existence of efficient allocations if diversity
and happiness are both measurable by continuous functions. Second, it’s just
intuitive that insignificant differences between options provide only insignificant
diversity of choice. To take an example from Sugden (1992, p. 318), suppose you’re
offered a choice between one of three cans of the exact same beer on a flight, each
different from the other only by their serial number and position on the tray; you
have some diversity of choice in this situation (choosing the can on the left is not
quite the same as choosing the can on the right), but so vanishingly little one is
almost tempted to say you only really have one option before you. Contrast this
with a situation where you can choose between a can of beer, a small bottle of
wine, and water.
(TI), finally, essentially just states that if the options in A are as dissimilar,
relative to each other, as the options in B, relative to each other, then A and B
must be equally diverse. Or in other words, an option’s absolute position in Rn
has no bearing on how great a contribution it makes to the diversity of your op-
tions: only its relative position to available alternatives matters. This condition is
attractive, again, for two reasons. First, our choice of origin for d(.) was arbitrary,
but the diversity of a collection supervenes on the elements of that collection. A
measure of diversity whose assessments depended on a conventional choice of ori-
gin for d(.) would be completely pathological, as it would imply that the diversity
of a collection can change without the elements in that collection changing. Sec-
ond, diversity is a property of the relations in dissimilarity between options, not
a property of the intrinsic features of options. Thus if you change the intrinsic
properties of a set of options, but preserve all the relational properties of dissim-
ilarity, you can’t have changed the overall degree of diversity in the set. This is
most evident when we consider two singleton sets. Any option x is as similar to
itself as any other option y is similar to itself, so with no other basis for making
judgements of diversity, we’re left to conclude that {x} and {y} are necessarily
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equally (un)diverse.
D does not satisfy these conditions uniquely (one didn’t need to use Gaus-
sian functions, for instance), but it is, I believe, the first measure of diversity yet
proposed to satisfy them all. Moreover, there is an informal argument for mea-
suring diversity using D. One way of interpreting the Gaussian functions is as a
representation of substitution value. If x and y are very similar, then they must
be good substitutes for each other: if you can’t do y (e.g., eat some particular
apple) but you can do x (e.g., eat a different apple), it’s almost as if you could
do y. Notice that in this case d(x) and d(y) must be very nearby in Rn, so the
Gaussian associated with d(x) will reach a high value at d(y). In contrast, if x
and y are very dissimilar, then the Gaussian associated with d(x) will reach a very
low value at d(y), mirroring the fact that x and y are very complimentary. So
the Gaussian associated with d(x) distributes its density in a way that tracks how
good a substitute x is for other possible options. This interpretation gives us a
very natural way of thinking about diversity: a very diverse opportunity set, as
measured by D, is a set that maximizes the space of possible options for which the
options that are actually available are good substitutes. In fact, not only is this a
natural way of thinking about diversity, it helps explain why diversity matters. If
x and y are near-perfect substitutes, then having x gives one a sort of proxy access
to y, even if you don’t have y. In effect, having more diverse options is a way of
having access to more options – without actually having more options.
In sum, D is an attractive way of measuring diversity in Rn. Now consider the
following ranking rules.
(a) ∀A,B ∈ Z,A % B ⇐⇒ D(A) ≥ D(B)
(b) ∀A,B ∈ Z,A  B ⇐⇒ either max{1, D(A ∩M)} > max{1, D(B ∩
M)} or D(A∩M) = D(B∩M) and D(A) > D(B). Moreover A ∼ B ⇐⇒
D(A ∩M) = D(B ∩M) and D(A) = D(B).
Rule (a) simply states that the degree of freedom offered by opportunity sets is
increasing in the diversity between the options in that set. This rule is of interest
to anyone who wishes to sensitize their measure of freedom to dissimilarity con-
siderations, but not to option quality considerations. We’ll come back to it later.
Rule (b) is a version of our earlier rule, now sensitized to dissimilarity conditions.
Rule (b) retains all the attractions of our earlier lexical rule, while avoiding the
objection that it ignores diversity considerations in measuring individual freedom.
Therefore, if one is to incorporate a concern for option quality in the measure
of freedom, and if this concern is to be incorporated by a minimal desirability
constraint, then rule (b) is an attractive solution concept.
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4.2.2 From a lexical rule to a continuous rule
That said, one might want to incorporate qualitative constraints on the measure
of freedom yet resist the use of a lexical rule. After all, the capacity of an option to
excuse wrongdoing due to its costly character is graded, so if an option’s quality is
determined by its tendency to excuse wrongdoing, a bivalent standard like approval
is too crude a measure of quality.4 And anyway, whatever gains in tractability
applying a lexical measure may afford us, it is not plausible that options which
are guaranteed to provide standing for responsibility are lexically superior in value
to options which are not. It would imply that we should either not be willing
to pay anything for options that don’t pass minimal standards of review, or that
we should be willing to pay any price for options that do. The latter disjunct
is obviously false, and the former is also implausible: even terrible options will
provide standing for responsibility in some cases, and so would be worth paying
something for.
To address these concerns, we can try extending rule (b) to a continuous or-
der. Consider that if an option would confer responsibility to a given individual
across more possible worlds (within a class Ω of possible worlds that taken as rel-
evant to this assessment) than another alternative, then the first option is in an
obvious sense more capable of grounding standing for responsibility, and for that
reason more valuable to the individual. Now, since the set of possible worlds is
representable as a Euclidean space, we can in principle assign to sets of possible
worlds a number representing how big they are. In particular, if we impose an
upper bound on Ω, limiting our attention only to those worlds within some suffi-
cient distance from the actual world, then we can assign numbers between 0 and
1 to any subset of Ω denoting how large a share of Ω the subset occupies. Now as-
sume that an option’s quality is linearly increasing in the share of situations across
which it is responsibility-conferring (“good enough” options get a value of 1, be-
cause they’re always responsibility-conferring). Then there exists a value function
v : X −→ [0, 1] representing option quality. Now consider the following ranking
rule:
A % B ⇐⇒ (D(A)− 1) ·
∑
x∈A




Call this the continuous quality-based rule. This rule is a simple extension of
rule (b) which satisfies (INS) because D(A) − 1 = 0 whenever A is a singleton,
implies that expansions in one’s opportunities always increase our freedom, and
4Incidentally, the reasonableness of a preference order is also graded: behind some veil of
ignorance, some preference orders will seem more plausible from behind the veil as candidates
for people’s actual preferences, so the present criticism applies to Jones and Sugden’s criterion
as well.
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implies that the degree of freedom offered by an opportunity set is strictly increas-
ing in both the value of one’s choices and in their degree of diversity. Thus the
continuous quality-based rule avoids the pitfalls associated with Sen’s view, which
violates (INS), while capturing his general intuition that freedom expands with our
capacity to live lives that are of better quality (according to common standards of
assessment); it is sensitive to the fact that option quality is graded, and it implies
no implausible lexical superiorities in value.
4.3 Responsibility and the intrinsic value of free-
dom
With all that said, I will nonetheless argue in this section that option quality
considerations shouldn’t be taken into account in the measurement of freedom,
having a more useful role in measuring the value of freedom.
There is an interesting contrast between the sorts of reasons appealed to by
philosophers who argue that freedom is increasing in the dissimilarity between
one’s options, and those appealed to by philosophers who argue that freedom is
increasing in the value of one’s options.5 Both groups agree that merely counting
options is silly but, as stated earlier, the intuition behind why dissimilarity matters
is that a set of highly dissimilar options gives you more to choose between than
a more homogeneous set. Indeed, there is a quasi-literal sense in which having
more diverse options gives you more options. In contrast, the intuition behind
why quality matters is that better options enable people to live better lives – and
insofar as we care about people’s freedom, don’t we care about their freedom to live
well?6 To which the answer is obviously yes. We’re only in the game of measuring
freedom because we think it’s valuable, in both intrinsic and non-intrinsic ways.
But to show that we only care about measuring freedom because it is a valuable
thing is not to show that the measure of freedom itself should be value-laden.
And indeed, to the contrary, a good measure of freedom should only register
how extensive one’s opportunities for choice are, not how good these are. This
is because a measure of freedom ought to be neutral on the question of whether
more freedom is (in any respect) better than less. A measure of freedom that
rewards opportunity sets for enabling individuals to live better lives is not neutral
on this question. It is not a conceptual necessity that more freedom is (ceteris
paribus) better than less – I happen to think that it is, but this is a substantive,
5Of course, many defend both views simultaneously, e.g., G A Cohen, 1978, §5.4, Raz, 1988;
Sen, 1990c.
6See Raz (1988, p. 374) and Sen (1990c, p. 471).
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disputed claim; if we do not wish to speak past each other we must first agree
on a way of measuring what counts as “more” or “less” freedom that does not
prejudice the outcome of our dispute. Moreover, I share the standard liberal
attitude that our conception of freedom ought to be nonprejudicial about what
ends are worthwhile, for the familiar reasons that one’s own value judgements
may be wrong, that some disagreement about ends may be faultless, and that
restrictions on people’s freedom must be justifiable in terms acceptable to all, etc.
(see Garnett, 2016). In sum, while I think it is appropriate to sensitize one’s
measure of freedom to diversity considerations, it is inappropriate to sensitize it
to quality considerations. Rule (a), therefore, is a better measure of freedom than
the continuous quality-based rule.
Moreover, I submit that option quality considerations are simply more illumi-
natingly invoked to explain what makes freedom valuable than to explain what
makes for more or less freedom. My responsibility-based account of option quality
is well-suited to explain the intrinsic character of freedom’s value, that is, the fact
that freedom may be valuable in itself, in a way that entails that more freedom is
(ceteris paribus) better than less, and in a way that does not reduce to its instru-
mental value in enabling us to pursue further ends that we value independently.
This is in contrast to other quality-sensitive measures of freedom, such as have
been proposed by Kreps (1979), Arrow (1995), and Vallentyne (2002), which are
ill-suited to explain the intrinsic value of freedom, because they essentially reduce
the value of freedom to its expected utility, which is not necessarily increasing in
one’s freedom.
If freedom is intrinsically valuable, then more freedom is, ceteris paribus, better
than less. This implies that it is sometimes better to have a choice between some
set of options A than to simply be forced to do x, where x /∈ A and you prefer
x to any y ∈ A, because the intrinsically valuable gain in freedom will sometimes
offset the intrinsically disvaluable loss of well-being (G. Dworkin, 1982, p. 60).
Hurka (2011, pp. 142-143) persuasively defends this implication on the grounds
that in the first case, but not in the second, you are responsible for what you do
and bring about, and have a more active role in shaping your own life.7 Living
a life of one’s own making is simply a valuable component of living a good life,
valuable enough that it is worth not always getting what one wants in order to be
a person of one’s own making. Or to put things differently, freedom is intrinsically
valuable because being free is a valuable way to be. It comes with a unique moral
status: the standing to say “this is me, this is what I choose, this is how I live,
this is what I value.” Moreover, Hurka goes on, given that one is more responsible
7This is a point also emphasized by Sugden (1992) and Arrow (1995).
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for the shape of one’s life the more ways there are one could have chosen to live
it instead, it follows that that more freedom is (ceteris paribus) better – up to,
I would stress, how good additional options are at conferring on us standing for
responsibility.
This last point by Hurka, qualified in the way I propose, speaks strongly in
favour of the continuous quality-based rule as a measure of the intrinsic value of
freedom, under a responsibility-based interpretation of option quality. Interpreted
in this way, the rule states that the intrinsic value of freedom of choice is increasing
in the extent of one’s freedom, and in the capacity of one’s available options to
ground standing for responsibility, which is just a formal explication of Hurka’s
intuition. The rule also has the desirable implication that when one has minimal
freedom of choice (i.e., one’s opportunity set is a singleton) then the intrinsic value
of the freedom one enjoys is minimal, which is what you would expect on a view
like Hurka’s. If my opportunity set is a singleton, i.e., I can only do one thing,
then I’m not responsible for how my life then turns out, and I don’t enjoy the
status of a free person, i.e., one who can choose how to live according to their
will and be responsible for it. If it’s this status that is valuable, then the degree
of freedom I currently enjoy couldn’t be less intrinsically valuable. Further, this
rule in unresponsive to individual preferences over their options, which implies
that the intrinsic value of your freedom is invariant to whether you happen to
value the ends your freedom allows you to pursue. This is it as it should be: the
intrinsic value of freedom cannot depend on its instrumental value in satisfying
your desires (including your desire for more freedom or responsibility over your
life). And finally, this rule has important formal properties, such as continuity,
and the fact that it trivially induces a transitive value ordering over Z. These are
all attractive properties for a measure of the intrinsic value of freedom.
Naturally, in offering the continuous quality-based rule as a measure of the
intrinsic value of freedom, I am committing myself to the claim that freedom has
intrinsic value. Hurka’s argument notwithstanding, many philosophers balk at the
claim that it can be better to be free and not get what you want than simply to get
what you really want (G. Dworkin, 1982; Gustafsson, 2019), and so have offered
skeptical arguments in response. The most recent attempt to refute the claim that
freedom is intrinsically valuable comes from Gustafsson (2019), and so, in closing,
I think it is worth addressing his worries.
Gustafsson’s argument can be simplified as follows: if we receive additional
options which any rational person is required to strictly disprefer to their existing
alternatives (what he calls a valueless expansion), then there is no intrinsic value
in the expansion in our freedom – it is not, all else being equal, better to have those
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additional options than not to have them. Freedom is therefore not intrinsically
valuable, because if freedom is intrinsically valuable then there is intrinsic value
in every expansion in our freedom, including valueless expansions.
Gustafsson (2019, p. 10) defends this claim by imagining that the valueless
expansion happens in two steps. Suppose that you start with a single option.
In the first step, you’re to imagine you receive two additional options which are
exactly alike to the first in every respect that a rational person is permitted to
care about. So, for example, you start with an orange, and are then given a choice
between that orange or two additional oranges that are physical duplicates of the
first. After this first step, claims Gustafsson, you have not gained anything of
intrinsic value, because the new opportunities you’ve acquired don’t differ from
the starting option in a way that it is rational to care about – and if you had
gained something of intrinsic value it should at least be rationally permissible to
prefer the new situation to the old one. In the second step, you imagine each of
the two additional options being worsened in some distinct way. You now have
three options, two of which are strictly worse than the first, e.g., one of your
oranges rots and the other one dries out. The deterioration can’t have improved
the intrinsic value of your freedom of choice, says Gustafsson, because it leaves
you with as many options as before, and just makes some of your options worse
without improving any in return.
There is much to unpack in this argument. For a start, it is important to un-
derscore that Gustafsson is presupposing a non-Humean conception of rationality,
according to which there are rational requirements on the content of preferences.
There are thus some things which it is irrational to prefer to others, even if this im-
plies no inconsistency in one’s choice pattern. Gustafsson’s argument is therefore
easily resisted by insisting on Humeanism, which is the prevailing view of ratio-
nality within economics and philosophy. Humeanism also fits naturally within a
liberal worldview, since liberals are hostile to people telling others what they can or
cannot like. Carter (1999, pp. 54-99), for example, implicitly invokes Humeanism
to reject quality constraints on the measure of freedom, arguing that no one is in
a position to declare that some option just couldn’t be valued by someone, or that
some aim could not be rationally pursued. I agree. Still, I will grant Gustafsson
the conception of rationality he presupposes, and respond directly to his two-step
argument.
Both steps in this argument are dubious. After the first step, you may have
very little freedom, but you do have some: ∀x, y, z ∈ X,D{x, y, z} > 0. In some
tiny respect your life will turn out differently depending on what you choose,
and you will be responsible for this difference. Being responsible for one’s own
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life is valuable, therefore there is value (however little) in being responsible for
this tiny difference. And after the second step, your life could turn out very
differently depending on what you choose, so you are much more responsible for
how your life is lived. Gustafsson might object that if it is irrational to choose
anything other than the dominant option, you can’t claim too much responsibility
for choosing well. But this is false: people frequently make irrational decisions, e.g.,
through displays of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), or hyperbolic
discounting (see Samuelson, 1937; Ainslie, 2001), and they are responsible for
those choices as well as for the rational ones. Indeed, you might take great pride
in the fact that you’re able to avoid making these sorts of errors in judgement. Or,
contrariwise, you might revel in making choices derided as irrational just to stick
it to the rationalists. After all, as Dostoyevsky (1864, p. 33) wrote in Notes from
the Underground :
I, for instance, would not be in the least surprised if all of a sudden,
A PROPOS of nothing, in the midst of general prosperity a gentleman
with an ignoble, or rather with a reactionary and ironical, countenance
were to arise and, putting his arms akimbo, say to us all: “I say, gentle-
man, hadn’t we better kick over the whole show and scatter rationalism
to the winds, simply to send these logarithms to the devil, and to en-
able us to live once more at our own sweet foolish will!” (...) And how
do these wiseacres know that man wants a normal, a virtuous choice?
What has made them conceive that man must want a rationally advan-
tageous choice? What man wants is simply INDEPENDENT choice,
whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead. And
choice, of course, the devil only knows what choice.
Either way, and whether or not you would actually exercise it, you would value
the freedom to make irrational choices. Thus we have ample grounds for rejecting
Gustafsson’s skeptical argument against the intrinsic value of freedom.
Summary
Where have we come to? I’ve argued that the most promising kind of quality-
sensitive measure of freedom is one based on a responsibility-based account of
option quality. Of the two quality-based measures I’ve proposed, the continuous
quality-based rule is particularly attractive, though the lexical rule may have some
advantages in tractability. In the process of defending this thesis I have also
presented a new and attractive way of measuring the diversity of opportunity sets.
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Nonetheless, I’ve argued that, ultimately, we shouldn’t impose quality constraints
on the measure of freedom. Rather, these should instead be applied to the measure
of the intrinsic value of freedom. And I contend that the continuous quality-based
rule is a plausible measure of the intrinsic value of freedom of choice. This measure
connects naturally with the best argument we have for thinking that freedom is
intrinsically valuable. Rule (a), meanwhile, makes for a more plausible candidate
measure of freedom, since it is wholly non-value-laden and strictly increasing in
the number and diversity of one’s options.
The package of views that emerges from this discussion has an attractive uni-
fying power, because it resolves the question of whether quality considerations are
to bear on the measure of freedom in a way that lets everyone in the debate have
their cake and eat it too. It gives traditional liberals the victory they wanted: the
measure of freedom is insensitive to option quality. But Sen & co. suffer no harm
from this defeat, because option quality turns out to be essential to the measure
of the intrinsic value of freedom. Thus insofar as we are interested in expanding
the scope of individual freedom for its own sake – a central aim of both liberalism
and the Sen-inspired capability approach to human development – we will want to
refer to quality-sensitive measures.
****
The next chapter will pursue the investigations we’ve started here into what
makes freedom valuable, but before we turn to this, it is time, at last, to pull
together everything we’ve learned so far about the measurement of freedom. How,
ultimately, do I think freedom should be measured? Overall assessments of free-
dom depend on many things: how many options you have, how accessible these
options are, how modally robust they are, and how diverse they are. How should
one tie all these concerns together? I said in the previous chapter that we don’t
need to settle on a single measure of freedom: different measures may be appro-
priate for different contexts. I still think this is a defensible view. For example,
in aid and development contexts, it may be best to focus on how many options
people have, how diverse they are, and how accessible they are, but ignore modal
considerations. Why? Because the first aim of policy should be to make people
more capable – to expand the range of things they can do; in any case, we usually
can’t do much to make people’s freedoms more robust in development contexts,
since many development initiatives take place under autocratic regimes whose co-
operation we need to carry out our interventions, and whose very autocratic nature
makes all freedoms substantially non-robust. In contrast, if you’re interested in
constitutional reform, or if you want to know how worried you should be about
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corporate or government concentration of power, the modal considerations may be
more salient, and accessibility considerations less so.
Still, it may also be useful to have a single measure of overall freedom. And
here we can propose two adequacy conditions on how to combine rule (a) with
the two fuzzy cardinality rules considered in earlier chapters: first, (INS) must
be respected, and second, freedom must be strictly increasing in the number,
accessibility, robustness, and diversity of one’s options. So consider the triple
(A, µA, θA), where A ∈ Z is a set of available options, µa is a probabilistically
interpreted membership function that defines for A an associated fuzzy set A∗ =
(X,µA) ∈ Z∗, and θA is a modally interpreted membership function that defines
for A an associated fuzzy set A′ = (X, θA) ∈ Z∗. Both θA and µA have the property
that the elements of X∩A are the only elements to receive a non-zero membership
grade. This triple tells us what your options are, how accessible they are, and how
robust they are, which is everything we need to know to assess how much freedom
you enjoy. So I propose your “overall” degree of freedom is given by a function
f from the set of all such triples to the reals. The simplest such function which
conforms to our two desiderata is defined by:









where a, b, c are strictly positive weights reflecting how much importance you wish
to give to accessibility, robustness, and variety, relative to each other.
What this rule is telling us, essentially, is that your overall degree of freedom
is given by the degree of diversity of your options, discounted by how inaccessible
and non-robust your options are. It’s easy to verify that this rule has the desired
properties. Notice that this rule is not separable across the four factors that deter-
mine the extent of your freedom (number, diversity, accessibility, and robustness),
but this actually seems right: the extent to which an improvement in any one of
these four factors expands your freedom does not seem independent of how well
you’re doing on the other factors. An increase in the accessibility or robustness
of one option expands your freedom less if this is an option that is very similar
to many others; conversely an increase in the number or diversity of your options
can’t be seen to expand your freedom very considerably if the new options are
barely at all accessible. Tentatively, then, I am ready to proffer this rule as the
correct measure of overall individual freedom.8
8And obviously, if you add V (A)d as a fourth term in this product, we will arrive at a complete
overall measure of the intrinsic value of the individual’s freedom.
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Chapter 5
The Diagnostic Value of Freedom
Elizabeth feels conflicted. She has just been notified by email that there arecheap student tickets available to see the ballet version ofManon at the Royal
Opera House, and also tickets for a production of Rigoletto. Elizabeth knows that
she likes opera, and she knows that she likes ballet music, but she’s unsure if she
actually enjoys ballet, having never gone before. Her preferences between ballet
and opera are incomplete: she simply isn’t in a position to judge what would
make for the best use of her money. In the end, she goes to see Manon, where she
discovers that she deeply dislikes ballet. In a way, this experience was very valuable
to Elizabeth. True, she enjoyed herself less than she would have otherwise, but she
acquired valuable information. In the future, if she is ever has to make a decision
about whether to go to the opera or the ballet, she will know what she prefers. As
I will put it, Elizabeth’s choice was diagnostically valuable to her.
Elizabeth’s case is not uncommon. We frequently elect particular courses of
action not because we prefer them to their alternatives, but because we hope to
learn something about our own dispositions, tastes, or generally anything that will
help us form new or better-informed preferences. Indeed, this may be one of the
reasons we care about having a wide range of options available to us in everyday
life: if we are free to try out many different activities and pursue different interests,
we may discover something about our tastes and desires, or about the features of
our alternatives. This in turn may cause us to form new judgments about the
good, or revise our previous judgments. Our whole plan of life may be turned
upside-down by what we learn. If we were already maximally opinionated, that is,
if our preferences were complete and we always had fixed prior judgments about
which of two options is better, as is often assumed by rational choice theorists and
economists, then having a wide range of options would matter less to us.
This point is under-appreciated by philosophers and economists. Often, in as-
sessing the (instrumental) value of freedom to individuals, theorists have narrowly
focused on the extent to which individuals’ opportunities enable them to achieve
higher levels of welfare. Little concern is expressed for whether individuals have
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opportunities to learn about themselves and their preferences. This is the issue
which this paper addresses: I will be looking at the many different ways in which
an option can be diagnostically valuable. My approach is as follows. In section
2, I introduce some of the more influential accounts of the instrumental value of
opportunities. I show that a concern for diagnostic value, that is, for the value of
learning about oneself and one’s preferences, is missing from these accounts. In
section 3, I make the intuitive idea of diagnostic value more precise, and briefly
contrast my interpretation of diagnostic value with Bodner and Prelec’s concept
of diagnostic utility. In sections 4 through 8, I discuss the various dimensions of
diagnostic value, and I propose ways of measuring diagnostic value along each of
these dimensions. Finally in section 9 I consider how to move from these four
separate measures to an overall measure of the diagnostic value of a set of options.
5.1 What makes opportunities valuable?
I argued in the previous chapter that freedom is intrinsically valuable. And insofar
as freedom is intrinsically valuable, more freedom is better. Of course, freedom is
also valuable instrumentally, notably because it allows us to achieve outcomes we
prefer. And insofar as we care about its instrumental value, more freedom is not
always better. If you dream of being an astronaut, and NASA offers you a position
in their space program, an offer from your uncle to take over his second-hand car
dealership is of little instrumental value to you. As G. Dworkin (1982) observes,
there are decision-making and information-gathering costs to deciding carefully
between a large swath of options; if you already have very good options to choose
from, giving you a bunch of extra options may be more trouble than it’s worth.
How then do we go about assessing the instrumental value of opportunity sets,
if we don’t simply count up options? A simple approach would be to look at
individual preferences over options. Pattanaik and Xu (2015) suggest that we
could order opportunity sets by their top-ranked option. That is, an opportunity
set A is instrumentally better for you than another set B just in case you prefer
your top-ranked option in A to your top-ranked option in B. G. Dworkin (1982,
p. 60) also seems to endorse this view, arguing that if a, b, c are three objects,
which I rank in that order, then it is better for me to receive a than to be given a
choice between b and c. If, moreover, intensities of preferences are interpersonally
comparable, then we can say that opportunity set A is more valuable to Stephanie
than set B is to Delilah just in case Stephanie’s desire for her top-ranked option
is more intense than Delilah’s desire for hers. Thus, on this model, an additional
option is valuable to you just in case you strictly prefer it to every one of your other
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alternatives (note that this view is insensitive to the problem of decision-making
costs).
Now, looking only at top-ranked options is surely naïve. If one’s preferences
are incomplete, and we have no top-ranked options, we may prefer having all our
“maximal” (i.e., undominated) options to only one of our maximal options. After
all, even if today I’m torn about whether I want to go see Götterdämmerung or
Hamlet and just can’t decide how I want to spend my money, tomorrow I might
make up my mind – indeed, I might rationally be willing to pay £10 for the
guarantee that there will still be tickets for both performances until tomorrow
evening, just to keep my options open. More generally, as Kreps (1979), Sen
(1993b), and Pattanaik and Xu (2015) point out, if we’re unsure what our future
preferences will be, then we may want more options than just those few which
we currently most prefer. If I know myself to be capricious (or, more kindly,
spontaneous), I may anticipate that my tastes will change abruptly, and thus
although I currently rank x over all of its alternatives, I may prefer having every
alternative available to me to just having x.
Further, we may place what Scanlon (1998, pp. 252-253) calls representative
and symbolic value on having certain options. Options have representative value
if choosing between those options enables us to express our values. Scanlon gives
the example of selecting a gift for one’s partner. In these cases, we don’t simply
care about securing the best possible gift for our partner (though we do care about
this); we also care about choosing it ourselves, after careful thought, from among
a set of alternatives, because it is only through this sort of careful choice that we
can express our love and commitment to them. If an omniscient third party comes
along and threatens to present us with the gift that our partner would most enjoy
unless we pay them, it may be perfectly rational to pay to retain the privilege of
making our own selection.
Meanwhile, options have symbolic value if not having those options to choose
from “would be seen as reflecting a judgment (their own or someone else’s) that
they are not competent or do not have the standing normally accorded an adult
member of the society” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 253) . Thus if we care about being
seen as an individual capable of individual choice, if we refuse to be coddled by a
parternalist entity, we may rationally prefer to have many options to having just
the one option we do (or would) most prefer. And indeed, we may be willing to
retain the services of a protective agency whose job it is to guard us from such
intervention.
The lesson here seems to be that we need to attend to individuals’ global
preferences for sets of options in assessing the value of a set of alternatives to
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them, not merely their preferences over individual options. We could thus simply
say that A is instrumentally better for you than B just in case you rank A over B,
where this ranking reflect your preferences over options, your interest in keeping
your options open, and your interest in having representatively and symbolically
valuable options. Or else, as Pattanaik and Xu (2015) suggest, that A is better for
you than B just in case you rank the pair (x, A) above (y, B), where x and y are,
respectively, the outcomes you in fact achieve with A and B as your opportunity
sets. After all, you may prefer A to B (for any of the reasons above), but if you
would end up worse off with A than with B, say, because B is a much larger set and
you quite consistently make poor decisions when faced with too many alternatives,
this isn’t irrelevant to our assessment of how instrumentally valuable to you A is
as compared to B.
Vallentyne (2002) defends a somewhat similar view. He proposes to identify
the value of opportunity sets with their expected level of outcome advantage. One
opportunity set A is (instrumentally) better for you than another set B just in
case your expected level of advantage, conditional on A being your opportunity
set, is higher than your expected level of advantage, conditional on B being your
opportunity set. Given a set of options to choose from, the outcome that an
individual achieves is jointly determined by the individual’s choices and the state of
nature that obtains. Thus Vallentyne assumes that the chance of any outcome a is
a function of the probabilities of the different states of nature and the probabilities
of the different choices the individual might make.
An example might help illustrate. Suppose there is a 0.5 chance that Alice
will choose to stay indoors reading a book and a 0.5 chance she will choose to
go out for a walk, and that there is further a 0.5 chance that she will get wet if
she goes out for a walk, and a 0.5 chance that she will remain dry if she goes out.
Suppose Alice achieves a welfare level of 5 by going out and remaining dry, a welfare
level of 2 by staying indoors, and a welfare level of 0 by going outside and getting
drenched. Alice’s expected level of welfare is 0.5 ·2+0.25 ·5+0.25 ·0 = 2.25. Thus,
on this model, an option is valuable to you insofar as it improves your expected
level of welfare; this is consistent with believing both that giving you additional
options may be better for you even if you don’t choose them or rank them first
(say, because their mere availability increases the welfare you derive from other
choices) and that giving you “too many” options may be bad for you (because it
decreases the chance that you will choose the option that would make you best off
or increases your decision-making costs).
Whatever the merits of these particular proposals, they all miss the importance
of the diagnostic value of options. I noted earlier that one may have incomplete
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preferences, or that we may uncertain about our future preferences, and that for
that reason one may wish to keep one’s options open; but of course choice itself
plays a large role in helping us to complete our preferences, and in reducing our
uncertainty regarding the stability of our preferences. It’s only by going skating
that you can find out how you enjoy skating, and only then are you in a position
to rank skating against skiing. Likewise, if you keep skiing regularly, and you find
yourself enjoying it more and more every time, this should presumably increase
your confidence that you will continue to prefer skiing over skating in the future. So
although it’s perfectly true that you might rationally want you and your friends
to defer for another week your decision of whether to rent a ski lodge for the
weekend or to rent a small chalet by a frozen lake, because by then (with enough
introspection) you might make up your mind, you might also be rationally willing
to pay instead for the additional option of going skating yourself for a few hours
at the local arena, because by exercising this option, you might acquire just the
information you need to make up your mind about the other two options.
It would be misleading, however, to say that the option to go skating for an
afternoon is your top-ranked option: if the alternative is to save the money on
buying a ski pass for the day, which you know you would enjoy, you may be
unable to rank going to the arena against its alternative, and it may be rationally
permissible for you to choose either, though your choice would be grounded in
different reasons (to learn about your tastes, in one case, and to enjoy yourself,
in the other). Nor is going to the arena necessarily what’s best for you: if it
turns out that you really wouldn’t enjoy skating, but you just don’t know it, then
what would be best for you, from the sole point of view of welfare, would be to
buy a ski pass. The value of the option to go to the arena is purely diagnostic
in this case: all the good it does you is to teach you about yourself and to help
form new judgements. Of course, like all knowledge, knowledge about yourself
may instrumentally enhance your objective long-run expectation of welfare, by
making you more likely to choose well later. But diagnostic value is not purely
instrumental: life is a series of value judgements, and it is in itself part of good
living to be a competent evaluator, one who knows their own values and tastes,
is aware of the evaluatively salient features of their alternatives, and can more
frequently and more confidently reach good judgements.
The diagnostic value of options will ultimately be baked into the all-things
considered ranking of pairs of the form (x, A), but if, as the example above suggests,
the diagnostic value of an option is distinct from the value it derives from being
your top-ranked option, or its conduciveness to your welfare, then the diagnostic
value of an option makes a distinct contribution to the overall value of the set, in
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the same way that the representative and symbolic value of one’s options do. It
may then be of interest to us to assess how diagnostically valuable different options
are. And in general, since some sets of options might be richer in symbolically
or representatively valuable options, while others may be richer in diagnostically
valuable options, it may be of interest to us to assess how diagnostically valuable
a set of options is, on the whole, so that we may be in a position to make informed
trade-offs.
5.2 What is diagnostic value?
So far, I’ve only explored the concept of diagnostic value through examples. Now
it’s time to make this idea more precise. As I define it, the diagnostic value of
an opportunity is the epistemic-cum-pragmatic value of the information generated
by choosing it, in terms of making one a better judge of value, as measured by
the (potential) changes one’s preferences can undergo as a result of processing this
information (“preference” here is synonymous with “subjective value assessment”).
This concept of value raises four questions: (a) what kinds of preference changes
are there? (b) how does one measure the diagnostic value of choice by these
changes? (c) are all choice-induced preference changes diagnostically valuable, or
only those which constitute learning of some kind? (d) what even constitutes
preference learning? In this section I focus on (c) and (d), and will try in the next
section to answer (a) and (b).
Regarding (c): only preference changes which constitute some kind of learning,
or an improvement in one’s faculties of judgement, are diagnostically valuable.
Choices which merely cause preferences to change without providing a reason for
the change are excluded. This is because diagnostic value is tied to the value of self-
knowledge and of being a good judge of the value of one’s options: a change in one’s
preferences must count as a cognitive achievement if it is to count as diagnostically
valuable, and therefore must be the effect of an appropriate response to a learning
event.
Thus, if I get drunk and my preferences change – say, I develop a strong desire to
go shopping-cart surfing off my parents’ roof – this does not constitute a cognitive
achievement. I’ve not learned anything about myself (e.g. I have strong bones) or
about shopping-cart surfing (e.g. it’s not that risky) that would justify my taking a
more favourable attitude to the prospect of launching myself in a metal crate from
my parents’ roof and onto the concrete. Rather, the alcohol has simply altered my
brain chemistry. Likewise, suppose that upon learning that some desired outcome
is less likely to happen, my preferences adapt and I come to desire it less. Here
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the preference change is responding to a learning event, but not in an appropriate
fashion, as the information that is acquired doesn’t seem to provide a reason for
the change. As Bradley (2017, 200) puts it: “the fact that I am unlikely to win
a competition is no reason to regard winning it as less valuable than winning at
one in which my prospects are good.” Indeed, Bradley (2017, p. 207) argues that
rationality prohibits this sort of preference change.
So it’s a necessary condition that a preference change constitute learning to be
diagnostically valuable. But is it a sufficient condition? Not all change is good
change, you might argue, even when it’s the result of a learning experience: some-
times you get misleading evidence. Maybe Elizabeth saw a bad ballet performance,
and would discover she actually likes ballet if she went to see good performances.
Therefore, after seeing only one performance, her preferences have actually moved
further away from the preferences she would have if she were much more informed.
You might then think that a preference change should only count as diagnostically
valuable if the change brings you closer to the preferences you would have if were
maximally well-informed. Unfortunately, while this line has some persuasive force,
it rests on the assumption that there is such a thing as the preferences you would
have if you were maximally well-informed. However this is not so, because ratio-
nality frequently underdetermines how your preferences must change in response
to a learning event (see section 7). Without a “true” preference relation to guide
us, I conclude that our only criterion for judging whether a preference change is
good is whether it was rationally mandated as a response to a learning experience.
The point about misleading evidence is a red herring. As we will see later, Eliza-
beth should not form a confident value assessment about ballet based on a single
viewing,
This brings us to (d): I take preference learning to be any kind of learning
experience which informs our value judgements, and thereby rationally compels
a change in one’s preferences over actions and outcomes or (as we will see later)
in one’s confidence in those preferences. Of these, four may be distinguished.
First, we may revise our preferences over possible courses of action upon learning
something about the world or about ourselves which changes the expected utility
of engaging in those courses of action – e.g, when you change your attitude to going
to the beach after looking up the weather and learning it will rain (Bradley, 2017,
p. 200). Second, we may revise our attitudes to certain outcomes upon learning
something on which the desirability of the outcome depends – e.g. if I have already
planned a vacation to Sydney, then learning that it will be sunny all week makes
me look forward to the trip more than learning that it will rain (Bradley, 2017,
p. 207). Third, we may change our attitudes towards some action or outcome by
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discovering through experience something about our own likes and dislikes – e.g.,
forming a preference to go skating after trying it once and discovering one enjoys
it (Bradley, 2017, p. 201). Fourth, we may change our preferences by becoming
aware of new possibilities or options – e.g. learning that, in addition to white,
red, and rosé wine, there is also orange wine, may change your disposition to buy
white.
The first two cases differ from the third and fourth in important ways, but all
four are types of preference learning. In the first two cases, some propositional
content is learned, which then alters our beliefs about the state of the world, and
since what we desire to do or happen depends partly on what we know or believe
will happen, this rationally leads us to change our preferences. In the third case,
although some propositional content is surely learned (e.g. “I enjoy skating,” or
“wine is better with cheese”, or even “ah, this is what wasabi tastes like!”), it
isn’t learning that content which prompts the preference change, but rather the
positive or negative phenomenal valence of the experience itself. Still, you have
learned something about the action or outcome you’ve experienced (its “what-it-
is-likeness”), which can be represented by a proposition about how the outcome or
action stands with respect to your tastes,1 and in response to which there may be
more-or-less appropriate ways of revising your preferences. For example, supposing
you prefer to engage in activities you enjoy than ones you dislike, you should come
to prefer skating over activities you dislike upon learning that you actually enjoy
it, and likewise the intensity of your desire should for skating should change in the
same direction as the change in your enjoyment of the activity.2 In the fourth case
there is also some propositional knowledge acquisition (“there is a fourth type of
wine”), but in this case the learning experience doesn’t merely modify our existing
attitudes (e.g. decreasing my desire for white wine), it makes us aware of new
ways the world might be and new options we might choose (I could buy orange
wine instead of white). So-called “awareness growth” (see Karni and Vierø, 2013;
Bradley (2017, chapter 12)) is a distinct kind of learning experience from the other
three, and will require separate treatment later.
This ends our treatment of (c) and (d); we now know what diagnostic value is.
Note that as I’ve characterized it, the diagnostic value of one’s choices is different
from their diagnostic utility, which is how Bodner and Prelec (1997, 2002) refer
to the utility of the information which one’s choices reveal about our own traits
1Representing preference changes in sentential form is a common move in the literature on
preference change. See e.g. Hansson (1995), Bentehm and Liu (2007)
2This remark connects naturally with arguments in defense of the desire-as-belief thesis, which
states that a rational person desires some proposition to be true just to the extent that she
believes or expects it to be good. See Broome (1991a), Bradley and List (2009), and Bradley
and Stefánsson (2010) for discussion and defense.
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and dispositions.3 To illustrate, they suggest that someone who chooses to go
for their daily jog in spite of rain may derive diagnostic utility from this choice,
because jogging in spite of the rain is taken as evidence that they are steadfast
and strong-willed, which is a desirable trait to have. To be sure, learning about
one’s traits can help us form new preferences (e.g. learning that I don’t have an
addictive personality makes it more attractive to use drugs recreationally every
now and then). But it hardly needs emphasizing that the value of news conveyed
by choice in terms of making us better evaluators cannot be reduced to how much
we desire that news: I may not like discovering that I don’t enjoy skating – what
kind of Canadian does that make me? – but I am now in a better position to judge
what to do next weekend. That said, the extent to which we care about the news
our choices convey may affect the latter’s diagnostic value. And this brings us to
(a) and (b): what sorts of preference changes can result from preference learning,
and how does one measure diagnostic value by these changes?
5.3 Dimensions of diagnostic value
If what makes an option diagnostically valuable is that the information which
choosing it would generate can improve your evaluative capacities, provided you
revise your preferences appropriately, then presumably an option is more diagnos-
tically valuable the greater the size of this improvement – that is, the greater the
change in your preference structure rationality mandates as a response to your
learning experience. Different changes are possible, though, making diagnostic
value multidimensional in nature. “Simple” preference change, in the sense of
forming new preferences or reversing one’s existing preferences, is different from
awareness growth. And both are different still from changes in confidence in one’s
preferences, which may also result from a preference learning experience, or so I
will argue, even if the experience does not otherwise alter those preferences. More-
over, as I will argue later, the diagnostic value of a choice also depends on how
much we care about the information it generates or the improvement it enables.
Thus, diagnostic value has four dimensions, and in the following sections I will
look at each in turn, starting with simple preference change, followed by aware-
ness growth, confidence change, and how much we care about the information
generated by our choices.
To make this conversation precise, however, we ought to start with a model of
an agent’s preference and belief structure, so that we can model (and measure)
3This concept is closely related to how observation is defined in the study of causal networks
(Pearl, 2000). See Bovens (2013) for discussion.
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changes to this structure. I will adopt the framework developed by Hill (2013);
this is a non-standard representation of individual attitudes, but it is sufficiently
general to model all the changes of interest to us under a single representation. As
ever, we start with a set X = {x, y, ...} of mutually exclusive possible alternatives,
and a set Z of nonempty subsets A,B, ... ofX, called opportunity sets. We define a
set P of possible preference orderings over X; each element of P is denoted %1,%2,
and so on, and subsets of P are denoted by the generic terms R1,R2, etc. Each
%i∈ P is assumed complete and transitive, and so represents a fully determine
preference ordering an individual might have.
The distinctive feature of Hill’s framework is that now, instead of using just a
single preference relation to represent the individual’s preferences, we use a nested
family of preference relations – that is, a set of subsets of P such that, for any
two distinct subsets, one is contained in the other. Let Ξ denote such a nested
family of subsets of P . If there is a set of weak orderings R ∈ Ξ such that for
every %i∈ R, x %i y, then the individual weakly prefers x to y. The individual’s
weak preference relation is denoted %, and it can be recovered by looking at the
smallest R ∈ Ξ (i.e., the smallest set of preference orders such that every other
distinct set of preference orders belonging to Ξ contains it): if R is a singleton
{%i}, then %=%i, and % is accordingly complete. Otherwise, % is the intersection
of all the %i∈ R, and it is incomplete. And intuitively, % denotes the individual’s
best guess as to how any two elements in X compare. Thus when the smallest
R ∈ Ξ is a singleton, the individual always has a best guess as to how two options
compare, but when R is not a singleton, then even the individual’s best attempt
at ordering X leaves some pairs of elements unranked – i.e., the individual can’t
do better than suspend judgement in some cases.
Of course, even if the individual can reach a determinate value assessment,
they may not be confident in the assessment they’ve reached. So even if x % y
and y % z, the individual may be more confident in the first value assessment than
in the second, and thus may be willing to rest more weight on it in high-stakes
situations. Hill proposes that degrees of confidence in the assessment that x % y
can be captured by the largest set Ri ∈ Ξ such that x %i y for all %i∈ Ri. The
individual is more confident that x % y than that y % z if the smallest set Ri ∈ Ξ
such that x %i y for all %i∈ Ri includes but is not included by the smallest set
Rj ∈ Ξ such that y %i z for all %i∈ Rj. We say that a preference order %1 is more
plausible (i.e., the individual thinks, in light of their experiences, that it’s a better
“best guess”) than another preference order %2 if the smallest R1 ∈ Ξ containing
%2 is a superset of the smallest R2 ∈ Ξ containing %1. For any nested family of
preference orders Ξ, there corresponds a unique “implausibility order,” noted E,
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on P , which ranks preference orders by their implausibility. Plausibility is closely
tied to confidence: an individual is more confident in some value assessment the
higher degree of implausibility up to which all preference orderings agree on this
assessment. This terminology allows us to define the notion of a preference relation
at a level of confidence; this is identified with the intersection of all the %i up to
a certain degree of implausibility.
A graphical representation may help. In the figure below, every point on the
plane represents a possible weak ordering. Each colored disk is a set of preference
orders belonging to Ξ, so if a value assessment holds in some disk that means it
holds at every point in that disk. The darker disk represents the individual’s “best
guess” as to how the elements in X compare; this disk would be a point if the
individual’s best guess were a complete preference order. If one value assessment
holds in a bigger disk than another, this means the individual is more confident in
it. Note that this diagram also makes clear that there are a lowest and a highest
point of confidence: the lowest point is reached whenever some value assessment
only holds in the darkest disk (i.e., every %i in the smallest R ∈ Ξ agree on it,
but not in any superset of R), and the highest point is reached whenever a value
assessment holds at all points in the largest coloured disk (i.e., when all %i∈ ∪Ri∈Ξ
agree on the assessment). Confidence being inversely related to plausibility, this




Although Hill developed this framework to model individual preferences, Bradley
(2017, chapter 14.3) shows it can also be used to model individual beliefs. In
this case, instead of a set X of possible alternatives, we have a boolean algebra
Ω = 〈X , |=〉 – i.e., a pair consisting of a set X of propositions which is closed under
negation, conjunction, and disjunction, and an implication relation |= on that set
of propositions which ensures that the distribution of truth values over X obeys
classical logic. We can think of Ω as the set of all possibilities one can have atti-
tudes about. X and Ω are connected, however, in that X can be interpreted as a
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partition of Ω, namely, that consisting of the set of propositions that the individual
could make true. Instead of a nested family of sets of preference relations, we have
a nested family of sets π1, π2... of probability distributions p1, p2, ... over Ω. Each
pi represents one possible complete and coherent set of beliefs about the world.
The pi are ordered as before in an implausibility order, and the individual’s best
guess as to how the world is corresponds to the smallest π in the nested family.
5.4 Formation, Restriction, Revision
The presentation of Hill’s framework being now complete, we can look at the rela-
tion between diagnostic value and simple preference change. There are three kinds
of simple preference changes: preference formation, in which we reach a definite
value assessment between two objects about which we previously reserved judge-
ment; preference restriction, where we withdraw some value assessment regarding
two objects and now suspend judgement; and preference revision, where we reverse
our value assessment regarding two objects.4
The cases I used to introduce the concept of diagnostic value were ones of
formation: individuals start out not knowing how to rank two possible options,
then, after choosing to perform some act from among a list of alternatives, they
learn something about their own likes and dislikes and make up their mind, filling
in some of the gaps of their preference ordering. Thus, as a result of choosing x
from the opportunity set A, the individual’s preference relation % gets extended
to an updated preference relation %x,A, which is a strict super-relation of the prior
relation %. Note that I index the updated relation not just to the option which
was selected but also to the opportunity set it was selected from, because the
information generated by choosing x may not always be the same depending on
what alternatives were available: choosing to donate blood when you could choose
not to may teach you something about the value of altruism which you could not
learn if donating blood were your only option, since it is part of what makes some
personal sacrifice altruistic that it was up to you whether to make this sacrifice or
not.
Acquiring new preferences is valuable to decision-makers because it releases
them from indecision and caprice, but sometimes preference restriction is the ap-
propriate response to what one learns. Imagine a committed activist and volunteer
4In the dynamic logic of preference change revision is not distinguished from formation, as
both are modelled by the addition of some sentence to a set, which must then be further altered
by dropping any sentences that are inconsistent with the addition (see Hansson, 1995; Bentehm
and Liu, 2007). The intuitive difference between formation and revision gets captured by the
fact that in the case of formation, the addition will not contradict any existing sentence in the
set.
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who is, at first, confident in her belief that the best plan of life for her is to join an
NGO like Oxfam or Amnesty, but who, after watching a remarkably chilling tele-
vised report on the brutal military occupation of Western Sahara, becomes deeply
impressed by the work of the journalists behind the report, and begins to wonder
if she shouldn’t instead aspire to become a war corespondent. This change in our
activist’s preferences should be regarded as a diagnostic improvement: making up
one’s mind about an issue can be a valuable change, but so can realizing that
one had made up one’s mind too hastily. By re-examining one’s priorities, one
may avoid making rash or hasty decisions. In these cases, the updated preference
relation will be a strict subrelation of the prior preference relation.
Now consider the case of preference revision. Suppose that I currently prefer
playing online chess to reading poetry. Poetry only mildly entertains me, but
I’ve been a serious chess player for some time – I even pay for a subscription to
chess.com. But one day, on a whim, I read the opening lines of The Lovesong of J.
Alfred Prufrock and, mesmerized, continue reading it to the end, then read it over
and over again. This experience has taught me something very important about
the value of poetry, and this will lead my desire for online chess versus poetry
to weaken considerably. If the price of my premium subscription to chess.com
increases, I may be just as happy to downgrade my membership, give up playing
so much chess, and read more poetry instead. In this case the diagnostic value of
the option to read The Lovesong of J. Alfred Prufrock is that choosing it forced me
to reverse my preferences over certain combinations of time spent playing chess and
time spent reading poems. As I continue reading more great poems my preferences
over more combinations will shift until I generally prefer poetry to chess.
Note that although I’ve only used examples where one learns about one’s tastes
in discussing preference change, any of the first three preference learning experi-
ences canvassed in section 3 could lead to preference formation, restriction, or
revision. In the case of formation, for instance, the incompleteness in your value
assessments could be due either to the fact that you don’t know how two objects
stand with respect to your tastes, or to the fact that their comparative desirability
depends on the state of the world, which you are uncertain about.
I won’t go into the details of how rationality requires you to update your prefer-
ences or degrees of desire in response to new information (though for illuminating
discussion, see Hansson 1995; Dietrich and List 2012; and Bradley 2017, ch. 10.6),
because the task before us now is to measure the diagnostic value of an option
along the dimension of simple preference change, a dimension noted p, and all
I need to define this measure is the assumption that rationality does sometimes
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require us to revise our preferences, which is uncontroversial. Intuitively, the big-
ger the change rationality requires in your preferences as a result of some learning
experience, the more diagnostically valuable the choice leading to this experience
was. If going to the arena only makes me realize that I prefer skiing to skating,
but going to see Manon helps me realize that I prefer to see an Opera, a play, a
concert, or a musical to going to see the ballet, then it seems that going to the
ballet is in one respect a more diagnostically valuable choice to me. Diagnostic
value is increasing in the size of the improvement to one’s capacities of judgement
choice enables.
This idea can be made precise. Let Z(%,%x,A) ⊆ X × X denote the set of
all pairs x, y ∈ X on whose ranking % and %x,A disagree. So, if your preferences
update towards completion, there will be some pairs which % refuses to rank but
which %x,A ranks, and vice-versa if your preferences update towards restriction,
and if your preferences reverse there will be pairs which % ranks in reverse order to
%x,A; all these different pairs are elements of Z(%,%x,A). We now say that x is as
least as diagnostically valuable as y along p just in case |Z(%,%x,A)| ≥ |Z(%,%y,B
)|. Or, if X is infinitely large, but measurable, the measure of each Z(%,%x,A) is
substituted for its cardinality. This rule induces a complete ranking, and has the
attractive implication that some option has no diagnostic value along dimension
p if and only if your value assessments would rationally remain unchanged from
choosing it.
5.5 Confidence change
John Maynard Keynes (1973/1921, p. 73) introduced a distinction between what
he called the weight of evidence and what we might call the balance of evidence.
The balance of evidence is the degree to which one’s evidence supports a particular
proposition, i.e., how high a probability assignment in some proposition it justifies.
The weight of evidence is how substantial the evidential basis for some probability
assignment. To get an intuitive handle on the distinction, consider an example from
Popper (1959/1934): suppose I show you a coin and ask you to bet on its landing
heads heads; in your ignorance of whether it’s a fair coin, you might reasonably
apply some version of the principle of indifference and assign equal probabilities
to its landing heads as to its landing tails. If I now flip it a thousand times, and it
lands heads exactly 500 times, then you will continue, presumably, to assign equal
probabilities to its landing heads as to its landing tails, but now your judgement
is made on a much sounder basis. The balance of evidence is the same, but the
weight of evidence has greatly increased.
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What goes for beliefs goes for preferences. Suppose I’ve loved the Beatles since
I was a child, and I just think they’re the best act in rock history. Over the
years, I’ve listened to an ever widening repertoire of rock music, some of which I
have loved greatly, some of which left me cold, but every new experience has only
served to ingrain my long-held belief that the Beatles are the best, that their music
is better than the rest. My preference for the music of the Beatles is now very
strongly confirmed by the evidence I have accumulated over my years of listening
to music, and I can anticipate that it will remain stable over the years to come.
Notice that this need not imply that the relative intensity of my preference for
the Beatles over other bands about which I had prior opinions has changed: Pink
Floyd may always have been a close second. In fact, as my tastes expand, and I
become more opinionated, I may spend relatively less of my time listening to the
Beatles, and relatively more listening to the hundreds of other artists that I’ve
discovered. Still, I continue to prefer the Beatles to any other act, Abbey Road
remains my favourite album, and Eleanor Rigby my favourite song ever composed
in the dorian mode. In this case, the balance of evidence over the course of my
life has always supported the value judgement that The Beatles dominate all other
acts, but the weight of the evidence underpinning this judgment has substantially
increased.
The distinction between the balance of evidence and the weight of evidence
maps on to the distinction between the individual’s preference relation and their
implausibility order. Preference orders which fail to rank the Beatles first become
less and less plausible as I accumulate more musical experiences which are inconsis-
tent with those preference orders, and so I become more confident in my childhood
assessment that the Beatles are the best. Naturally, as I undergo more preference
learning experiences, my confidence in some value assessments may drop, but in
that case it’s my confidence in other value-assessments that will rise. All increases
in the weight of the evidence underpinning my value assessments will therefore be
recorded as changes in my implausibility order.
The question for us is whether changes to an implausibility order induced by
preference learning should count as diagnostically valuable. I think so. It’s per-
fectly fine to make decisions on the basis of somewhat lightly-reached assessments
of value and probability when the worst that can happen if you’ve reached the
wrong assessments isn’t so bad. But when the price for misjudging the best course
of action is steep, and we really don’t want to get it wrong, greater caution is
required in reaching one’s assessments – i.e., greater confidence in the assessments
– and it’s quite rational to punt the decision to later, accepting a sure loss to buy
oneself the time to gather more evidence. Indeed, caution of this sort is part of the
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motivation for the imprecise Bayesian approach (see e.g. Levi, 1990; Gärdenfors
and Sahlin (1982); Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1982; Binmore, 2008). Having a weight-
ier evidential basis for our value assessments makes us more competent judges of
value, because it means we remain capable of rendering determinate value judge-
ments across a wider range of circumstances, and particularly in higher-stakes
situations.
Moreover, embedding confidence in the concept of diagnostic value links the
latter quite naturally with Pattanaik and Xu’s remark about our uncertainty re-
garding our future preferences. Presumably, if I am uncertain about the diachronic
stability of my preferences, this will be reflected in the fact that my current pref-
erences lack much confidence. And conversely, if I am quite confident in my pref-
erences, then I should be more confident that they will remain stable over time,
and this puts me in a better position to evaluate how much I should be willing
to pay to keep my future options open. Thus there are all sorts of decision where
evaluative competence requires having a weightier base of evidence on which to
rest one’s judgements.
As before, I presume that the diagnostic value of an option is increasing in the
increase of the weight of our evidence – and therefore in the size of the change
to our implausibility order – that choosing it would provide. Since E is a weak
ordering, we can define as before the set Z(E,Ex,A) ⊆ P × P as the set of all
pairs %i,%j∈ P which E and Ex,A disagree about how to rank. We now say that
x is at least as diagnostically valuable as y along the dimension c of confidence if
and only if |Z(E,Ex,A)| ≥ |Z(E,Ey,A)|. The measure of the sets is substituted for
their cardinality if the sets are infinite but measurable. As before, this measure
has a natural zero point: some option has no diagnostic value along dimension c
if and only if your implausibility assessments would rationally remain unchanged
from choosing it. This ranking is also complete.
Note that any change in the individual’s preference relation implies a change in
their implausibility order,5 so an option that is diagnostically valuable along pmust
also be diagnostically valuable along c. Still, having both measures is useful, as
you might think that changes to your implausibility order are more diagnostically
valuable when they also imply changes to your “best guess” at the right value
assessments, and therefore that the former changes should receive greater weight
in the measure of overall diagnostic value. Your best guess is special, as compared
with your best guesses at higher levels of confidence, because it’s your best guess,
your fullest attempt at a complete and coherent evaluation of the world. And of
5This is easy to show: % is defined as the intersection of all the %i belonging to the smallest
set R ∈ Ξ, thus % 6=%x,A iff the smallest R ∈ Ξ is different from the smallest R′ ∈ Ξx,A. But if
Ξ = Ξx,A then R = R′.
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course, it’s possible for one option to be more valuable along c than another yet
less valuable along p,6 so it’s far from redundant to retain both orders.
5.6 Awareness growth
A final respect in which choice may inform our value judgements is by making
us aware that there are more ways of intervening upon the world and more ways
the world could be than we had previously countenanced. That is, we could learn
that the set of possible options is more expansive than we thought it was – e.g. I
learn from soliciting the advice of a sommelier that in addition to bubbly, white,
red, and rosé wine, I could also order orange wine, which is not a type of wine I
previously knew existed. Or we could learn that there are more possible states of
the world than we had realized, on which the desirability of other states we were
previously aware of may depend, and which may yield consequences we had not
considered, depending on what course of action we pursue – e.g. I learn that in
addition to rain and sunshine, the weather in Canberra may also turn to violent
hail and asphyxiating smoke haze.
Strictly speaking, there are two varieties of awareness growth: expansion, where
the new possibilities one becomes aware of are disjoint from any of the possibilities
we were previously aware of, and refinement, where they are not. So in the case
of options, learning that one can also order orange wine in addition to bubbly,
white, red, and rosé wine is a case of expansion: to buy orange wine is ipso facto
not to buy any of the other four kinds of wine. In contrast, if I start being
unable to make fine distinctions between types of white wine, but then, through
experimentation, learn that there is an appreciable difference between Sauvignon
Blanc, Pinot Grigio, Viognier, and Chardonnay, then we have a case of refinement;
I go from having a coarser-grained representation of the space of possible options
(e.g.{red, white,...}) to a finer-grained one (e.g.{red, Sauvignon blanc, ...}). One
way of putting this is that with expansion, I learn that more options are possible
than I thought, and with refinement, I learn that the space of possible options is
more diverse than I thought.
6Suppose the smallest set in Ξ contains only two preference orders which disagree with each
other about everything; your preference relation is therefore empty. Now suppose choosing x
would teach something which makes one of those two preference orders less plausible, so your
updated preference o is identical with the remaining order. This implies a maximal change to
your preferences, but a rather small change to your implausibility order, since your updated
implausibility order and your prior implausibility order only disagree about the ordering of two
preference orders. In contrast, suppose choosing y would not affect your judgements as to the
plausibility of the preference orders you find most plausible, but would change your judgements
about many of the less plausible preference orders. Then choosing y implies greater changes to
your implausibility order than choosing x, but no changes to your preferences.
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In the case of the possible states of the world, learning that hail and smoke
haze are additional possible weather states is a case of expansion, since each type
of weather event is mutually exclusive with every other. In contrast, suppose
the possible weather states you are aware of for tomorrow (rain, sunshine, hail,
smoke) exhaust the space of possibilities, but you also believe that whether it will
be hot or cold also affects the desirability of your various options; temperature
can vary independently of weather state, so you must assess the likelihood and
desirability of your doing so-and-so when it is rainy and cold, rainy and warm, etc.
If now you inform yourself and learn that humidity may also vary independently
of temperature and weather, and the humidity level affects the desirability of
your courses of action, then you must now refine your attitudes to consider the
consequences of doing so-and-so when it is cold and sunny and humid, cold and
sunny and dry...
Some decision theorists try to treat all cases of expansion as cases of refine-
ment by defining a “catchall” proposition (Shimony 1970), which stands for all
possibilities one hasn’t considered.7 This may be reasonable in some cases, as
when attempts to diagnose gaps in knowledge predict unanticipated possibilities
but cannot identify them (Loch, Solt, and Bailey, 2007), because in this case it
may be possible to make (imprecise) probability estimates by looking at the size of
the gap in knowledge. Barring those cases, though, a catchall is an unreasonable
strategy, because, as Bradley (2017, p. 255) argues: “given that we don’t know
anything about the prospects that we are potentially unaware of, (...) what prob-
ability should we assign to the catch-all prospect? But if we recognise the lack of
such a basis then we will be driven towards a state of radical non-opinionation,
which does not seem to be much of an improvement over that of conscious un-
awareness.”8
There are differences in how it is rational to adjust our attitudes in response
to expansion and refinement. In the case of refinement, it is in principle possible
to extend one’s attitudes to the new finer-grained possibilities being considered
without modifying one’s attitudes to the old coarse-grained possibilities: learning
7In Bayesian confirmation theory, awareness growth is related to the problem of new hypothe-
ses (Glymour 1980). In that context the catchall stands for all hypotheses not considered.
8There is a growing project in the field of risk management around quantifying the “unknown
unknowns,” i.e., putting a probability on the catchall. But in fact the methodology for doing
so basically involves trying to identify the unknown unknowns, thereby converting them into
known unknowns, i.g. anticipated contingencies whose probabilities we can try to estimate. And
indeed Kim (2012) argues that in the case of unanticipated disasters like hurricane Katrina or the
Fukushima nuclear accident, many of the contingencies which were supposedly unidentifiable in
advance were in fact identifiable. So really, quantifying the unknown unknowns doesn’t involve
estimating the proabability of a catchall, but attempting to grow one’s awareness and then
estimating the probabilities of the possibilites one is aware of.
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that white wine comes in multifarious varieties need not change my opinion that
white wine is better than red. In the case of expansion, however, your attitudes
to the old possibilities must be modified to accommodate your awareness growth:
learning of some new disjoint possibility must reduce the probability you assign
to at least one of the previously countenanced possibilities, and this in turn will
affect the expected utility of your available options, and likewise learning of some
new possible option will necessarily change how much you desire to pursue your
other options whenever you aren’t indifferent between the new option and any of
the old ones. In either case, rationality underdetermines how one must distribute
one’s credences: if my awareness grows by expansion, I can award either a huge
or a tiny lump of probability to the new possibility, and rationality has nothing to
say about which is best (in the same was that rationality imposes no constraints
on how we set our priors).
Once again, I won’t delve into what the rational constraints are on how one
is permitted to revise one’s attitudes following awareness growth, but will simply
emphasize what matters for our purposes, which is that the process of attitude
revision can be envisioned as a two-step process. First we grow our awareness
of the possibilities, then we form new attitudes to the possibilities we are now
aware of. This second step was discussed earlier, so the question for us is whether
the first step constitutes an improvement in one’s capacities of judgement, and
therefore whether preference learning experiences which result in awareness growth
are diagnostically valuable for that reason. Clearly so: simply being aware of
potentially relevant new possibilities better equips us to make wise decisions, even
if we cannot yet form determinate evaluative or probabilistic judgements about
these possibilities. If nothing else, it will alert us to the need for caution and
informing ourselves.
Measuring the diagnostic value of an option along the dimension of aware-
ness growth is fairly straightforward. Diagnostic value being monotonic in the
size of the improvement to one’s capacities, and greater awareness being a greater
improvement, it follows that choice is more diagnostically valuable the more pos-
sibilities it makes us aware of. If Ω = 〈X , |=〉 is the background boolean algebra,
let ΩA = 〈A, |=〉 with A ⊆ X be the set of all possibilities of which the agent
is aware prior to the moment of choice. Finally, let ΩA,x,A denote the set of all
possibilities the agent is aware of after having chosen x from A, given that ΩA
was their prior awareness state. Then, we say that x ∈ A is more diagnostically
valuable than y ∈ B along the dimension a of awareness growth if and only if
|ΩA,x,A| ≥ |ΩA,y,B|. If the sets of possibilities are infinite, but measureable, their
measures are substituted for their cardinality. This ranking is complete.
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5.7 Information we care about
Diagnostic value is not purely a function of what we learn, but also of our attitudes
to what we learn. As Bodner and Prelec emphasize, learning experiences which
inform us of desired traits and dispositions are more valuable to us than ones
which does not. Moreover, preference learning experiences can be more-or-less
desirable if the news allows me to form new opinions about things I care more-or-
less about. If I enjoy wine, then it may matter to me greatly that I be able to make
fine distinctions between types of wine, since this may put me in a much better
position to make good decisions. In contrast, if I hate beer, finding it unbearably
bitter, then I may be uninterested in trying out every different kind of beer out
there. Thus, if choosing x will enable me to refine my attitudes over wine, and
choosing y will enable me to refine my attitudes over beer, then, ceteris paribus, x
should be considered more diagnostically valuable: whether or not x teaches me
more about my attitudes than y, what it teaches me is worth more to me.
Likewise, if I am, in general, a great enthusiast of stage art, then the fact that I
cannot rank ballet against any other form of stage art may cause me some distress;
for all I know, I’m missing out on truly unique and wonderful experiences, thus
it may matter to me to acquire the information necessary to make up my mind
about these things. In contrast, if I am generally indifferent to soap operas and
find myself unable to rank watching an hour of All My Children against an hour
of General Hospital, I may be in no particular rush to fill that lacuna in my
preference ordering. Thus, I prefer to learn such information as will help complete
my preferences over stage art than as will help me complete my preferences over
soap operas, and accordingly an option which would yield diagnostic news about
the former, if chosen, should be seen as more diagnostically valuable than an option
which would yield diagnostic news about the latter, if chosen. One could go on to
consider similar examples regarding the other dimensions of diagnostic value. The
point is clear enough: we may have preferences over news contents and over news
types, and this itself should affect our judgment of how diagnostically valuable any
given option is.
It might be objected that the extent to which we care about diagnostic learning
events is not really a distinct dimension of diagnostic value. Sure, we may be
more interested in improving our wine-related preferences than our beer-related
preferences, but all this really shows is that the measure I first proposed in section
5 was inadequate, and that diagnostic value with respect to p should be a function
not just of the absolute number of dyadic preference changes that occur following
a learning event, but also how much you care about these changes. Ditto for
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the other dimensions. This interpretation could be motivated for a concern with
conceptual unity: instead of three learning-related dimensions of diagnostic value
and one preference-related dimension, we just end up with three learning-related
dimensions. In fact, I wouldn’t mind this move. However I’m not certain that
the formal difference amounts to a very substantive one, since either way overall
diagnostic value will end up depending on learning-related stuff and on preference-
related stuff. In the meantime, I believe it clarifies my exposition to treat all four
issues separately.
This is because the issue of how the diagnostic value of some option depends
on our attitudes is a complicated matter: we must confront the problem that
some people don’t want to be better informed. Consider the case of a homopho-
bic religious zealot, who, on the insistence of his liberal niece, goes to see The
Miseducation of Cameron Post, and is deeply moved. As a result, he grows less
confident in his homophobic value assessments and more confident in the “hereti-
cal” value assessments of his niece. Our zealot might not welcome this change,
since it deeply challenges his entire world-view and sense of identity. He might
therefore rationally, albeit regrettably, refuse to probe any further his homopho-
bic value judgements through learning and experience. After all, from his present
evaluative vantage point, he is like Ulysses anticipating the unwelcome future cor-
ruption of his preferences. This suggests that any preference learning experience
which would further disconfirm his homophobic preferences and increase his con-
fidence instead in “heretical” value assessments must be of very low (perhaps even
negative!) diagnostic value, with respect to the dimension d of the desirability of
preference learning events.
And yet if our zealot did undergo such a preference learning event (e.g. he
allows himself to be roped into going to the gay pride parade with his niece), then,
ex post, he would presumably be thankful for having made that choice, since now
his preferences and his beliefs have changed in a way he cannot but regard as an
improvement, since they changed as a result of receiving information in light of
which he himself regards it as appropriate to revise his judgements. And he would
therefore be inclined to regard his old beliefs and preferences as mistaken.
In situations like these, when our ex ante and ex post attitudes to the im-
portance of a bundle of diagnostic news differ, precisely because acquiring the
information in question changes our attitudes, it’s not immediately obvious which
set of attitudes is authoritative in determining the diagnostic value of options along
d. On the one hand, it is on the basis of our prior preferences and beliefs that
we make choices; when we choose x over y because of the value we attach to the
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diagnostic news conveyed by x, the preference we thus reveal is our current pref-
erence for x over y. In general, the only rankings over pieces of diagnostic news
which we can empirically elicit from individuals are those induced by their prior
preferences.9 Moreover, it is presumably supposed to give us a reason to choose x
that x is diagnostically valuable, but the Ulysses point stands: surely it gives me
no reason to choose x that it will (as I presently see it) corrupt my preferences.
This is very much related to the problem of how rational choice is even possible
among actions when some of these would result in “transformative experiences,”
which change the values held prior to the choice (Paul, 2014; Callard, 2018).
On the other hand, if our prior and posterior preferences over bundles of di-
agnostic news disagree, then our prior preferences are formed in error, given that
they are formed in the absence of precisely that information which we would later
deem it necessary to have for a proper appreciation of the choice. Why not then
simply defer to our better informed posterior preferences over bundles of diagnos-
tic news? After all, when individuals disagree about what to believe, but one is
known to be better informed than the other, and they are otherwise equally good
at making inferences from available evidence, it’s generally thought the less-well
informed individual ought simply to accept the judgments of the better informed
individual (this story wouldn’t satisfy Ulysses, but then in Ulysses’s case it’s a bit
unclear whether the sirens’ song is a reason for his preference to drown or merely
a cause of it, in the same way that snorting cocaine is a cause of addictive de-
sires, but not a reason for them: many addicts report not enjoying their addiction
and judging they should stop). Thus individuals’ posterior preferences seem to be
better indicators of the individual’s “true” valuation of bundles of diagnostic news.
Now, different choices are bound to induce different preference changes, so we
need to decide which of the possible posterior preference relations is the privileged
indicator of an agent’s “true” valuations; presumably it is the preference relation
they would have if they were maximally well informed, or the preference relation
that would be obtained by updating on every bundle of diagnostic news they could
ever obtain. The problem, of course, is that such ideal circumstances never obtain,
and so it is impossible to elicit empirically any individual’s “true” valuations, and
anyway there is no unique preference relation that the individual is guaranteed to
form if they become maximally well-informed. So at best, we can make more-or-
less well informed guesses about how individuals’ preferences would likely change
if they made this or that choice. We thus face a hard trade-off between empirical
soundness and accuracy, on the one hand, and epistemological justification, on the
9The empirical elicitation of preferences may be done either by observing actual choice be-
havior, or by asking individuals to rank bundles of diagnostic news and gambles over bundles of
diagnostic news, as in the Von-Neuman Morgenstern method.
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other, in our rankings in deciding whether to take prior or posterior preferences as
authoritative.
In any case, regardless of which set of preferences we take to be authoritative,
it is simple to rank options along d. Let Ex,A denote the preference learning
experience undergone by choosing x from A. Quite simply, x ∈ A is at least
as diagnostically valuable along d as y ∈ B if and only if the individual prefers
to undergo learning experience Ex,A than learning experience Ey,B. Notice that
under this ranking rule, there is also a very natural zero-point. If some option
x conveys no information to you (the “learning” event involves no learning), then
it should also have no diagnostic value along d. As Jeffrey (1965, chapter 5.7)
argues, you can’t well desire to learn what you already know: news is only good
or bad news compared with no news at all. If the individuals’ preferences over
learning events are incomplete, the ranking of X along d will be incomplete, but
provided the individual satisfies all the remaining axioms of rational choice theory
besides completeness, the diagnostic value of options along d will nonetheless be
measurable by a family of utility functions. An option will be considered at least
as diagnostically valuable as another along d just in case every utility function in
the family assigns it at least as high utility. Note, though, that an individual’s
preferences over learning events might be complete even if their preferences over
all possibilities are not.
5.8 Overall diagnostic value
Having discussed the measure of diagnostic value along each of its dimensions,
we’ve now finished our treatment of (a) and (b). All that’s left to discuss is how
one might condense the disparate measures I’ve defined into a single measure of
the overall diagnostic value of an opportunity set. There are two ways in which we
might do this: we might either start by extending our dimension-specific measures
of option diagnostic value to dimension-specific measures of opportunity set di-
agnostic value, then aggregating these dimension-specific measures into an overall
measure of diagnostic value. Or we might start by aggregating the dimension-
specific measures of option diagnostic value into a unique measure of overall option
diagnostic value, then extending this aggregate measure to a measure of opportu-
nity set value. The order of aggregation often matters, so it’s not obvious in this
case that these two ways of doing things will always be equivalent. Luckily for the
approach I develop here, the order doesn’t matter, so let us start by aggregating
dimensions across options.
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The following restrictions on the concept of overall diagnostic value seem rea-
sonable. First, overall diagnostic value should be increasing in each dimension
of diagnostic value: all else being equal, an option that is more diagnostically
valuable along some dimension is more diagnostically valuable overall. Second, di-
agnostic value should be separable across dimensions, meaning that if two options
are unequally diagnostically valuable across some dimensions, but equally valuable
along remaining dimensions, then the ranking between them is invariant to just
how valuable both are along the dimension along which they are equally valuable.
This is just a way of saying that diagnostic value is additive, that an increase in
diagnostic value along some dimension always counts for the same regardless of
how diagnostically valuable some option already is along the other dimensions.
Third, diagnostic value varies continuously along each of its dimensions. Thus
no dimension lexically dominates the others, and trade-offs between dimensions
of value are possible, such that a decrease in value along one dimension can be
compensated by a large enough increase along any other dimension.
The first condition is a no-brainer. The second and third are not self-evident,
but both seem plausible in the present context. What would a violation of addi-
tivity look like? Suppose we represent the diagnostic value of some option (or set)
by a vector of four numbers. A non-separable ranking rule might rank (10,7,0,0)
over (8,8,0,0) but rank (8,8,8,8) over (10,7,8,8) due to the perfect equality in the
size of the diagnostic improvements along each dimension of the third vector. In
contrast, a separable ranking rule that ranks (10,8,0,0) over (9,9,0,0) must rank
(10,7,8,8) over (8,8,8,8). Now, nothing in our discussion to this point suggests that
there might be interaction effects between dimensions of diagnostic value, and it’s
hard to see what rationale there could be for thinking that an option should be es-
pecially valuable for generating equally sized improvements along each dimension
of diagnostic value. The distribution of diagnostic values across an option is not
like the distribution of welfare or opportunities for welfare across society: there is
no story to tell here about fairness, non-domination, or the special concern we owe
to the worse-off.
As for the third condition, weighing dimensions of diagnostic value is not like
weighing welfare against the health of the ecosystem, two goods which are very
different in kind, or the welfare of one person against that of another, goods
which, though similar in kind, are difficult to commensurate with much fineness of
grain due to the lack of intersubjective comparability of different minds. All four
dimensions of diagnostic value are similar in kind, conceptually connected with
one another, and seem valuable for very similar reasons, so it is difficult to see why
one of those dimensions should be overridingly more important than the others,
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or what conceptual obstacles there could be to making trade-offs between them.
Under those assumptions, the overall diagnostic value of options is measurable
by a continuous real-valued function f(p, c, a,d) : X×Z −→ R, which is increasing
in each dimension of diagnostic value, as well as separable across those dimension –
i.e., f(.) is a positively weighted sum of the four measures defined above. Since each
dimension of diagnostic value has a natural 0 point, and since utility is cardinal,
then if we further assume that diagnostic value along each of p, c, a is linear in the
relevant cardinality-based measures of those dimensions of value, and make some
conventional choice of unit for each of the four resulting dimension-specific scales of
diagnostic value,10 f is unique up to positive linear transformations. If diagnostic
value along d is only measurable by a family of cardinal utility functions, rather
than a unique cardinal utility function, then instead overall diagnostic value will
be measurable by a family of f ’s, each unique up to positive linear transformation.
To move from f to an overall measure of the diagnostic value of an entire oppor-
tunity set, we might seek inspiration from the standard measures of opportunity
set value. One naïve suggestion that quickly comes to mind is to rank opportu-
nity sets by their most diagnostically valuable alternative, à la Pattanaik and Xu
(2015). Thus we might say that A is more diagnostically valuable than B just in
case the maximum over all x ∈ A of f(x,A) is at least as great as the maximum
over all x ∈ B of f(x,B).
This suggestion is clearly incorrect, however. To the extent that it is attractive
at all to rank opportunity sets by the value of their top-ranked option, this is
because of the implicit belief that the instrumental value of an opportunity set is
just the value of the outcome individuals achieve with those opportunities, and
since a rational person will always choose the option they most prefer, it follows
that the instrumental value of an opportunity set is the value of the outcome of the
best option. Now, there is surely something right about the idea that the diagnostic
value of an opportunity set has something to do with the diagnostic value of the
outcome that individuals achieve with those opportunities, but it obviously does
not follow from the assumption of rationality that individuals will always choose
the most diagnostically valuable option: they may have other reasons for choice.
A’s most diagnostically valuable element may be more diagnostically valuable than
B ’s most diagnostically valuable option, but if the remaining options in A are
10This assumption guarantees that the four scales are unique up to a common scalar mul-
tiplication, which matters, because otherwise f is only unique up to dimension-specific linear
rescalings. One way of doing this is to assume, as seems plausible, that there is a least upper
bound on how diagnostically valuable an option can be along any given dimension, e.g. there is
a limit to how many new possibilities some choice can make you aware. Then we simply set, for
each scale, the value of this least upper bound to 1, and this gives us a common unit of measure
for all four scales.
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not diagnostically valuable at all, but are attractive for other reasons, while the
most diagnostically valuable option in B is also attractive for other reasons, the
individual may extract much more diagnostic value from B than from A.
These last remarks suggest that an analogue to Vallentyne’s proposal would
make a much more appropriate measure of diagnostic value. Thus, if q(x,A) is
the probability that the individual will choose option x, given that A is their
opportunity set, we can now propose that A is at least as diagnostically valuable




y∈B q(y,B)f(y,B) for every f in the
family of admissible measures of overall option diagnostic value. I am interpreting
q subjectively here, as representing the beliefs of some evaluator or modeller (or
perhaps even the individual’s own) about what the individual will choose. This
interpretation has the benefit of being metaphysically innocent: as Inwagen (2000)
and Buchak (2013a) have argued, to postulate objective unconditional probabilities
of humans making particular choices seems to rule out the possibility of free will.
Subjective probabilities, however, are un-mysterious: individuals are always trying
to predict others’ behaviour, and indeed sometimes their own.
Note that (to refer back to this section’s opening remarks) an alternative way
of constructing this expectational measure of diagnostic value would have been to
first define dimension-specific value measures of the form fi : X × Z −→ R and
Fi : Z −→ R, where i = p, c, a,d and Fi = q(x,A)fi(x). We then say that A % B
just in case the weighted sum of all the Fi(A) is at least as great as the weighted
sum of all the Fi(B). This ranking rule is the same rule as the one I proposed.
An advantage of the expected value approach is that because each f is unique
up to positive linear transformation, and therefore associates to each element in
X × Z an absolute level of diagnostic value (starting from 0 diagnostic value), we
have the flexibility to make our ranking of Z sensitive to the fact that different
options within a single opportunity set may be unequally diagnostically valuable.
Two opportunity sets, A and B, may have equally diagnostically valuable expected
outcomes, yet if the variance in the diagnostic value of the options in A is much
greater than the variance in the diagnostic value of the options in B, then the actual
diagnostic value of the outcome the individual would achieve with A will tend to
diverge much more from our expectations that the actual diagnostic value of the
outcome the individual would achieve with B. Now, some level of risk aversion
with respect to diagnostic value would justify ranking B over A in this case. And
risk-aversion is well justified in some contexts: it makes the impact of policy
choices more predictable, by minimizing the divergence between actual outcomes
and expectations, and it minimizes the chance of poor diagnostic outcomes for
individuals, which is a good thing if one thinks that duties of beneficence generally
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imply a greater interest in preventing bad outcomes than in promoting good ones.





y∈B q(y)Φ(f(y,B)), where Φ(.) is an increasing,
strictly concave transformation of f, say, the square root function. This trans-
formed expected-value ranking is thus quite attractive: it induces a ranking over
Z that is complete up to the level of completeness of the individual’s preferences
over preference learning experiences, it ties the diagnostic value of a set to the
diagnostic value of the outcome we can expect individuals to achieve, and embeds
a seemingly justified level of risk-aversion in its ordering.
Summary
I have tried in this chapter to draw attention to a neglected aspect of the value
of freedom, namely the value opportunities have in generating knowledge which
makes us better judges of value. Being a better evaluator is useful in helping us
achieve better outcomes, but it is also good in itself. Diagnostic value is accordingly
distinct in kind from ordinary prudential value, understood as the tendency of an
option to satisfy one’s desires, and from representative and symbolic value. Given
that our preferences are often incomplete, that we may be uncertain about how
they will change over time, and that we frequently lack information that is material
to making good judgments, the value of having options that are diagnostically rich
is not to be overlooked. Measures can be defined for each dimension of diagnostic
value, three of which are guaranteed to be complete, and from these we can define
plausible overall measures of both option and opportunity set diagnostic value.
****
This chapter ends our discussion of the opportunity aspect of freedom. In
conclusion, I wish to offer some thoughts on how the intrinsic and instrumental
value of freedom combine to determine the overall value of freedom. Presumably,
the overall moral value of freedom will be positively related to both the intrinsic
and instrumental value of freedom. Moreover, intrinsic and instrumental value
are paradigmatically separable concerns: in every context where these distinctions
matter, it is customary to separate one’s assessment of how the intrinsic value of
some activity (e.g. learning for its own sake) speaks in favour of it from one’s
assessment of how the instrumental value of said activity (e.g. learning because
it’s necessary to get a job) speaks in favour of it. Supposing this general principle
applies here, the simplest view one can propose on the overall value of freedom
is that it is some sort of convex mixture of the intrinsic and instrumental value
138 Chapter 5. The Diagnostic Value of Freedom
of freedom – and it will therefore NOT necessarily be increasing in the extent of
one’s freedom, which is an interesting conclusion.
We are now ready to turn to the final theme of this thesis, concerning liberty,
or the process aspect of freedom. So far, I’ve said quite a bit about the value
of being free – of being a free person – so it is appropriate that we now turn to
consider how it is that respect for free persons and their capacity for free choice




Liberty, Rights, and Social Choice
Individuals have rights. These rights express our respect for them as free, au-tonomous beings, and constrain what inroads into personal liberty may be
sanctioned by the pursuit of social welfare. That said, it speaks in favour of any
course of action or public policy that it improves social welfare. Accordingly, I
address two key questions in this chapter. How do rights and welfarist concerns
interact to constrain social choice? And when can we say that one social state
respects individual rights to a greater extent than another? Or in other words:
how much protection does the process aspect of freedom require? And how can
we assess when it is better protected? To answer these questions, I defend a novel
choice theoretic approach to the representation of rights which allows us to define
rights-based social choice criteria, and study how these criteria interact with stan-
dard welfarist criteria. I then operationalize this approach to define philosophically
meaningful measures of the degree to which social states respect individual rights.
These measures could be usefully applied to assess government or social policy
performance on rights issues.
The point of departure for my argument is Sen’s (1970) celebrated “Impossi-
bility of a Paretian Liberal” result, in which Sen proposed a way of formalizing
rights within a social choice theoretic framework, and showed that even the most
minimal rights-based constraint was inconsistent with the weak Pareto principle,
arguably the least controversial welfarist constraint. Sen’s impossibility result
vividly illustrates the conflicting demands which respect for rights and concern for
welfare place on morality. However, his formalization of individual rights has been
criticized. Rights, on his view, amount to a privilege of dictatorship over pairs
of entire social states. Nozick (1974) formulated an influential critique of this
conception of rights, showing that it quickly led to paradoxes, and so proposed
that rights had to be conceived as protections against interference in one’s choices,
rather than dictatorship privileges. This critique inspired numerous economists
(e.g., Sugden, 1985; Gaertner, Pattanaik, and Suzumura, 1992) to formalize rights
through game forms, instead of axiomatic constraints on a social choice function,
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and this approach has gained acceptance among social choice theorists.
Though the game form approach has important virtues, I argue that it also
has one important shortcoming: by abandoning the attempt to formalize rights
as a constraint on permissible social choice, it does not capture the conception
of rights Nozick deployed in his critique of Sen, and which is widely accepted
among philosophers. This conception, I will show, can be better expressed in a
social choice-theoretic framework, albeit one that differs from Sen’s. My main goal
in what follows is to show just how fruitful this analysis is: using the language
of social choice theory allows us to talk about how many general kinds of rights
people have (e.g., freedom of speech), as opposed merely to how many individually
enumerable acts they have a right to perform, how severely these kinds of rights
may be infringed, and what makes one social state more illiberal than another –
none of which is possible under the game form approach.
This chapter runs as follows. In section 2, I contrast Sen’s conception of rights
with the game form conception of rights, and argue that while the latter improves
on Sen’s, it still has limitations, and it continues to run afoul of Nozick’s critique. In
section 3, I present a novel approach to the representation of rights in the language
of social choice. This framework allows us to recover an analogue to Sen’s original
impossibility result, but also to present possibility results which capture standard
deontological views about how rights constrain the pursuit of social welfare. In
section 4, I move on to discuss the possibility of measuring how illiberal a social
state is, and I show that my framework allows us to express a variety of desirable
axiomatic conditions on a measure of illiberalism, and I present representation
results for two such measures. The significance of these results is then discussed.
A practical upshot is that these measures will enable us to improve our evaluations
of countries’ human rights performance. A theoretical upshot is that, with slight
tweaks, these measures will also allow us to represent how strong an individual’s
deontic reasons to avoid performing some act are, providing a sort of representation
result for a class of deontological theories.
6.1 Two formal conceptions of rights
6.1.1 Rights as decisiveness
Sen (1970, pp. 152-153) frames rights as constraints on a social decision function,
which is a mapping from any set of individual orderings %i over the set of possible
social states X to a unique social preference relation % over X, the range of
which is limited to those preference relations which specify, for every subset of X,
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a (not necessarily unique) “best” alternative. He assumes that individuals have
“dictatorship privileges” over social states which differ only with respect to how
they are situated. For example, if x and y differ only with respect to whether your
bedroom walls are painted white or pink, you get to decide between x and y, and
your decision is not to be susceptible to social censure.
From here, Sen (1970, p. 154) defines Liberalism, minimally, as the condition
that there should be at least two individuals in society such that each individual is
“decisive” over at least one pair of social states: an individual is decisive over a pair
(x, y) iff, if that individual prefers x to y, then x is socially preferred to y, and vice
versa if that individual prefers y to x. Sen’s remarkable result is that this condition
is logically inconsistent with two further apparently reasonable restrictions on the
social decision function: Universal Domain, which requires that the domain of
the social decision function include any profile of individual orderings, and Weak
Pareto, which requires that if every individual prefers x to y, then so does society.
To see that these conditions are inconsistent, Sen asks us to imagine two indi-
viduals, Prude and Lewd, and three possible social states – a (“no one reads Lady
Chatterley’s lover”), b (“Prude reads Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Lewd doesn’t),
and c (“Lewd reads Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Prude doesn’t”). Universal do-
main allows us to suppose that a Prude b Prude c and that b Lewd c Lewd a.
If the social decision to be taken is between a and b, then Prude should surely be
decisive, and similarly, if the social decision to be taken is between c and a, then
surely Lewd should be decisive. The Pareto condition implies that b  c, but Sen’s
condition of minimal liberalism implies that a  b and c  a, and thus a cycle
emerges, leaving no best alternative exists.
Commentators on this result agree that it shows that there is a tension between
a respect for rights, on the one hand, and welfarism, on the other. However, many
of those same commentators see a problem with the conception of rights suggested
by Sen’s result. As Gaertner, Pattanaik, and Suzumura (1992, pp. 166-167) and
Sugden (1985, p. 218) show, if we try to formalize all rights as defeasible decisive-
ness powers, certain intuitively plausible assignments of rights become logically
impossible. Sugden asks us to imagine Liz and Ken, who both write diaries; let
pn be the social state in which Liz writes a political diary and Ken a nonpolitical
diary, nn the social state in which neither writes a political diary, np the state in
which Liz writes a nonpolitical diary and Ken writes a political diary, and pp the
state in which both write political diaries. Presumably, Liz should be decisive be-
tween pn and nn, since the only difference between these two states is the content
of her diary. For the same reason, she should be decisive between np and pp, and
Ken should be decisive over pn and pp, and over nn and np.
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However, Liz and Ken cannot logically be decisive over these pairs. Universal
Domain allows us to suppose that pp Ken nn Ken np Ken pn, thereby implying
that neither np nor pn can be socially preferred, and that np Liz pn Liz nn Liz
pp, thereby implying that neither nn nor pp can be socially preferred. But then
no social decision function exists which satisfies Universal Domain and respects
Liz and Ken’s rights. This seems to imply that for social choice to be possible
either society must restrict what preferences individuals may express, or that Liz
and Ken don’t have a right to write what they like in their own diary. Either is
chilling.1
6.1.2 Rights as game forms
The key problem with Sen’s social choice approach was correctly diagnosed by
Nozick (1974, p. 166): rights are not entitlements to the satisfaction of one’s
preferences over social states, but rather protections against interference in one’s
choices. In Liz and Ken’s case, due respect for liberty requires that they both be
allowed to freely decide what to write in their diary, and then, que sera, sera... If
the outcome is not to someone’s liking, that is unfortunate, but it does not imply
any intrusion upon their liberty. Nozick’s insight poses a serious challenge for the
attempt to represent rights in the language of social choice theory, because the
mappings from individual preferences to social preferences which are the bread-
and-butter of social choice theory are typically not sensitive to choice behaviour.
These reflections pushed authors like Gaertner, Pattanaik, and Suzumura (1992)
to propose that rights be defined as game forms. The thought is that different ways
of organizing society can be represented by game forms, which are differentiated by
what strategy profiles they assign to individuals. Of those available game forms,
one of these game forms is assumed to be the “correct” game form, in the sense that
you have a right to φ if φ is (or makes up part of) an available strategy to you in
1Gibbard (1996, pp. 400-402) defended a formalization of rights as decisiveness privileges
that is consistent and does not run into the problem cited here, but he does so by adding a
forfeiture condition. Roughly, if your exercise of your right would block the emergence of a
Pareto superior outcome, your right is forfeited and imposes no constraint on the social decision
function. However adding this condition does not improve things, because if rights are forfeitable
in Gibbard’s sense, then then the cycle between Ken and Liz is broken by forcing Ken to give
up his right of decisiveness over pp and pn, thus implementing pn. But now Ken can no longer
decide what to write in his diary, and his choice is dictated by Liz’s preferences. Moreover,
notice that if Ken is free to choose what diary to write, but is ignorant of what Liz will write, his
maximin and maximax strategy is to write a political diary; likewise Liz’s maximin and maximax
strategy is to write a nonpolitical diary. It then follows that if Liz and Ken both follow their
maximin-cum-maximax strategies, the social state which would result is np, not pn. Gibbard’s
approach therefore implies that allowing Liz and Ken to follow their optimal strategies – which
leads to Liz’s top-ranked outcome – will violate Liz’s rights. Satisfying Liz’s rights forces the
implementation of her second-ranked outcome. This is counterintuitive.
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that game form. Your rights are violated just in case the strategies that are in fact
available to you do not match the strategies that would be available to you in the
correct game form. What game form counts as the right one? Sometimes this is
a matter of stipulation: for example, Sugden just assumes that Liz and Ken both
have a right to write what diary they like, and so the right game form here is a
normal form game with two players, each of whom has two pure strategies: “write
political diary,” and “write non-political diary.” In Pattanaik and Suzumura (1996)
and Suzumura and Yoshihara’s (2006) approach, the right game form is the game
form that society would prefer. On their approach, rights constrain social choice
by forcing the selection of social states to be done by a two-step procedure: first
society decides what game form should be used, out of all the feasible game forms
that could be used, then the social state that is selected is simply the outcome of
the game.
Of course, we don’t have to do things this way. Most deontologists would
probably object to allowing the content of people’s rights be determined by the
outcome of some social choice procedure. So instead we could simply assume that
there is a privileged game form given to us by the true theory of rights, and then
take it as a criterion of evaluation on social choice that it implements the game
form that deviates the least from this privileged form. The true objects of social
choice will then be game forms, or probability distributions over game forms, which
actually seems like a plausible characterization of the empirical process of social
choice: governments and other collective decision-making bodies never determine
a complete social state, they only ever determine strategy profiles, making certain
courses of action possible and others impossible for different individuals, and then
individuals make the choices they make given the options they have.
So the game form approach has much to recommend it. That said, it isn’t
quite as expressive as one might like. What, after all, is a right in this framework?
A right can’t be an entitlement to having a particular strategy made available to
us, at least in the way rights are usually conceptualized, because a strategy may
involve doing a huge sequence of actions, all of which are not protected by the same
rights. Suppose an available strategy to you in a game is “criticize the government,
then join a golf club.” The first of those two acts is protected by a right to free
speech, but the second by a right to free movement and free association. So even if
some game form accurately represents the current state of society, one can’t read
off this representation what kinds of rights people have (e.g., freedom of speech,
association, movement, etc.). A fortiori, if some strategy we’re entitled to isn’t
available, we can’t tell which of these rights are violated nor the extent to which
they are violated.
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This matters. Some rights are more important than others: freedom of speech
usually ranks higher, in most philosophers’ hierarchies of rights, than freedom of
commerce or freedom of automotive circulation (we’re much more willing to fine
people for their driving than for their speech). Some rights may also be unequally
important to different individuals, and therefore the same restrictions on their
rights may be easier or harder for them to bear. So even if you could measure
“distance” from some ideal game form, this distance measure wouldn’t tell you
everything you need to know to accurately assess how well people’s rights are
respected by different actions and social arrangements. Likewise, it goes directly
to the severity of a wrongdoer’s crime which rights they violated, and to what
extent, and this will not be revealed simply by counting how many strategies the
wrongdoer makes unavailable. So while there’s nothing incorrect about the game
form approach, it’s just a bit too coarse-grained to represent everything that is
of moral concern with respect to rights. I therefore wish to propose a different
representation, which is in some respects an extension of the game form approach,
but is more fine-grained and expressive and, I hope, philosophically illuminating.
6.2 A new framework of rights
To motivate my framework, I will adopt a simple heuristic device. Suppose we
place ourselves in the shoes of an impartial but sympathetic and liberal observer,
who is tasked with advising society on what social outcomes it should aim to
bring about. What would such an observer need to know in order to form their
recommendations? For a start, the impartial observer will need to know how well
everyone is doing in the various possible outcomes. But moreover, the liberal
observer will need to know whether bringing about various different outcomes
would violate anyone’s rights. Since the observer is liberal, they will be exceedingly
reluctant to advise any course of action that would require the infringement of
individual rights. To evaluate any given social state, therefore, the liberal observer
will need to know many things: how well is everyone doing? What rights do they
have? Under what conditions are these rights infringed, and in which social states
are these conditions met?
These last three questions raise an even more basic question: what it is, even,
to have a right? Here I will rely on the classic Hohfeldian analysis of rights, as
presented by Thomson (1992). Under this analysis, we can distinguish two kinds of
“basic” rights: claims, and liberties. Claims are a three-place relation between one
person, the claim bearer, a second person, against whom the first person holds her
claim, and a proposition, which the second person is under a duty towards the first
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person of not allowing to be false. For example, to riff on Thomson, I might have a
claim to a banana because you promised to give me one, a claim which is infringed
if you eat the banana you owe me. Liberties are a more complicated many-place
relation between one person, everyone else, and a proposition. Specifically, I am
at liberty to make some proposition true if and only if I have no duty to anyone
to ensure this proposition is false, and everyone else is under a duty to me to not
prevent me from making it true if I try. I am at liberty to walk upon the beach iff
no one has a claim against me that I don’t, and this liberty is infringed iff someone
imposes such constraints upon me as prevent me from walking upon the beach if
I so choose.
In ordinary moral language, we tend to bundle liberties together in broad cate-
gories of negative rights : the classic liberal rights of freedom of speech, association,
movement, conscience, etc. are all bundles of thematically related singular liberties
to make particular propositions true, e.g., the liberty to make it the case that I say
p and the liberty to make it the case that I say q are part of the bundle of liberties
that constitute my right to free speech. And likewise we sometimes bundle claims
together in broad categories of positive rights : it is usually held that the right to
life has a positive aspect which entails a duty of rescue on those who can save you
from death without excessive risk or cost; such a right entails all sorts of claims
against all sorts of people that they not allow certain propositions to obtain, e.g.,
they owe me a duty not to let me drown if they pass me by a pond where I’ve
passed out, a duty to pull me out of the way of a passing train if they can do so
safely, etc.
We can model these ideas quite precisely. Given a finite boolean algebra of
propositions Ω, define for every individual i ∈ N+ a unique schedule of rights
as a finite family Ri = {Ri1, Ri2, ...} with each Rij ⊆ Ω. The elements in each
Rij are propositions. Intuitively, they are the propositions which i either has a
liberty to make true (and could in fact make true if no one prevented them from
doing so), or has a claim against others to being true. I don’t assume that every
individual necessarily has the same number of rights, because under most theories
of rights it is possible for individuals to forfeit certain rights and even bundles of
rights (whether voluntarily or by violating the rights of others), and to acquire new
rights (e.g., couples who get married for example give each other certain rights and
duties). Now, x being a possible world, define Axij ⊆ Ω, intuitively denoting some
set of propositions which are true or which the individual can make true at x, and
which includes all the propositions from Rij which the individual can make true
at world x, or which they have a claim to being true and are in fact true at x. A
right Rij is infringed at world x iff Rij is not a subset of Axij.
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With this, our liberal observer knows what rights individuals have, and under
what conditions they are infringed. Now let the set X of all social states be the
set of all pairs (Ix, Ax), where Ix ⊂ N+ is the population in possible world x, and
Ax is a profile of sets {Axi1, Axi2, ...}, one for each i ∈ Ix. Since a unique social state
(Ix, Ax) is associated to every possible world x, it is convenient to denote social
states simply by the possible world x in which they occur. There are two important
points to note here: first, because x is a possible world, the propositions that all
individuals can in fact make true at x must be logically consistent with each other.
Second, notice that that a profile of sets {Axi1, Axi2, ...} will imply logically a profile
of strategies in a game form, because the union across all j of AXij specifies every
proposition the individual can make true at x – so implicitly, the objects of social
choice in my framework imply game forms.2 However, these objects are also more
informative, as under this way of specifying social states, a liberal observer can
simply read off the specification of a social state how many individuals there are,
which (if any) of their rights have been infringed, and (as we will see later) to what
extent. Indeed, by the definition of what it is for a right to be violated, our liberal
observer can identify the set L of all liberal social states as the set of all x such
that for every i ∈ Ix, Rij ⊆ Axij. Appendix A gives a formal example of a liberal
and illiberal state.
Our liberal observer now knows everything they need to know about people’s
rights in order to evaluate social states. The only thing they don’t know is how
well people are doing across the various possible outcomes. Obviously, for some
outcome to be better than another for some individual i, i has to be a member of
the two populations in terms of which these outcomes are defined. But supposing
they are, let us suppose for ease of exposition that one outcome is better for i
than another just in case i prefers it for its own sake (if you’re unhappy with this,
substitute any old theory of well-being instead). So for every i ∈ N+ let %i be a
preorder over the set {x|i ∈ Ix} of worlds in which i exists. The symmetric and
asymmetric parts of %i are denoted ∼i and i .
With this fairly sparse vocabulary, we can easily recover an analogue to Sen’s
“impossibility of a Paretian liberal” result. Because Sen’s result invokes Pareto
considerations, which can only be applied to cases where the population of interest
is fixed, we will confine our attention here to the set X ′ of all social states defined
for some particular population I. Define a social choice function as a function
C which selects from every nonempty C ′ ⊆ X ′, some nonempty subset of C ′,
2Specifically, a strategy is a maximal set of propositions that the individual can conjunctively
make true. So, for example, if Ax11 = {a,¬a} and Rx12 = {b,¬b} are the two sets of propo-
sitions individual 1 is at liberty to make true, then individual 1 has four strategies available:
a&b, a&¬b,¬a&b and ¬a&¬b.
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intuitively, the outcomes which the liberal observer regards as permissibly selected
by society. Finally, define a social choice rule as a mapping from the set of possible
profiles of preferences over X ′ to the set of possible social choice functions. We
can show that if there are at least two feasible social states, x, y ∈ X ′ such that
x ∈ L, y /∈ L, then there is no social choice rule which satisfies the following three
conditions.
(L) Liberalism: ∀x, y ∈ X ′, if x ∈ L and y /∈ L , then y /∈ C({x, y}).
(U) Universal Domain: every logically possible n-tuple of individual
orderings is included in the social choice rule’s domain.
(P) Weak Pareto: ∀x, y ∈ X ′, if ∀i ∈ I, x i y, then y /∈ C({x, y}).
Proof. Trivial. U requires there to be a social choice function C selecting some
nonempty subset of {x, y} when y is unanimously preferred to x. Since y is unan-
imously preferred, P implies that x /∈ C({x, y}), but since y /∈ L, L implies that
y /∈ C({x, y}). Thus C({x, y}) = ∅. Contradiction.
For an intuitive illustration of this problem, consider the case of a master and
their slave, or of a nation of oppressors and oppressed people, where the oppressed
have been so beaten, broken, and brainwashed that they have come to prefer their
servitude to their liberation. Of course, the oppressors prefer their victims to be
servile and under their control rather than for them to be free. We thus have a
situation where everyone in society prefers the social state where the slaves are
unable to make true countless propositions which they’ve a right to make true.
Weak Pareto implies that the social state in which the slaves remain slaves ought
to be chosen over the state in which they are liberated and go free. Liberalism
obviously implies the contrary. Hence, a contradiction.
The conflict between Pareto and liberalism may arise in other ways as well, as
is well illustrated by the prisoners’ dilemma. In the dilemma, two players have
a right to make it true that they cooperate, or to make it true that they don’t
cooperate. Both players would prefer to be forced to cooperate than to be allowed
to choose whether to cooperate or defect. Thus Pareto implies that society ought to
force each player to cooperate so as to bring about the Pareto-dominant outcome,
but Liberalism prohibits this very same choice. My Liberalism condition is thus
hostile to the coercive engineering of Pareto superior outcomes. This case contrasts
interestingly with the slavery case where it’s clear that P should be violated rather
than L (see e.g., Temkin 2015, 486), whereas in the prisoners’ dilemma it seems
plausible that L should be relaxed, at least provided the social benefits of forced
cooperation were great enough.
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L is too strict a condition, in my view, but it perfectly captures Nozick’s in-
tuition about how rights constrain social choice. By L, any social state which
violates an individual’s rights is eliminated, and the set of social states over which
collective choice is legitimate is restricted to L. Note that L may include many
social states, and therefore L may leave multiple social states uneliminated, so
even if we accept Nozick’s totally uncompromising prioritization of rights, there is
still some room left for social choice. We can, for example, define:
(P∗) L-Strict Pareto: ∀x, y ∈ L, if x %i y for all i, then x ∈
C({x, y}), and furthermore, if, for some i, x i y, then y /∈ C({x, y}).
This condition is consistent with L and U. Additional restrictions may be im-
posed on the social choice rule, since many different social choice rules exist which
satisfy U, L, and P∗. For example, if welfare levels are interpersonally compara-
ble, we can apply a choice-based analogue of the leximin rule to L, and likewise
with the elements in X \ L; this would specify a unique choice function over X,
one reminiscent of Rawls’s two principles of Justice, with Liberalism capturing the
demands of the first principle of justice, and leximin covering the demands of the
difference principle.
My framework thus allows us to capture how, according to two very influential
theories of justice, rights constrain social choice. In fact, a minor modification to
my framework would also allow us to capture how, according to absolutist theories
of deontology like Kant’s, rights constrain individual choice: suppose C selects
those outcomes which it is permissible for you to choose, and suppose we stipulate
that if some individual i’s jth right is infringed in some outcome but you yourself
are not responsible for this, then Axij = Rij. Then L will denote the set of all
outcomes you can bring about without infringing anyone’s rights. L thus prohibits
you from violating anyone’s rights, no matter the consequence, which is just what
absolutist deontology requires.
The simple framework I have proposed for thinking about rights is general
and expressive. For one thing, it is consistent with any substantive theory of
rights: you may assign any individual you like whatever schedule of positive and
negative rights your favourite theory requires (and those are the only two kinds
on any view), and moreover you may choose whether or not to make these rights
co-possible. This latter point is significant: authors disagree on whether rights
must all be co-possible (Nozick, 1974; Steiner, 1977; Scanlon, 2008 argue they
must, while Thomson, 1992 argues they are not). In my framework it is not
required that the elements belonging to a right be logically independent from each
other. It is possible within my framework for one individual to have a claim
6.3. Foundations for a measure of illiberalism 149
to some proposition whose negation another person has a claim to (of course, if
rights aren’t co-possible, then there are no liberal states). But obviously you can
interpret schedules of rights so that they are all logically independent from each
other, in which case rights will all be co-possible.
In addition, my framework is more expressive than the game form approach,
seeing as allows us to read off the specification of the social state much valuable
information which could not be be read off game forms: notably, how many bundles
of rights people have (e.g., right to free speech, right to freedom of movement, etc.),
whether any of these have been violated in any given social state, and, as we will
see in the next section, how extensively these rights have been violated and how
seriously morally wrong it is to violate them.3
A significant limitation of my approach is that it is synchronic, and assumes
schedules of rights as exogenously given. It is therefore not sensitive to how the
content of individual rights can change over time – in Hohfeldian terms, my analy-
sis omits powers, which are abilities to cause changes in the content of one’s rights
or the rights of others. Criminals, by having committed crimes, are usually held
to alienate many of their rights. For example, the freedom of movement of crim-
inals may permissibly be curtailed in spectacular fashion through just punitive
measures. A different assignment of rights is needed to represent the criminal’s
situation before and after the crime: “take a trip to Manilla” would be a protected
proposition before committing a crime, but not afterwards. Ideally we would like
an extension of the present framework that showed how acts by individuals in one
period endogenously determines the assignment of rights in the next.
This limitation aside, the framework I’ve proposed seems adequate for the
purpose of expressing liberal commitments in the language of social choice. In
fact, as I will now show, it allows us to define measures of illiberalism.
6.3 Foundations for a measure of illiberalism
An impartial liberal observer’s concern for rights is not exhausted by the question
of whether a social state is liberal or not. They will also care about the degree
of illiberalism of different social states. If there was no way for whomever they
were advising to avoid infringing anyone’s rights, the liberal observer would not
bottom out of advice: even if we bracket all welfare concerns, they would advise
minimizing, in some fashion, the extent of one’s disrespect for the rights of others.
3Pattanaik (2008) presents a non-game form approach to the representation of rights that
takes the idea of rights as protections on choice seriously, but his framework cannot express any
of this either, not can it represent positive rights, and it implicitly assumes rights are co-possible
and that everyone has only a single right.
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If we are to capture the judgements of such an observer, we stand in need of some
measure of illiberalism, one which will sort out which social states are more un-
choiceworthy than which, from the sole point of view of concerns for individual
rights.
What would our liberal observer’s judgments of the degree of illiberality of
any state be sensitive to? Obviously they will care about how many people’s
rights have been violated, and how many of each of these individuals’ rights have
been violated. They may also care about how rights violations are distributed
across the population. This is all stuff they can read off the specification of the
social state. But moreover, they will care about how deeply these rights have been
violated, and how valuable these rights were. Intuitively, the fewer the propositions
I have a right to make true that I actually can make true at will, the more my
right has been violated, and you do me greater wrong by violating my right more
deeply. Stealing my book for a year is a worse offence than stealing it for an hour.
Likewise, some rights matter more than others: many authors have argued that
negative rights prime over positive rights, and many recognize hierarchies among
negative rights. Likewise, political and civil freedoms are typically held by many
to be more important than economic freedoms.
6.3.1 Definitions
All of this can be precisely expressed in my framework. In appendix A I show how
to construct a family of functions F = {fi : X −→ R|i ∈ N}, unique up to a com-
mon affine transformation, with each fi measuring the extent to which individual
i’s rights are disrespected. Each fi is sensitive to the number of i’s rights that
are infringed, how deeply they are infringed, and how valuable the infringed rights
are, and its uniqueness implies that we can make interpersonal comparisons in the
degrees to which people’s rights are disrespected. The process for constructing
these functions is not complicated, but it is rather long and tedious, so I have
decided to leave it only as an appendix. The interested reader may consult it to
convince themselves that a philosophically well-grounded measure of the extent to
which rights are disrespected can be constructed – I’m not simply assuming such
a convenient structure exists! We can now associate to any outcome (I, Ax) an
|I|-length row vector x = [αfi(x) ... αfi′(x)] with α > 0 that summarizes how
severely disrespected the rights of every individual in I are in outcome x.
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6.3.2 Main results
I am in a position to present my main results. Let g : X −→ R denote a measure
of illiberalism, and consider the following conditions.
(A) Anonymity: for any two row vectors x,y of the same length, if
there is a permutation σ : x −→ y then g(x) = g(y).
In other words, if the only difference between x and y is the identity of the indi-
viduals whose rights have been infringed, then we must regard x and y as equally
illiberal.
(RI) Replication Invariance: if y can be obtained by multiplying
x by a duplication matrix, then g(y) = g(x).
This condition requires that if we can get from x to y just by duplicating the pop-
ulation in x some whole number of times, duplicating every single rights violation
in the process, then x is equally illiberal as y. Or in other words, illiberalism
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You can see that y is an replication of x, in the intuitive sense that we’ve just
copied and pasted twice, in turn, each column. And sure enough, you can get to






1 1 0 0




1 1 0 0
]
.
(PD) Pigou-Dalton: for any two x, y, if there is a pair i, i′ such that
1. fi(x) + fi(y) = fi′(x) + fi′(y)
2. fi(x) < fi(y) < fi′(x) and fi(x) < fi′(y) < fi′(x)
3. fi”(x) = fi”(y) for all other i” ∈ I
then g(x) > g(y).
PD says that if x can be obtained from y by “transferring” rights violations from one
individual to another whose rights (prior to the transfer) were overall disrespected
to exactly the same degree, leaving everyone else’s situation unchanged. The
“transfer” makes the distribution of rights violations over these two individuals
strictly more unequal than before. PD, in other words, encodes in g(x) an aversion
to strict increases in the degree of inequality with which rights violations are
distributed across the population.
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(PI) Pareto Illiberalism: for any x, y, if fi(x) ≥ fi(y) for all i then
g(x) ≥ g(y). Further, if there is an i ∈ I such that fi(x) > fi(y) then
g(x) > g(y).
Illiberalism increases in the degree to which each individual’s rights have been
disrespected, i.e., the more people’s rights are disrespected, the worse things are
(C) Continuity: g−1(V ) is an open set in X for every open set V in
R, where g−1(V ) ≡ {x ∈ X|g(x) ∈ V }.
It’s hard to read off C what, intuitively, it requires. But roughly, it says that
there are no qualitative “jumps” in the value assessments encoded in g(x), e.g.,
infinitesimal changes in how deeply a right is infringed can only make infinitesimal
changes in the value of g(x). Or in other words, evaluative judgements should not
be hypersensitive to arbitrarily small differences in the non-evaluative facts they
supervene on. In this case, the non-evaluative facts are the degrees to which each
individual’s rights are disrespected, and the identity and number of people in the
population of interest.
(S) Separability: for all x, y, z, zz with the same population size
such that fi(x) = fi(y) ⇐⇒ fi(z) = fi(zz), and for any i such that
fi(x) 6= fi(y) it is the case that fi(x) = fi(z) ⇐⇒ fi(y) = fi(zz), it
follow that g(x) ≥ g(y) ⇐⇒ g(z) ≥ g(zz).
This axiom requires that the assessment of two outcomes does not depend on
individuals unaffected by the choice between these outcomes. An example again

















Separability implies that g(x) ≥ g(y) ⇐⇒ g(z) ≥ g(zz), because the only
difference between x, y and z, zz is the degree to which the rights of the individual
in the second column were infringed, but this individual is unaffected by the choice
between x and y and by the choice between zz and z.
(SI) Scale Invariance: if x = αy then g(x) = g(y).
This final axiom says that if we rescale the functions which represent the overall
degree to which each individual’s rights are disrespected by a common factor,
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we don’t change how illiberal the outcome is. As is made clear in appendix A,
constructing the fi requires a conventional choice of unit. Rescaling here amounts
to changing the unit of measurement.
To see the motivation behind these conditions, let us place ourselves once again
in the shoes of an impartial but liberal observer who is trying to assess how well
individuals’ rights are respected in states of varying sizes, and imagine g(x) as a
representation of our assessments. Seen in this way, conditions A and PI are sine
qua non properties of g(x). An impartial liberal observer would not care about the
identity, as such, of those whose rights are violated, and they would judge things
to be worse the more people’s rights are disrespected.
SI and C are technical requirements on g(x), rather than substantive ones, but
they are innocuous. Regarding SI, it’s clear that nothing essential hangs on our
choice of unit for fi. All that matters is that there is a common normalization
across all i, because this captures the notion that everyone’s rights matter equally,
which is a foundational commitment of any liberal theory of rights, and that there
is an upper bound on how deeply any right can be infringed, which is true by
construction. This common normalization is preserved by common scalar multi-
plication. C, meanwhile, is attractive for guaranteeing that optimization problems
have solutions. If the imperative to avoid infringing rights competes with the aim
of promoting welfare, C guarantees that there is at the very least a boundary of
efficient solutions, such that one cannot further either end without hampering the
other. This would be a weak argument for it if there was any reason to think C
imposed potentially distorting constraints on our impartial observer’s judgements,
but thankfully this isn’t so. Our ordinary judgements about how well-respected
individuals’ rights are in different outcomes don’t appear to be hypersensitive to
arbitrarily tiny differences between those outcomes. Indeed, note that fi is already
a continuous function; it would be very surprising if our judgements about how
severely an individual’s rights may be disrespected were continuous, but not our
judgements about how severely everyone’s rights may be disrespected overall. C
is therefore innocuous.
RI and PD are more substantive, but likewise very compelling. To appreciate
RI, imagine that differently sized outcomes correspond to outcomes in differently
populated countries. Our impartial observer shouldn’t penalize some countries
for having a larger population than others, because assessments of the degree of
illiberality of a state should track something like how well that country is doing
to protect the rights of its citizens, and such assessments must necessarily be
relativized to population size. If there are ten times as many rights infringed in
the US as in Canada, but there are also ten times as many people in the US, then,
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all else being equal, neither country has done better than the other in protecting
its citizens’ rights. And to see that an impartial liberal observer would respect the
PD, it must simply be remembered that liberalism is inherently hostile to tyranny,
in general, and to the tyranny of the majority, in particular. Majorities must not
permitted to statute with impunity on the rights of minorities, so so we ought to
penalize social states that marginalize some people for the benefit of others.
This leaves S, which is not, in my view, a necessary condition on g(x), because
whether or not it is desirable to impose it will depend on how exactly we under-
stand the motivation driving our impartial observer’s aversion to inequality. Our
impartial observer will satisfy S if they don’t care, as such, for how individuals
fare with respect to each other in terms of the degree to which their rights are dis-
respected, but only about how each individual is doing, and they reach an overall
assessment of the outcomes by somehow aggregating these individual judgements.
How is such indifference consistent with a positive concern for the distribution of
rights violations across the population? Well, the impartial observer’s dislike for
inegalitarian distributions might stem from their special concern for those whose
rights are most disrespected in absolute terms. That is, if they believe that there
is added value to alleviating by an increment of e the degree to which i’s rights are
disrespected when i’s rights are more disrespected in absolute terms than when
they are less disrespected in absolute terms (i.e., fi(x) is closer to 0), then they will
favour more egalitarian distributions. This is arguably a reasonable attitude for
a liberal: the reason I’m so concerned with human rights abuses in Myanmar has
nothing to do with the fact that the rights of the Rohingya are more disrespected
than those of the military head brass, but rather with how incredibly profoundly,
in absolute terms, their rights are disrespected. There is also a good practical
reason to impose S, which is that if you know that some number of people are sure
to be unaffected by your decisions, you won’t need to gather data on how disre-
spected their rights are, and you can confine your attention to only the slice of the
population that will be affected. In practice, this will facilitate the computation
of g(x).
That said, in justifying PD I appealed to a sense that liberalism is hostile to
the tyranny of majorities over minorities. And you might think that this hostility
is fundamental, as opposed to being derivative of a special concern for the rights of
the most disrespected. That is, you can reasonably argue that the best explanation
for PD is that liberalism is intrinsically opposed to social domination: we don’t
want tyrants and oligarchs lording over subordinate populations of drones and
servants. Domination is an inherently relational concept though – there is no
domination without a dominator and a dominatee. So you simply can’t come to
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a correct judgement about how illiberal a social state is without looking at how
individuals do with respect to each other. To give an example, you might argue
that what’s so intolerable about slavery isn’t merely how severely the rights of
the slaves are infringed, it’s that their rights are infringed as deeply as they are
while the masters and other free persons enjoy the full gamut of liberal rights – in
one respect it would be better if everyone’s rights were infringed as deeply as the
slaves, for at least then there would be no such stark tyrannies. If you buy this
line of argument, then our impartial observer will want to infringe S.
I don’t wish to take a stand on whether to impose S or not. The philosophical
argument for violating it is stronger, to my mind, but there is a reasonable philo-
sophical argument for imposing it as well, and tractability considerations militate
in favour of imposing it. Accordingly, I propose two measures of illiberalism that
disagree only about whether to impose S. Thus I show:
Theorem 6.3.1. g(x) satisfies A, SI, RI, PD, MI, C, and S iff









γ being any strictly increasing and strictly convex transformation function.
Theorem 6.3.2. g(x) satisfies A, SI, RI, PD, MI, C, and violates S iff
g(x) ≥ g(y) ⇐⇒
∑




i∈Iy αi · fi(y)
|Iy|
,
where {βi} = {αi} ⇐⇒ |Ix| = |Iy|, all the βi and αi are positive and can be
arranged in a strictly increasing order, such that a person whose rights are strictly
more disrespected gets a greater factor βi or αi.
These results follow from very similar results proved elsewhere by Atkinson
(1970), McCarthy (2018), Adler (2018), and Fleurbaey (2018). Sketches of the
proofs are in the appendix.
We now have two well-behaved measures of illiberalism that capture a wide
range of liberal commitments, but we’re not done yet. I opened this chapter with
the promise of offering a way of representing the strength of an individual agent’s
reasons not to perform some act, out of respect for the rights of others. Yet the
heuristic I’ve used to justify the conditions above appeals to an impartial observer.
Under a deontological theory of morality, there are no doubt contexts in which it
is appropriate for an individual agent to take an impartial point of view on the
world and survey, as it were, how well-respected individuals’ rights are in different
societies (e.g., this might be important if you’re trying to decide in which society
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you’d like to live, or which society you would like to see brought about). But
the impartial observer is really a consequentialist sort of daemon, and we cannot
substitute their judgements for our own in most ordinary decision-making contexts.
There are two key reasons for this. First, deontology takes very seriously the
distinction between the rights that I infringe and the rights that others infringe –
a distinction that is not salient to the impartial observer, since they are precisely
just an observer, not an agent – and they want to make room for permissible
partiality. That is, in general, we have much greater reason to avoid infringing
some rights than we have to prevent others from infringing those same rights. To
be sure, if there were enough sufficiently weighty rights we could prevent others
from infringing sufficiently deeply, then our reasons to prevent the rights violations
might swamp our reasons to avoid comparatively much more minor infringements,
but it takes some doing. Likewise, a mother is permitted to care more about
protecting the rights of her child than about protecting the rights of her sister-in-
law’s third cousin once removed. This is all by way of saying that if you were to
interpret g(.) as representing the weight of your reasons not to bring about some
outcome, purely out of respect for the rights of others, anonymity is a singularly
implausible condition.
Second, while it makes sense to relativize illiberality to population size, it
does not make sense to relativize the absolute weight of your deontic reasons to
population size. This can be brought out with a pair of examples. Suppose you
were choosing which country to move to: you would surely care about the rate of
disrespect for rights in that country more than the absolute extent to which rights
are disrespected. The United States are more populous than North Korea, so it’s
not impossible to imagine they infringe the rights of more of their citizen than
North Korea does, just because there are so many more Americans than North
Koreans, but relative to population size there is clearly more respect for rights
in America. Wouldn’t you rather live in the US? But suppose you face a choice
between violating no one’s rights and violating some number of people’s rights;
would the weight of your reasons not to infringe the many’s rights diminish – i.e.,
would it make it easier to justify – if the total population were larger? Obviously
not.
These remarks point to a simple way of modifying the measures derived earlier
so that they measure instead the weight of our deontic reasons not to perform
acts which are the bringing-about of various outcomes. Instead of averaging sums
of weighted fi(.), we take the sum tout court of weighted fi(.), where the weights
reflect not simply inequality aversion, but also the extra weight that the individual
is permitted to place on the rights of those close to them, and the extra weight
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they must place on those rights which they would be personally responsible for
infringing if they chose some particular course of action. Thus, under an “egali-
tarian” construal of what’s wrong with inequality, the weight of an individual k’s





where the weighing parameter is indexed to individual k, to allow for differential
weighting based permissible partiality, and to the outcome x, to allow for differen-
tial weighting based on whether k is personally responsible for infringing individual
i’s rights by causing x, and to individual i, to ensure that, all else being equal,
individuals whose rights are more disrespected get weightier β-parameters.
6.4 Summary
What is the significance of all these results? In an interview by J. S. Kelly, Kenneth
Arrow confessed himself unhappy with the discourse of rights: it’s not that the
vocabulary of rights isn’t often very appealing, but he worried that you can always
make rights say what you want them to, and so he concluded that until “somebody
produces a logic of rights in terms of which we can argue, I really find the whole
issue is unfocused” (Sen, Arrow, and Suzumura, 2011). This chapter is my answer
to Arrow’s demand.
I’ve put forward a new way of formalizing rights. As we’ve seen, my approach
is more general than other approaches, being capable of representing both positive
and negative rights, and being consistent with any substantive theory of rights. In
particular, it allows us to define conditions on permissible choice that perfectly cap-
ture Nozick’s intuition about how rights constrain choice. But the main takeaway
point is just that, within the basic framework I presented in hand, we can express
in social choice-theoretic language a wide range of liberal – and, more generally,
deontological – commitments, including commitments against social tyrannies of
the majority, commitments to the equal value of everyone’s natural rights and of
everyone’s interests in having their rights respected, and more. My results give
deontology a proper “seat at the table” of social choice theory, when until now
deontology and social choice theory have been to each other as two ships passing
by in the night. All taken together, this is proof of concept, I believe, for my
proposed way of fitting rights inside social choice theory.
Moreover, we have seen that the interaction of these commitments, taken to-
gether with a technical assumption (C), has a very specific structure which can
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be conveniently summarized in functional forms that are familiar in welfare eco-
nomics and normative ethics. This has an immediate theoretical payoff. Section
3 showed how, in my framework, rights constrain social and individual choice for
absolutist theories of deontology: the non-violation of rights always dominates.
But with the two measures of illiberalism proposed in section 4 in hand, we can
study in the language of social choice theory how the package of moral commit-
ments that is summarized by the g(.) or gk(.) of our choice interacts with other
sorts of moral commitments, such as welfare-consequentialist commitments, which
can themselves be represented as functions from X to the reals. This opens up
an interesting research program for moderate deontologists who believe that our
deontic reasons to respect rights can be traded off against our axiological rea-
sons to promote welfare. Since both kinds of reasons can both be represented by
continuous real-valued functions over a common set of outcomes, we can combine
them in various ways (e.g., linear combination) and study how thus combined they
constrain permissible choice.
My results also have significant practical payoffs: many think tanks and NGOs
have an interest in measuring how well individual freedom is respected in different
countries. The Cato and The Fraser Institute (2019) have for many years produced
a Human Freedom Index, self-consciously grounded in a conception of freedom
owing to Locke (1948) and Berlin (1969), which ranks countries by the extent of
the economic and personal freedoms they offer, based on 76 sub-indices which we
then average over. Each indicator is ranked on an intuitive scale from 0 to 10, with
0 indicating no freedom along that indicator and 10 indicating maximal freedom,
then they average out the scores, weighing the overall economic freedom score and
the overall political freedom score equally. Other measures of human rights have
been proposed in the political science literature, all using a similar methodology.
The most influential measure of human rights in political science is the “Gastil
scale,” which involves simply drawing up a checklist of political and civil liberties
and scoring countries from 1 to 7 on each list depending on how poorly, in the
evaluator’s judgement, they fill out the checklist (see e.g., Gastil, 1990; Muller and
Seligson, 1987; Foweraker and Landman, 2000; Landman, 2004; Stepan and Skach,
1993).
These scoring rules can be quite illuminating, but ultimately the score just
reflects an evaluator’s ordinal intuitive judgements of how well countries do with
respect to different indicators. So, fundamentally, it isn’t clear how the principles
which motivate the scoring rules actually constrain their computation. Moreover,
averaging or summing over intuitive scores, as these indices require, is also du-
biously meaningful, because these numbers merely represent an ordinal ranking
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of countries, and because the different indicators measure quite different things –
e.g., it’s not clear what it means to average over the integrity of the legal system
and the absence of restrictions on freedom of movement. One worries it’s a bit
like averaging my weight in Kg with my body temperature in degrees Celcius:
both are important health variables, but they cannot be meaningfully averaged.
In contrast, with my measures of illiberalism, liberal commitments axiomatically
constrain the computation of the indices, and guarantee the meaningfulness of
comparisons in overall degrees of illiberalism. My framework therefore opens up





Ipromised in the previous chapter to discuss how much protection the processaspect of freedom requires, i.e., how strong are the prohibitions rights impose
on interference in the personal liberty of others. However, the possibility results I
presented paint an uncompromising picture of liberty’s priority over welfare. Lib-
eralism and the limited Pareto principle prohibit any inroads into the protected
sphere of individual liberty for the sake of improving social welfare. Fiat Justitia,
pereat Mundus. This picture accords with general principles of constitutional de-
sign. We generally want constitutions to place hard limits on government power
by enshrining certain rights and freedoms that no lawful act may breach. And
it finds support from figures as divergent on most other matters as R. Dworkin
(1977) and Nozick (1974), who defend the view of rights as, respectively, trumps
against competing interests, and side-constraints on permissible choice. This is not
surprising, as the framework I developed was designed to capture this Nozickean
intuition.
Clearly, this picture clashes with common sense. It strains our sense of empa-
thy and moderation to accept that no inroads into protected spheres of individual
liberty, however tiny, may be sanctioned to avert any amount of human suffer-
ing, however acute and widespread. Nozick himself expressed discomfort at this
thought, and many deontologists respond to these sorts of cases by introducing
threshold views of the constraining power of rights, according to which rights can
permissibly be infringed if the consequences of respecting them are sufficiently
horrible (see, e.g., Thomson, 1984; Moore, 1989; Nagel, 1972). I am sympathetic
to such views, and so, for the final chapter of this thesis, I propose to defend a
moderated vision of how rights constrain social and individual choice.
Not everyone recognizes the need for moderation in the defence of rights. There
are absolutists who insist that the world must sooner perish than we violate deonto-
logical constraints (Ellis, 1992; Alexander, 2000). I do not wish to beg the question
against the absolutists. And so, rather than start with a positive argument for
moderation, I propose to first show that the strict Nozickean vision enshrined in
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Liberalism, which is defined in a context where the consequences of our choices are
known to us, cannot be coherently extended to the context of uncertainty without
undermining absolutist starting points. From this initial argument I build a case
for moderation on premises that should be acceptable even to absolutists, and I
show how, with the measures of illiberalism developed in chapter 6 in hand, we
can weigh the right against the good in a way that is attractive.
My argument is structured as follows. In section 1 I extend the basic vocabulary
developed in chapter 6 to the context of uncertainty, and I argue that the most
natural extension of Liberalism to this context takes the form of an Extended
Liberalism (EL) axiom which encodes a strict preference for any act guaranteeing
a liberal social state to any act which does not. I then lay out a few impossibility
results, showing that any social choice rule satisfying Extended Liberalism and
two further conditions must violate non-atomicity and the sure-thing principle.
Violating these axioms comes with well-known costs. This is an initial blow against
absolutist deontology, but not a decisive one, since absolutists may be willing to
pay such pragmatic costs if it purchases them a strong set of rights.
However, I argue in section 2 that EL contradicts what absolutists like Nozick
themselves say about about the permissible exercise of our right to punish, given
that we must rely on methods for identifying wrong-doers that necessarily carry the
risk of false convictions. Indeed, under uncertainty, EL implies that such rights
are de facto never permissibly exercised – a much more bitter pill to swallow
for absolutists, since it largely strips our rights of value, and makes it harder
to justify violating Savage’s axioms. Making room for the permissible exercise
of these rights requires relaxing EL, but then freedom loses its absolute priority
over personal good in the transition from certainty to uncertainty. And if we are
prepared to part with absolutism under uncertainty, then I suggest we face no
pressure to accept it under certainty either. I thus move in section 3 to defend
general principles for decision-making under certainty and uncertainty that encode
a more moderate picture of the priority of personal liberty over social welfare. I
then argue in section 4 that this new framework defuses standard objections to
moderate deontology, notably the objection that it leads to strange verdicts in the
neighborhood of the thresholds.
7.1 The framework of liberty extended
As in the previous chapter, we start with a finite boolean algebra of propositions
Ω, and define for every individual i ∈ N+ a unique schedule of rights as a finite
ordered set Ri = {Ri1, Ri2, ...} with each Rij ⊆ Ω. The elements in each Rij are
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propositions, intuitively, the propositions which i either has a liberty to make true,
or has a claim against others to being true. Now define Axij ⊆ Ω, which includes
all propositions from Rij which the individual can in fact make true in outcome
x, or which they have a claim to being true and are in fact true. A right Rij is
infringed iff Rij is not a subset of Axij.
The set X of all outcomes is the set of all pairs (Ix, Ax), where Ix ⊂ N+ is
the population in outcome x, and Ax is a profile of sets {Axi1, Axi2, ...}, one for
each i ∈ RI . The set L of all liberal social states is the set of all (Ix, Ax) such
that for every Ri ∈ RI , Rij ⊆ Axij. As before, since exactly one pair (Ix, Ax) is
associated with every possible world, it is convenient to denote outcomes simply by
the possible world in which they occur. In liberal social states, no one’s rights are
infringed. Of course, if someone’s rights are infringed in some outcome x, whether
you would be the one to infringe those rights by bringing x about, or whether you
would simply be failing to prevent others from infringing them, makes a difference
for whether it would be permissible for you to bring about x. So let us simply
stipulate that if some individual i’s jth right is infringed in some outcome but you
yourself are not responsible for this, then, from your point of view, Rij ⊆ Axij.
Under this interpretation, L is the set of outcomes you can bring about without
infringing any rights.
There are different decision theories one can adopt to extend this basic frame-
work to the context of uncertainty, but for ease of exposition I will adopt that of
Savage (1954). On this framework, the primitives are states of the world, which are
the features of the world over which we have no control, and consequences, which
are the desirable or undersirable states of affairs that we can bring about through
our actions. The consequences of our actions depend on the states of the world,
and we are uncertain about which state of the world is the actual state of the world.
Thus we begin by defining a partition S of states over the set of possible worlds,
a set X of outcomes (defined as above), and a set Γ of acts, which are functions
from S to X. Subsets of S are called events. We then define, for every individual
i, a preference relation %i defined over Γ. If this preference relation satisfies all
of Savage’s axioms, then their preferences over acts can be represented by a util-
ity function unique up to positive linear transformations, and their beliefs about
the state of the world can be represented by a unique probability distribution pi
defined over S.
The aim of the game now is to provide restrictions on a moral choice rule which
maps profiles of individual preferences onto a choice function C which selects, from
any set A ⊆ Γ, a nonempty subset of A, intuitively denoting those acts which are
permissibly chosen from A. In chapter 6, I introduced the axiom of Liberalism,
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which encodes the Nozickean view of rights as side-constraints on permissible choice
by prohibiting illiberal social states from being chosen when liberal states are
available – that is, by prohibiting any rights infringements when it is instead
possible not to infringe any rights. This intuition can be generalized to our present
context by the following criterion:
(EL) Extended Liberalism: for all f, g ∈ A ⊆ Γ, if f(s) ∈ L for all
non-null s, but there is a non-null s such that g(s) /∈ L, then g /∈ C(A).
In other words, an act entailing the possible violation of someone’s rights is not
permissibly chosen over an act guaranteeing the non-violation of anyone’s rights
– morality prohibits gambling with people’s rights when you don’t have to. This
condition entails the more limited condition of Liberalism, for in the degenerate
case of certainty where f(sk) = x ∈ L and g(sk) = y /∈ L for all sk ∈ S, EL
requires you to choose f and not g, which is just what Liberalism requires. EL
receives direct support from Nozick’s (1974, p. 106) own view on how epistemic
considerations weigh on permissible action:
If doing act A would infringe Q’s rights unless condition C obtains, then
someone who does not know that C obtains may not do A. Since we
may assume that all know that inflicting a punishment upon someone
infringes his rights unless he is guilty of an offense, we may make do
with the weaker principle: if someone knows that doing act A would
infringe Q’s rights unless condition C obtains, then someone who does
not know that C obtains may not do A. Weaker still, but sufficient for
our purposes, is: If someone knows that doing act A would infringe
Q’s rights unless condition C obtains, he may not do A if he has not
ascertained that C obtains through being in the best possible position
for ascertaining this. (This weakening of the consequent also avoids
various problems connected with epistemological skepticism.)
Under its two stronger formulations, Nozick’s view straightforwardly entails EL.
The weaker version also entails EL, subject to a small modelling choice. Nozick’s
third principle seems motivated by the thought if you’ve ruled out all possibility
that φ-ing would infringe anyone’s rights, barring consideration of unreasonable
sceptical scenarios, then you’ve done your due diligence – no one could blame you
for doing what was sure beyond a reasonable doubt to infringe no one’s rights. So
if in specifying S, we leave out any states describing absurd sceptical scenarios,
Nozick’s weak principle entails EL.
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Extended Liberalism also flows from a standard Kantian picture of deontologi-
cal duties. In the view Kant expresses in the Groundwork, duties and prohibitions
apply primarily to maxims – or as Tennenbaum (2017, p. 691) puts it, “to what
we can will directly (rather than by means of willing something else).” He goes
on: “we can will directly only what we know that we can do by (in) willing it.
The requirement to keep one’s promises applies to an agent only insofar as she
knows that by doing certain things, she’ll be keeping her promise.” Keeping this
in mind, suppose that the antecedent condition of EL is satisfied. Then, under
Tennenbaum’s reading of Kant, the duty not to infringe anyone’s rights applies to
you, because you have an available alternative, f , which you know does not violate
anyone’s rights, thus you can will to violate no one’s rights by willing f . Of course,
you have another alternative, g, which you do not know will fail to violate anyone’s
rights. Is it permissible to choose g? Not as I understand Tennenbaum: since you
do not know that by choosing g, you will violate no one’s rights, you cannot will to
violate no one’s rights by (in) willing g. You would therefore fail to comply with
Kantian obligation to will that you violate no one’s rights by choosing g. And
since I am assuming that the obligation to violate no one’s rights is absolute, the
fact that choosing g fails to meet this obligation entails that g cannot be chosen.
The consequent of EL is therefore satisfied. Thus, Kantianism also leads us to
EL. And EL is quite a restrictive condition, as it quickly generates impossibility
results. Consider:
(U) Universal Domain: every logically possible set of n individual
preorders is included in the social choice rule’s domain.
(LEAP) L-Ex Ante Pareto: for any two f, g ∈ A ⊆ Γ such that EL
does not imply f /∈ C(A), if f i g for all i ∈ I, then g /∈ C(A)
(P6) Non-atomicity: If g /∈ C({f, g}), then for any x ∈ X, there is
a finite partition {E1, E2, ..., Em} of S such that:
• f ′(sk) = x for any sk ∈ Ek, but f ′(sk) = f(sk) for any sq /∈ Ek,
• g′(sk) = x for any sk ∈ Ek, but g′(sk) = g(sk) for any sq /∈ Ek,
• and g /∈ C({f ′, g}) and g′ /∈ C({f, g′}).
(P2) Sure-Thing Principle: if f, g, f ′, g′ are acts such that:
• f(s) = g(s) and f ′(s) = g′(s) for all s ∈ E ⊂ S,
• f(s) = f ′(s) and g(s) = g′(s) for all s /∈ E,
then f ∈ C({f, g}) if and only if f ′ ∈ C({f ′, g′})
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U requires that individuals be allowed to have what preferences they like.
LEAP expresses the very weak unanimity condition that it is impermissible to
implement a course of action which is universally dispreferred to an alternative
that is itself not excluded by EL. P6 is one of Savage’s axioms (only slightly re-
formulated here using a choice function rather than a preference relation), and
intuitively it demands that there be no outcome so good or so bad that it swamps
the improbability of any given event. That is, if f is already more choiceworthy
than g, then f remains more choiceworthy even if we add x as an additional pos-
sible consequence of f , provided that the chance of x’s occurrence is sufficiently
small. The intuition behind Savage’s famous sure-thing principle (likewise slightly
reformulated) is that if two acts generate the same outcome in one event E, but
a different outcome if E fails to materialize, then if one of those two acts is more
choiceworthy than the other it is because it generates a better outcome in the
event that E does not occur. Or to put things slightly differently, the desirabil-
ity/choiceworthiness of some act is increasing in the desirability/choiceworthiness
of each of its possible outcomes, if these could be brought about directly.
It is easily shown that no social choice rule exists which satisfies EL, U, LEAP,
and P6. Let f, g be two acts such that f(s) ∈ L for all s ∈ S and g(s) ∈ L for
all s ∈ S. Universal Domain requires there to exist a social choice function for
individual preferences for which f i g. LEAP then requires g /∈ C({g, f}). Now
let x be an illiberal outcome. Non-atomicity requires that for any x /∈ L there is
an event E and an act f ′ such that f ′(s) = x for all s ∈ E, f ′(s) = f(s) for all
s /∈ E, and g /∈ C({g, f ′}). But since g(s) ∈ L for all non-null s ∈ S and x /∈ L,
Extended Liberalism implies f ′ /∈ C({g, f ′}). Contradiction.
Likewise, no social choice rule exists which satisfies EL, U, LEAP, and P2. To





f Illiberal outcome High-welfare liberal outcome Illiberal outcome
g Liberal outcome Liberal outcome Illiberal outcome
f’ Illiberal outcome High-welfare liberal outcome Liberal outcome
g’ Liberal outcome Liberal outcome Liberal outcome
Universal domain requires there to be a social choice rule for individual prefer-
ences for which f i g for all i ∈ I. Extended Limited Weak Pareto thus requires
g /∈ C({g, f}). Since f agrees with g and f ′ agrees with g′ in event E, and f
agrees with f ′ and g agrees with g′ in event ¬E, the sure-thing principle implies
that g′ /∈ C({f ′, g′}). But since g′ generates a liberal outcome in every possible
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state of the world, Extended Liberalism requires that f ′ /∈ C({f ′, g′}). Contradic-
tion.
Conditions U and LEAP are innocuous. A hard-line deontologist must there-
fore violate the Savage axioms if they wish to preserve EL. The cost of violating
Non-atomicity is quite steep. It implies that morality requires us to pay any price
for the certainty that we will infringe no one’s rights. Thus even if you believe that
the likelihood you will infringe someone’s rights by φ-ing is astronomically small,
you must be willing to pay any price to bring that chance down to 0. Indeed it
implies we should be willing to pay as much for a great increase in our confidence
that φ-ing will infringe no one’s rights as for an infinitesimal increase in our con-
fidence, provided the increase moves us to certainty. For those, like myself, who
think that one good reason to reject consequentialism is that it is too demand-
ing of agents, requiring excessive sacrifices in the pursuit of the impartial good
(see also Williams, 1974; Lenman, 2000; McElwee, 2017), this is an embarrassing
conclusion. And we’re not out of the woods, because violations of the sure-thing
principle don’t come cheap either.
The standard pragmatic argument for obeying the sure-thing principle is that
agents who violate it are diachronically inconsistent, and will sometimes choose
courses of action which, by their own lights, are not as choiceworthy as their
alternatives. In our context, the violation of the sure-thing Principle implies that
we expose ourselves to being goodness-pumped: we will pay to do what we could
have done without paying. To see this, consider the following choice tree, where
square nodes represent choice nodes, where the agent decides whether to go left or
right, and round nodes represent chance nodes, where nature decides whether we
go left or right. Further, I let L denote a liberal outcome, L+ denote a high-welfare
liberal outcome, I denote an illiberal outcome, and ε some small benefit the agent
could provide to themselves or to someone else. E and F denote probabilistically
independent events, such that p(E) = 0.11 and p(F ) = 10/11.
The decision situation in this tree is the following: at t = 1, the individual can
choose between doing g∗ or f ∗. If the individual does f ∗ and E turns out to be
the case, this puts them in a later position to choose between doing r or r′, thus
giving the agent three strategies to choose from: g∗, f ∗ + r, and f ∗ + r′.































Notice that none of our three strategies are ruled out by EL, since none is
guaranteed to infringe no individual’s rights – and in particular, at the first choice
node, neither g∗ nor f ∗ is ruled out by EL. Further, observe that acts f ∗ + r
and g∗ have the same payoff as acts f and g from table 1, plus a small benefit
of ε in the case of g∗. We know that g /∈ C({g, f}), but if ε is small enough,
people’s preferences will not reverse. A reapplication of LEAP therefore yields
g∗ /∈ C({g∗, f ∗ + r, f ∗ + r′}). But supposing the agent chose f ∗ at the first choice
node and E turns out to be the case, then they arrive at the second choice node,
where it is not permissible for them to choose r instead of r′, because, unlike r, r′
is an act guaranteed to infringe no one’s rights. Since it is only rational to choose
a strategy which it would later be rational to pursue if one had the choice not to,
it follows that f ∗+ r /∈ C({g∗, f ∗+ r, f ∗+ r′}). Thus the only strategy that is left
uneliminated is f ∗ + r′.
But this is an irrational strategy. Whether or not E obtains, g∗ is more choice-
worthy than f ∗+r′: f ∗+r will turn out to infringe no one’s rights if and only if g∗
would also turn out to infringe no one’s rights, but at least g∗ is guaranteed to be
of extra benefit to someone. Our reasons for choice become internally inconsistent:
we are adopting a strategy we know we will be unable to commit to on the grounds
that, assuming we will later commit to it, this strategy is more choiceworthy than
its alternative.
There are two standard solution concepts for dealing with this sort of diachronic
inconsistency. The first is Resolute Choice, which instructs agents to stick to the
strategy they adopted at earlier choice nodes, even if by the time they reach later
choice nodes, they no longer judge this strategy to be optimal. In our context, this
would mean choosing to gamble with the rights of others by choosing r instead of
complying with one’s duty to infringe no one’s rights. This is not an attractive
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solution for someone with absolutist sympathies, which leaves us with the second
solution concept, Sophisticated Choice. Sophisticated choosers appreciate that
not all strategies that are open to them at the first choice node in a decision tree
are ones that they can follow through on, so they limit their attention to those
strategies which it will be permissible for them to follow through on at every
subsequent choice node. More precisely, assume the longest branches in some
tree have k choice nodes. A sophisticated chooser decides what the best choice is
at node k, and assumes no other choice is possible once they reach k, then works
backwards until they reach the root choice node. In our context, since f ∗+r is not
a strategy which it is permissible to follow through on at the second choice node,
sophisticated choice implies that only g∗ and f ∗+r′ are permissible strategies, and
between those two strategies, LEAP requires choosing g∗.
Sophisticated choice immunizes an agent obeying EL and LEAP against certain
displays of diachronic inconsistency. Unfortunately, there are well-known results
showing that sophisticated choosers will choose dominated strategies in other sorts
of cases (Rabinowicz, 1995; Briggs, 2015), and that moreover they will sometimes
pay to avoid free information that is relevant to their decision about what to do
(Al-Najjar and Weinstein, 2009).1 So the threat of irrationality looms large, and
this gives us initial reason to be skeptical of absolutist deontology. Morality is very
dearly bought if it comes at the expense of rationality. That said, the pragmatic
costs of irrationality are paid in the coin of welfare, not the coin of failing to comply
with duty, so the price of imposing EL may well be worth the prize for a really
hard-nosed deontologist, as it extends absolutist commitments to the context of
uncertainty. However, as the next section shows, absolutism has additional costs,
and these are paid in the currency of deontology.
7.2 A dilemma for absolutism
In addition to having rights against interference, individuals are usually held to
have the right to enforce those rights against others. Enforcement rights include
the right to defend one’s rights against intrusion by others, as in cases of legitimate
self-defense, and to seek redress for past wrongs, for example by seeking to punish
wrongdoers or forcing them to issue apologies, compensate their victims, or serve
their community as repayment.
1Rabinowicz (1995) defends a third solution concept to the problem of dynamic inconsistency,
wise choice, which essentially combines features of sophisticated and resolute choice. Wise choice
avoids dynamic inconsistency by sometimes choosing resolutely (Peterson and Vallentyne, 2018,
p. 68), which remains as unattractive in our context as before. Likewise, Buchak (2013b) has
argued that the negative pricing of information can be rationalized as a strong desire to avoid
being misled, but this is hotly contested.
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According to the natural rights tradition that follows Locke (1948, 2nd Tr. §7),
all individual have the right to defend themselves and others from aggression, and
to punish rights-violators and force them to compensate their victims, if compen-
sation is possible. We lose these rights only if we voluntarily alienate them by
infringing the rights of others or by consenting to the authority of some State-like
entity. The right to punish is typically seen to follow from the right to protect
oneself from aggression (see Otsuka, 2003, ch. 3; Quinn, 1994; Hurka, 2011, ch.
7). Since it is permissible to organize such defenses around your person as will
deter anyone from infringing your rights by imposing high costs on any attempt
at infringing your rights (e.g., setting barbed wires around your house to deter
intruders), it is also permissible to protect yourself through measures that will
deter anyone from infringing your rights by imposing high costs on anyone who
successfully infringes your rights.
On a range of other views, while individuals have the right to defend themselves
against aggression, the right to administer justice is solely the State’s, which, if
it is a just State, derives this right from the obligation of its citizens to obey just
laws (Duus-Otterström and Kelly, 2019; Rawls, 1971, §51). Any just society must
proscribe certain sorts of harmful behaviour – assault, harrassment, intimidation,
etc. – which it must aim to prevent by what means are consistent with respect
for the basic rights and liberties of all citizens. Punishment, restorative justice,
and public safety institutions, if they are effective at depressing violent behaviour,
compensating victims, healing community rifts, and if they are appropriately con-
strained by laws of due process, become means for enforcing the law that are
consistent with respect for the rights of all (Bedau, 2004). Some retributivists
(e.g., Duff, 2001) argue that punishment also has important value as an expression
of official disapproval of criminal acts. Moreover, it is argued it would be unfair
to law-abiding citizens not to enforce prohibitions against criminal behaviour, as
this would create a class of harmful free-riders. On this picture, then, the state
has a duty to use appropriate resources to enforce citizens’ rights.
I am leaving it open what specific forms of criminal justice and public safety
institutions are legitimate, e.g., whether prison sentences or violent institutions
are permissible. All that matters for our purposes is that, on both these views,
there exist permissible means for enforcing individual rights, permissible means,
and that these permissible means, as an unfortunate matter of empirical fact, are
imperfect and may occasionally lead to the misenforcement of rights. Indeed this
is something which any plausible theory of rights should accept, but it meshes very
poorly with EL.
Let us consider the Lockean picture first, and assume that individuals have
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the full range of enforcement rights, unless they voluntarily alienate them. It is
a conspicuous fact about criminal justice that even the best methods available
for identifying those guilty of crimes are imperfect. Moreover, our methods for
determining what kind of punishment is justified, or what level of compensation
it is right to extract, in light of the the severity of the crime, and of our interest
in helping victims of crime and in deterring future crime, are also, of necessity,
imperfect. Sometimes we get it right, sometimes we get it wrong. Even so, accord-
ing to Nozick (1974, 107), provided the method we use for judging suspects and
sentencing those found guilty is fair and is the most reliable method available, and
provided we can demonstrate the fairness and reliability of our method to those
upon whom we would use it, then we are permitted to render justice on those
whom we find guilty by this method. Similar constraints presumably also justify
public safety institutions, even if these institutions are also imperfect and carry
the risk of rights-misenforcement (e.g., unintended harm to innocents in the course
of responding to active shooter situations). And surely we may defend ourselves
from aggression, even if we know there is a chance that in the heat of the moment
we cause more harm in defending ourselves than is proportionate (e.g., I push my
aggressor back, accidentally sending him careening out a window).
This view of the permissibility of rights-enforcement is plausible enough, but it
contradicts EL. A first point to recognize here is that, while any individual has the
right to defend themselves and seek redress from wrong-doers, they do not have a
duty to do so. If you steal a loaf of bread from me, it may be more trouble than
it is worth to me to get you to pay me back, or I may simply be forgiving and
choose not the press the matter. If you raise your fist to hit me, I can just turn the
other cheek. We might just choose to trust each other instead of establishing public
safety institutions. A second point to underscore is that if we misenforce our rights
by mistakenly punishing an innocent person for a crime or overcharging them for
compensation, or by using excessive force in the course of defending ourselves or
others, having used a method which we knew sometimes leads to such outcomes,
then, however justified and blameless we are in having relied on such methods,
we have infringed their rights. Indeed, it is precisely because unreliable processes
of justice threaten regular infringements of the rights of the innocent that Nozick
(1974, pp. 106-107) imposes epistemic constraints on their permissible use. But, to
reiterate, even the most reliable enforcement methods are demonstrably imperfect,
and therefore run a foreseeable risk of infringing the rights of the innocent. In
contrast, one is guaranteed to infringe no one’s rights if one never even attempts
to defend anyone or to seek redress for wrongs. Thus if individuals face a choice
between enforcing their rights through a highly reliable but imperfect procedure,
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or doing nothing, EL requires they do nothing.
Things don’t change if we switch to the more Statist picture, or assume that
individuals have voluntarily alienated their rights to private enforcement of their
rights, in exchange for the protective services of some State-like entity. True, under
such assumptions, the State has a duty to those subject to its power to protect
their rights. But the State may no more than any of its citizens intentionally
infringe the rights of some as a means of preventing the violation of the rights of
others. After all, we generally regard states as having a greater obligation not to
go to war and massacre civilians than to prevent other states that have gone to war
from massacring a similar number of civilians. If the duty not to infringe anyone’s
rights is a perfect duty, as hardline deontologists maintain, then EL applies to the
state, and it must sooner let its citizens suffer the greatest indignities than fail to
guarantee that it itself does not infringe their rights. The state can guarantee this,
but only provided it establishes no institutions endowed with the slightest power
of coercion – not even such powers of coercion as are minimally necessary to ensure
the state can respond to mass outbreaks of violence, penalize dangerous behaviour,
or ensure the compensation of victims of crime. The right to self-defense remains
unexercisable so long as there is a foreseeable chance that you might, in the heat
of the moment, use excessive force to defend yourself.
Strict deontologists face a dilemma: either accept that EL is false, and that,
under uncertainty, respect for rights does not imply an unlimited priority for lib-
erty over axiological considerations, or accept that, under uncertainty, most rights
are almost always unenforceable against those who would infringe them. Taking
the second prong of this dilemma is extremely costly to deontology’s credibility,
because it completely devalues the very rights whose sanctity it insists upon. Who
needs rights if you can’t enforce them except (maybe) in the rarest of cases (e.g., a
murderer is caught red-handed)? Everyone in society would recognize it as being in
their interest to have rights that were slightly less uninfringeable. Risks of having
their rights infringed can permissibly be imposed on individuals when counterveil-
ing moral considerations are sufficiently strong, if this means their rights could
actually be enforced under the extremely common context of uncertainty. Indeed,
for rights to adequately protect us against being instrumentalized in the service of
maximizing the impartial good, it had better be that we can permissibly defend
ourselves from attempts to so instrumentalize us. Moreover, such insistence on the
inviolability of rights perversely punishes those who actually do respect the rights
of others by incentivizing harmful free-riding on their efforts.
Taking the first prong of this dilemma is equally costly for absolutism, because if
strong counterveiling axiological considerations can license inroads into protected
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liberties under the context of uncertainty, no grounds are left for resisting the
moderate deontologist’s view that strong counterveiling axiological considerations
may license similar inroads into protected liberties under the context of certainty.
It is of course open to the hard-line deontologist to retreat from absolutism under
uncertainty while insisting upon absolutism under certainty. In my framework, this
amounts to accepting L but rejecting EL. This is an available position in logical
space, but it is not one that is easy to justify or motivate. The usual justifications
for deontological constraints don’t rely on the assumption of certainty. They appeal
instead to ideas of respect or the inviolability of persons, and these don’t suggest
any natural asymmetries between different epistemic contexts. So it will go hard
for absolutists if they attempt to justify an asymmetry by relying on these standard
explanations.
For example, on Frances Kamm’s (1995) influential view of rights, the posses-
sion of rights is identical with one’s having a certain kind of moral status, namely,
that of an inviolable person – a person that may not easily be instrumentalized in
the pursuit of the greater good. According to Kamm (1996, p. 273), our inviolabil-
ity stems from “certain properties [...] we have as individuals”, and she hints that
our most salient property is “having a rational will, whose consent we must seek
before interfering with” (ibid, 276). The vocabulary of rights merely serves to spell
out the content of this status, which it is good for us to have, for as Nagel (2007,
p. 108) puts it: “What actually happens to us is not the only thing we care about:
What may be done to us is also important, quite apart from whether or not it is
done to us – and the same is true of what we may do as opposed to what we actu-
ally do.” In other words, we are more valuable beings the more circumstances in
which morality prohibits our being used in certain ways against our consent, and
this is good for us because it demarcates us from other creatures whose interests
may be more easily sacrificed, even if our unwillingness to kill innocents for the
greater good means we are likelier to die as a result.
We are more inviolable the fewer exceptions are permitted to the principle that
one may not harm innocents, and so to impute to individuals rights that admit of
thresholds is to grant them less inviolability than to impute to them rights that
admit of no thresholds. But by the same token we are more inviolable if moral-
ity prohibits the imposition of foreseeable and avoidable risks on us of having
our rights infringed than if morality tolerates the imposition of such risks for the
sake of other ends. If absolutists should try to ground the absolute character of
side-constraints by appealing solely to the value of inviolability, then straightfor-
wardly this argument must lead us to EL. Some additional consideration must be
introduced to justify the exceptions that are made under uncertainty, such as the
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greater value for all of a system of rights that allows those rights to be enforced,
or the lack of respect for rights-bearers that is expressed by a system of rights
that doesn’t allow the enforcement of those rights. But if the hard-liners can avail
themselves of non-inviolability-based considerations to justify exceptions under un-
certainty, why can we moderates not avail ourselves of quite similar considerations
to justify exceptions under certainty? Johnson (2020), for example, argues that to
always refuse to infringe the rights of one person to save innumerably more from
certain death is disrespectful towards the innumerably many, because it betrays a
moral outlook that refuses to take their interests into account. And Kamm herself
emphasizes that the value of our saveability – the value we have as beings worth
saving from harm – acts as a counterweight to the value of our inviolability.
Nozick’s (1974, p. 31) own justification is Kantian: imputing rights to individu-
als just expresses and gives content to Kant’s idea that we not treat people merely
as means, but also always as ends in themselves. That is, individuals cannot be
sacrificed for other ends – even very valuable ones, and even ones that are in their
objective interests – without their consent. Alexander (2000), who defends abso-
lutism, appears to accept this justification of constraints (see also O’Neill, 1980,
p. 547). This view does not suggest interesting asymmetries between certainty
and uncertainty; on the contrary, if respect for persons prohibits instrumentaliz-
ing them by harming them without their consent for the sake of some valuable
end, why should it not also prohibit instrumentalizing the innocent by imposing
foreseeable risks of unconsented-to rights infringements on everyone for the sake
of some greatly valuable end? Considerations other than pure aversion to instru-
mentalization must be invoked to generate the desired asymmetry, which brings
us back to where we were.
Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka (2005) suggest a kind of reverse-engineering
justification for rights, on which certain rights are to be imputed to individuals
because the ownership of such rights best grounds and explains the intuitive wrong-
ness of various forms of non-consensual interference with bodily integrity. There
are structural constraints on what rights we can assign to individuals consistent
with this explanatory aim (for example, all rights must be compossible; see Steiner,
1977), but if the ultimate justification for imputing certain rights to individuals
is that this scheme of rights best rationalizes prior intuitions about what acts are
permissible, then this story is not particularly favourable to the hard-liners, since
moderates can lay claim to greater intuitive appeal for their system of rights.
Perhaps the absolutist deontologist might reply to all this that I have performed
a sleight of hand, falsely portraying the reasons to reject EL as being the same
kinds of reason as the ones I’ve advanced to reject absolutism under certainty. In
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rejecting EL, we weaken one class of rights to strengthen another, but in allowing
rights to be infringed to avert bad consequences, we weaken rights to better pursue
the Good. An absolutist could insist that rights may be traded for rights, but not
for the impartial Good. Unfortunately, this response misses its mark, because in
rejecting EL we are not trading rights for rights: EL does not imply that we lack
enforcement rights – de jure, we have all the enforcement rights in the world, and
these rights are absolute, insofar as it is impermissible (whatever the consequences)
to prevent us from exercising them upon rights-violators – it simply implies that,
de facto, these rights are never permissibly exercised. We therefore gain no rights
by rejecting EL. Nor do we strengthen them, since they’re already absolute. On
the contrary, rejecting EL weakens all our rights; they just become more valuable
in the process. Thus it is for axiological reasons that EL is implausible. The rub
is that these reasons are hard to dismiss even for an absolutist.
In brief, once absolutism is rejected under the context of uncertainty, there is
no longer any motivation for it under certainty. The reasons which justify limits
on the scope of rights to constrain permissible action under uncertainty are the
very same reasons which moderate deontologists appeal to to justify limits on
the scope of rights under certainty. On pain of imposing arbitrary restrictions on
morality, one must therefore be absolutist across the board, or moderate across the
board. Of these two options, moderation is clearly to be preferred: it has greater
intuitive appeal, it requires us to pay none of the pragmatic costs of EL, and
it alone permits the enforcement of individuals’ fundamental rights and liberties.
Moreover, the moderate picture gives up no conceptual unity, since both the rights
imputed to individuals and the limits imposed on those rights are grounded in the
common value of respect for persons. With this in mind, I now propose some
moderating amendments to the framework presented earlier.
7.3 The framework of liberty reconsidered
It is pretty clear intuitively what form moderate deontology must take. It must
register the weight of both deontic reasons and axiological reasons, and allow for
the balance of reasons to swing in either direction. There are many ways in which
one can explicate this basic intuition, but I will take the simplest approach and
model our all-things-considered moral reasons to act as some convex mixture of
our deontic and axiological reasons.
To represent the demands of our axiological reasons on our choices, we can
define for each individual k a value function Wk : X −→ R, which encodes the
demands of our favourite axiology on k. Thus Wk(x) > Wk(y) implies that, from
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the perspective of k’s axiological reasons alone, y is not permissibly chosen in any
situation where x is an available alternative. I index Wk to the individual to make
room for agent-relative permissions to weigh one’s own interests and those of one’s
loved ones relatively more heavily (within limits) than those of others. Of course,
your favourite axiology may make no room for partiality of this sort, in which case
the indexing is unnecessary.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the weight of our deontic reasons can be
represented by a function Dk(x) =
∑n
i=1 βxkiFi(x), unique up to positive affine
transformations, where Fi(x) represents how severely individual i’s rights are dis-
respected in x. Recall that βxki is weighing parameter indexed to individual k,
to allow k to weigh more heavily the rights of those who are closest to them and
whom they can most easily save; the outcome x, to allow for rights which k is per-
sonally responsible for infringing by causing x to be weighed (much) more heavily,
since our primary duty is to avoid violating rights, not prevent them from being
violated; and to individual i, to ensure that, all else being equal, individuals whose
rights are more disrespected get weightier β-parameters.
I propose that the ideal moderate deontological agent is rational and positively
responsive to both their axiological and deontic reasons. This means that their
choices respect the Savage axioms and that, all else being equal, they are reliably
disposed to pursue better courses of action, and to avoid courses of action more
disrespectful of the rights of others. Established results in social choice theory
show that our ideal deontological agent can then be represented as if they are
maximizing the probability weighted sum over every possible outcome of a convex
mixture of their axiological and deontic reasons. So, in the Savage framework
adopted in this paper, this means they can be represented as maximizing some




P (sl) · [Wk(f(sl)− γDk(f(sl)],
where γ is a real constant reflecting the weight of deontic reasons relative to axio-
logical reasons. Conversely, if an individual’s choices can be represented as if they
were maximizing some function V satisfying this definition, then the individual is
rational and responds positively to their axiological and deontic reasons.
It is important to emphasize that Vk is not a decision procedure nor a descrip-
tion of anyone’s moral psychology. Vk tells us what structure one’s choices must
have if they are to comply perfectly with the principles of moderate deontology,
but says nothing substantive about what one should in fact choose (outside trivial
cases), nor about what considerations should motivate us.
7.4. Assessing the revised framework 177
7.4 Assessing the revised framework
An attractive feature of this proposal is that it allows us to retain strong deontic
commitments, while paying none of the pragmatic costs of absolutist deontology.
Any individual whose choice pattern maximizes some Vk “reveals” a preference
relation respecting the Savage axioms.2 And this in turn means that a moderate
deontologist will never choose dominated strategies, be money-pumpable, or be
willing to pay an infinite price for certainty. At the same time, this framework is
consistent with lending great weight to deontic reasons while still making room
for the permissible enforcement of one’s rights under uncertainty. Provided we
are epistemically responsible, and reduce the chance of misenforcing our rights,
countervailing evaluative reasons and reasons grounded in concern and respect for
potential victims whose rights we could protect from intrusion may prove suffi-
ciently weighty to override our deontic reasons not to infringe anyone’s rights.
Moreover, this proposal allows us to defuse some of the standard objections to
moderate deontological theories. I will now consider three that have been influen-
tial. First, Ellis (1992) and Christopher (2003) have argued that it is impossible to
set the deontological threshold in a non-arbitrary fashion. Both argue that this is
because deontic reasons and axiological reasons are incommensurable, in the sense
that when they disagree their disagreement is either irresolvable, or it is resolved
by one kind of reason always swamping the other. If disagreement is irresolv-
able, then trivially there is no discrete point at which the badness of consequences
swamps the imperative not to infringe the rights of others, and likewise if one
reason always swamps the other. Therefore, the argument goes, when moderate
deontologists claim that you are permitted, say, to sacrifice the life of one innocent
if by doing so you can save some minimal number N of lives, they must be pulling
this number out a hat, as there can be no objective basis for their claim. But the
difference between what is morally right and morally wrong cannot be a matter of
arbitrary choice, therefore moderate deontology is false.
In response to this objection, note that if deontic and axiological reasons are
incommensurable in Ellis and Alexander’s sense, then it is impossible to be both
rational and positively responsive to both axiological and deontic reasons. This
is a strong and surprising implication of their claim, so they had better have
a compelling argument. But their only gesture of support for it is the vague
suggestion that “Deontologists treat killing an innocent person for others’ benefit as
intrinsically wrong. (...) On the other hand, for the consequentialist, consequences
2“Reveals” in the sense of revealed preference theory, meaning that their choices can be repre-
sented as if they had been induced by a binary betterness relation. The revealed preferences have
no realist psychological interpretation. See Samuelson (1938), Sen (1971), and Thoma (n.d.)
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are all that matter. The only thing that is intrinsically wrong for her is the act-
type “failure to promote the best consequences” ” (Alexander, 2000, p. 907). Ellis
(1992, p. 862) adds, helpfully, that ‘it seems plausible to think that these two sorts
of consideration [intrinsic wrongness of acts and badness of consequences] will be
incommensurable.”
I’m not sure what to make of this. Perhaps what is being suggested is that, un-
like axiological reasons, deontic reasons don’t come in degrees, and therefore cannot
be represented by a real-valued function, and for this reason continuous trade-offs
between the two are impossible. But as I’ve argued in the previous chapter, deontic
reasons can be represented by a real-valued function, Dk, so continuous trade-offs
are possible. Indeed, even on absolutist pictures of rights, deontic reasons have de-
grees: your reasons not to steal my banana are less weighty than your reasons not to
kill me. Perhaps Ellis and Alexander are simply incredulous at how the trade-offs
could ever be carried out in practice. But we can lift the veil of mystery by con-
structing easy cases: because deontic and axiological reasons are both cardinally
measurable, we can invent acts f and g such that our deontic reasons to choose f
over g are arbitrarily weak (i.e.
∑m
k=0 P (sk)Dk(f(sk)) −
∑m
k=0 P (sk)Dk(g(sk)) is
close to 0) and our axiological reasons to choose g over f are arbitrarily strong,
or vice-versa. It strains credulity that by introducing an arbitrarily weak reason
not to do something which we otherwise have arbitrarily strong reason to do, we
thereby render the act impermissible. If this is right, though, then deontic and
axiological are plainly commensurable.
With all this said, rationality and positive responsiveness alone don’t tell us
where the thresholds lie, i.e., how weighty both kinds of reasons are relative to one
another. More substantive accounts of moderate deontology will have more to say
about this, but one might still worry that any specific proposal of weights must
have a conventional aspect. Fair enough. Our only guide to the “true” weights, I
take it, is reflective equilibrium, hardly a precise measurement tool. If all we know
is that it is wrong to sacrifice one innocent to save five, but permissible if to save
20, then any decision on our part to draw the line at 15, say, in the crafting of legal
standards, will in a limited sense be arbitrary. But this is not a special problem for
moderate deontology: egalitarians must weigh the interests of the worse off against
the interests of the better off, absolutists must weigh weightier rights against less
weighty rights, utilitarians must weigh better quality living against longer living,
etc.3 And we are all in the same boat regarding reflective equilibrium.
A second common objection to moderate deontology is that it leads to strange
decisions in the neighbourhood of the thresholds. Suppose it is permissible to
3See also Zamir and Medina (2010, p. 46) for a point along this line.
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torture an innocent to save n people from death, but not to save n − 1; then,
asks Alexander (2000, p. 900), supposing the police believe that by torturing some
terrorist’s mother they will induce the torturer to release his nth captive, must the
torture stop once the terrorist calls the police to let them know he’s released one
hostage, thereby reducing the number of people they could theoretically save from
n to n − 1? Alexander thinks a moderate deontologist must say it is permissible
for the police to begin torturing the terrorist’s mother, but require them to stop
once the single hostage is released, which is very weird: terrorists shouldn’t be
able to “game” morality.
There is some major sleight of hand in this counterexample. Alexander starts
by setting n as the minimal number such that it would be permissible to torture
an innocent if we were certain to save n people by doing so, then presents a
case where one has to decide whether to torture an innocent to try and save n
innocents, but where we are initially quite uncertain about how many we will
actually save (clearly the police couldn’t have been certain, since they turned out
to be wrong), and then some later event occurs which resolves our uncertainty.
But on the simple view that I’ve presented of how deontic and axiological reasons
interact, if it is permissible to torture one innocent save at minimum n people
with certainty, then it is not permissible to torture an innocent if you’re far from
certain to save n, and certain not to save any more than n. Many more lives would
have to be at stake. To be sure, if you permissibly torture an innocent expecting
to save a sufficient number N of lives, and it would be permissible to continue
torturing them provided you could still expect to save N lives, but you later learn
that the number of lives you can expect to save by continuing the torture is less
than N , then continuing the torture is impermissible. But morality isn’t being
gamed here: obviously rationality may require you to alter your plans when you
learn something which resolves your uncertainty about the world! I may find it
worthwhile to walk across town to meet a date, but if, when I’m halfway there, she
texts me to cancel, it would only compound my disappointment to keep walking
to a cafe where I know I’ll be alone.
A third and final classic objection to moderate deontology is that it capitulates
to consequentialism. By admitting that people can sometimes be instrumentalized
for the sake of averting terrible consequences, we’re admitting that morality bot-
toms out in the assessment of the impartial goodness and badness of consequences.
Indeed, the objection continues, it can be shown that moderate deontological the-
ories are extensionally equivalent to the brand of consequentialism defended by
Sen (1982) or Portmore (2001) which incorporates evaluator relativity. My own
framework shows this, since any individual who conforms to the requirements
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of moderate deontology as I’ve laid them out can be represented as maximizing
the value of some numerical function. And in this case, the difference between
moderate deontology and consequentialism comes down to an indifferent choice of
vocabulary, not a substantial disagreement about what morality is about and how
one should think about one’s decisions.
On the face of it, the complaint that deontology capitulates to consequentialism
by making space for evaluative considerations seems a bit strange. One might
as well say that consequentialism capitulates to deontology by making space for
deontic considerations and permissible partiality. By admitting that the aim of
doing good is habitually subordinated to considerations of right, and that anyway
the good is to be evaluated from the position of the agent, it accepts that morality
does not bottom out in the assessment of the impartial goodness and badness of
consequences, but in individual agency.
More seriously, though, as Tennenbaum (2014) argues in response to Portmore,
to argue that some theory is just a form of consequentialism it is not enough to
show that the choices it induces could be represented as if it were maximizing the
value of some numerical function. Any choice pattern can be so represented, if
we are sufficiently creative in how we describe the objects of choice and throw in
enough “mathematical fireworks” (Tennenbaum, 2017, p. 686). Consequentialism
requires that the ordering “revealed” by our choices be determined by the social
welfare function, not the other way around (Sen, 1986; J. A. Weymark, 1991;
Ponthière, 2003), otherwise it is no moral theory, only a trifling mathematical
thesis regarding the representation properties of certain choice functions.
Moderate deontology is a form of deontology because it preserves what is dis-
tinctive about deontology generally, namely the commitments to the priority of
rights over value, and to the agent-relativity of certain reasons. As Sen (1982,
p. 22) highlights, there are three ways in which reasons might be agent-relative
in any given case. Self-evaluation relativity: there may be reasons for me to do
things which are not reasons for you to do that same thing, e.g., that f would
benefit my friends and g would benefit yours give me a reason to do f , but not
you. Doer relativity: there may be reasons which prohibit me from doing some-
thing which however do not require me to prevent you from doing it, e.g., as Nagel
(1980, p. 119) argues, it may be that I ought not to twist a child’s arm to bring
about some good consequence even though it would not be required of me to forego
a comparable benefit to prevent someone else from twisting a child’s arm. And
viewer relativity: I may be permitted to do something which you are required to
prevent, e.g., suppose two people need the same abandoned boat to save their own
children; then although either is permitted to take the boat, both are required by
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the balance of their own evaluative reasons to prevent the other from taking it. My
framework preserves all three types of agent-relativity. True, the side-constraints
rights place on permissible action are spongy, but as Nagel (2007, p. 106) rightly
notes: this does “not change the basic character of the right, since the threshold
will be high enough so that the impermissibility of torture or murder to prevent
evils below it cannot be explained in terms of the agent-neutral badness of torture
or murder alone.”
In contrast, agent-relative consequentialism does lose what is distinctive about
consequentialism generally, namely the commitment to all moral reasons being
agent-neutral. As Brown (2011, p. 759) has argued, a necessary condition for a
theory to qualify as consequentialist is that it instructs every single individual to
maximize exactly one common and complete ranking relation on the set of possible
outcomes. This characterization is quite minimal, but it implies that consequen-
tialism at a minimum violates viewer relativity, and in fact most consequentialist
theories violate all three forms of relativity. Indeed, it is for this very reason that
Sen himself insists that his own preferred theory, which does make room for all
three kinds of relativity, is not a brand of consequentialism, but rather a third way
between consequentialism and deontology which he alternately calls a “goal-rights
system” or “consequence-based evaluation.” Given how far removed Sen’s view
actually is from consequentialism, it’s not so surprising that moderate deontology
should turn out to be extensionally equivalent to it. But this just shows that wor-
ries of our having capitulated to the cold utilitarian calculus of consequences are
misplaced, and anyway one might reasonably take the view that agreement with
Amartya Sen is a thing to be celebrated.
Summary
Rights are not worth the price of purchase if they can’t be enforced. When we try
to extend absolutist commitments from the context of certainty to the context of
uncertainty, we find we can do so only by paying important pragmatic costs, and
by de facto denying everyone the permission to enforce anyone’s rights. Creating
permissions for the enforcement of individual rights therefore requires abandoning
absolutism under uncertainty, which undermines the motivation for absolutism
more generally, and pushes us towards a more moderate picture of deontology.
I have tried to state this view precisely, and to show that it is in fact a very
attractive picture of morality: it complies with all the norms of rationality, gives
rights their full value and carves robust boundaries around personal liberty while
making appropriate room for axiological concerns, and retaining the distinctive
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commitments of deontology. Moreover the standard objections to this sort of
view are unconvincing, as they largely rest on a misunderstanding of moderate
deontology’s structure.
****
To conclude this long study on freedom, I wish to offer some parting thoughts
on how I see the concern for the opportunity aspect of freedom interacting with the
concern for the process aspect of freedom, to help make sense of how everything
that has been argued so far hangs together.
My view is that the concern for the opportunity aspect of freedom should
be folded into our assessments of how well individuals’ lives are going, while our
concern for the process aspect of freedom should be folded into our ethics of respect.
Or in other words: in its opportunity aspect, freedom is a component of well-being,
i.e., an argument in the value function Wk which captures our welfarist concerns,
whereas in its process aspect, freedom is the grounds for certain kinds of side-
constraints on permissible action, i.e., an argument in the value function Dk which
represents our deontological concerns. An attractive feature of this view is that it
unifies the disparate values that have traditionally animated the debates between
republicans, liberals, and capability theorists. Wk registers the importance of
making individuals more capable, of giving them more valuable opportunities, and
of immunizing them against domination, while Dk registers the special importance
of non-interference in protected spheres of choice.
Naturally, our welfarist and deontological concerns are not exhausted by our
concerns for freedom: we may care about how well people’s lives actually turn
out, not just how good their opportunities are, and we may think that respect for
others requires not just that we refrain from interfering with them, but also that
we not lie to them or think of them unkindly or intend them harm. Still, much of
morality hangs just on properly appreciating the value of freedom.o
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Appendix A
Measuring distance across possible
worlds
We start by defining a binary, nonsymmetric and transitive relation D on the
set W = {w1, w2, ...} of possible worlds, interpreted as the “at least as dissimilar
from the actual world as” relation. I define . and ./ as the “more dissimilar
than” and “equally similar to” parts, respectively, of this relation. Because some
counterfactuals are true, and true counterfactuals are validated by facts about
which possible world is most similar to the actual world, it follows that there
are facts about which possible worlds are more similar than others to the actual
world – i.e. we know D is nonempty. And not only are there such facts, but
they are epistemically accessible too, since they can be discovered by investigating
counterfactuals. If any two possible worlds differ in some respect, there must be a
true counterfactual which reveals this difference. Therefore, a large enough body
of true counterfactuals determines a complete ordering of W . We then define the
world-distance function d :W −→ R which we require to satisfy the property that
d(w1) ≥ d(w2) ⇐⇒ w1 D w2.
This doesn’t yet bring us to shore, as d(.) only captures ordinal information
about world similarity, and I promised a cardinal measure. But notice that just
as we can ask which worlds are most similar to the actual world, we can also ask
which worlds are most similar to each other. These facts are likewise discovered
by investigating counterfactuals: on Lewis’s analysis, the counterfactual A −→
(B −→ C) is true if and only if there is a world w in which A was the case in
which the embedded counterfactual B −→ C is true which is closer to the actual
world than any world in which A was the case but the embedded counterfactual
was false, and for that counterfactual to be true in w is just for it to be the case
that there is a world w′ in which B and C were the case which is closer to w than
any world in which B was the case but not C.
And this gives us a way of constructing a quaternary preorder Dd on W ×W ,
which ranks pairs of worlds by their differences in similarity from the actual world.
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The procedure I am about to describe is represented graphically below in figure
1. Suppose w is more similar to the actual world wa than w′ is. Let W be the
set of all possible worlds that are equally similar from wa as w is, and let w∗ be
the world in W which is most similar to w′. If w∗ is more similar to wa than to
w′, then the difference in similarity from wa between w and wa is less than the
difference in similarity from the actual world between w∗ and w′. This is noted
(w∗, w′).d (w,wa). Now suppose instead we want to find worlds w,w′, w” such that
(w,wa) ./d (w
∗, w”). This is easily done by taking the set of all possible worlds W ′
that are equally dissimilar from w∗ as wa is, then picking some arbitrary element
w” of this set. Continuing in like manner, we form a rich ordering. We now require
that d(.) satisfy the additional property that d(w1)− d(w2) ≥ d(w3)− d(w4) ⇐⇒
(w1, w2) Dd (w3, w4).
This and the previous requirement I imposed on d(.) are very natural restric-
tions on a distance function, but there are alternatives. For example, we could set
d(w) = ln(d(w)). This distance function would continue to satisfy the requirement
that d(w) ≥ d(w′) ⇐⇒ w D w′, so it is an order-preserving transformation of
d(.), but it makes distance multiplicative in the dissimilarity of worlds from the ac-
tual world rather than additive, so it does not preserve intervals. This would be a
proper measure, but not a natural one. For an analogy, consider the measurement
of length. We normally require the overall length of two objects to be equal to be
the sum of their lengths, this numerical convention corresponding to the empirical
operation of concatenating two rods by abutting them end to end. But we could
instead require the overall length of two objects to be equal to the square root of
the sum of their squares, this convention intuitively corresponding to the empir-
ical operation of concatenating two rods by abutting them at a right angle. We
don’t do this though, because it’s unintuitive and mathematically cumbersome,
and similar considerations apply here. See Weymark (2005) for more.
And with this last requirement, we guarantee the uniqueness of d(.) up to
positive affine transformations. This is easy to verify: take any worlds w1, w2, w3
such that d(w1) > d(w2) > d(w3) and d(w1) − d(w2) = d(w2) − d(w3); given
the two requirements I’ve imposed on d(.), any admissible transformation of d(.)
must preserve the truth of these two expressions. But crucially, any two triples
satisfying these expressions must be related to one another by a positive affine
transformation (Ellsberg 1952, 534).
A graphical representation may help to visualize things. Suppose we represent
the set of possible worlds as the 2-dimensional (because we’re supposing that world-
similarity varies along 2 dimensions, noted here “laws” and “facts”) euclidean
space E2. Points on the euclidean plane are possible worlds, and their distance
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from the origin represents their distance from the actual world, which is located
at the origin. In figure 1 below, W is the circle centered on wa with the radius
of length waw, and w∗ is the point where the line (ow′) intersects with W . (Note
that W doesn’t need to be represented by a circle: any isodistance contour would
do. We could replace the curves in this figure with straight lines, or with sawtooth
edges, or elliptical curves. This is important, because otherwise the reader might
think I was committed to a Euclidean measure of distance, whereas it is in no way
implied by my method of construction that world-distance must be Euclidean.) If
w∗ is closer to o than to w′, then ow∗ < w∗w′. Since ow∗ = ow, it follows that
the difference in similarity from o between o and w is smaller than the difference
in similarity from o of w∗ and w′. Likewise, W ′ is the circle centered on w∗ with
radius w∗wa and w” is any point on this circle. The equality in the difference in
similarity between wa and w and the difference in similarity between w” and w∗















Some final remarks on this whole construction procedure are in order. It’s
important to realize that this entire construction only makes sense if we assume,
first, that the set of possible worlds is densely ordered by similarity from the actual
world (i.e. for any two worlds w,w′ : w . w′, there is a world w” : w . w” . w′),
and second, that the set of possible worlds has the least upper-bound property
(i.e. for any set S of possible worlds such that there is a world w which is at least
as dissimilar from wa as any element of S, there is a world w′ which is at least as
dissimilar from wa as any element of S such that any world more similar to wa
than w′ is more similar to wa than at least one element of S). I have no argument
for these assumptions. On the face of it, though, both strike me as plausible. And
in fact, the following argument by Lewis against the so-called limit assumption
suggests that at least some of the time both conditions are satisfied.
Suppose we entertain the counterfactual supposition that at this point
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there appears a line more than one inch long. (Actually it is just under
an inch.) ...But how long is the line in the closest worlds with a line
more than an inch long? If it is 1 + x” for any x however small, why
are there not other worlds still closer to ours in which it is 1 + 1/2x”,
a length still closer to its actual length? ... Just as there is no shortest
possible length above 1”, so there is no closest world to ours among the
worlds with lines more than an inch long. (Lewis 1973, pp 20-21)
In this example, possible worlds are being ordered (literally!) by the real line,
which is densely ordered and has the least upper bound property. So if Lewis’s
rather persuasive reasoning in this instance is sound, then at least some subsets
of W are densely ordered and satisfy the least upper bound property. This is far
from a demonstration that the properties hold for W as a whole, but at least as a
default position I feel we are justified in assuming this. The onus is now on skeptics
to show that the subset of worlds implicated by Lewis’s example is exceptional.
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Proof of Theorem 4.2.2
Necessity is obvious, so I only prove the sufficiency part of the theorem. Let %
satisfy (INS), (SM), (MM) and (S). I first show that
Indifference: A ∼ B for all A,B ∈ Z such that max{1, |A ∩M|} =
max{1, |B ∩M|} and |A| = |B|.
Proof. We use an inductive argument to show this. So first I prove
(Inductive step) For every positive integer n, if [max{1, |A′ ∩M|} =
max{1, |B′∩M|} = n and |A′| = |B′|] =⇒ (A′ ∼ B′) for all A′, B′ ∈ Z,
then [max{1, |A∩M|} = max{1, |B∩M|} = n+1 and |A| = |B|] =⇒
(A ∼ B).
Consider a positive integer n such that [max{1, |A′ ∩ M|} = max{1, |B′ ∩
M|} = n and |A′| = |B′|] =⇒ (A′ ∼ B′) for all A′, B′ ∈ Z. Let max{1, |A∩M|} =
max{1, |B∩M|} = n+1 and |A| = |B|. Let C ⊆ A such thatmax{1, |C∩M|} = n
and A \ C = {x}. Clearly, x ∈ M, otherwise it would follow that A ∩ M =
C ∩M and therefore that max{1, |A ∩M|} = max{1, |C ∩M|}, contradicting
our assumption. Now, either
(a) x ∈ B,
or
(b) x /∈ B
Suppose (a) holds. Then let D = B \ {x}. Because x ∈ M and max{1, |B ∩
M|} = n+ 1 ≥ 2, it follows that max{1, |D∩M|} = n. Thus max{1, |C ∩M|} =
max{1, |D∩M|} = n. Further, |C| = |D|, since |C∪{x}| = |A| = |B| = |D∪{x}|.
Given our inductive assumption, this implies C ∼ D. (S) then implies C ∪ {x} ∼
D ∪ {x}, i.e. A ∼ B.
Now suppose (b) holds. There must be some y ∈ B such that (i) y /∈ A and
(ii) max{1, |B \ {y}|} = n. Otherwise, if all y ∈ B for which (ii) is true also
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belong to A, then the union E of all such y is a subset of A \ {x}. But clearly,
max{1, |E ∩M|} = n+ 1, thus max{1, |E ∪ {x}|} = n+ 2, which contradicts our
assumption that max{1, |A ∩M|} = n+ 1 because E ∪ {x} ⊂ A.
With this in mind, for some y satisfying (i) and (ii) let F = B \ {y}. Then
max{1, |C ∩M|} = max{1, |F ∩M|} = n, and moreover |C| = |F |, since |C ∪
{x}| = |A| = |B| = |F ∪ {y}|. Thus, by assumption, C ∼ F , and hence by (S) it
follows that (C ∪ {x}) ∼ (F ∪ {x}), i.e.
(c) A ∼ (F ∪ {x}).
Now consider B and F ∪{x}. Sincemax{1, |(F ∪{x})∩M|} = max{1, |B∩M|} =
n+1, it follows that |B∩M| ≥ 2, and therefore that |F∩M| = |B∩M|−1 ≥ 1. Let
z ∈ (F ∩M) ⊂ B. Noting that max{1, |(F ∪{x})\{z}|} = max{1, |B \{z}|} = n
and |(F ∪ {x}) \ {z}| = |B \ {z}|, we have ((F ∪ {x}) \ {z}) ∼ (B \ {z}). Hence,
by (S), we have
(d) (F ∪ {x}) ∼ B.
From (c) and (d) and the transitivity of %, we obtain A ∼ B.
This completes the proof of the inductive step. I now prove
(inductive premise) ∀A,B ∈ Z such thatmax{1, |A∩M|} = max{1, |B∩
M|} = 1, and |A| = |B|, A ∼ B
Obviously, for all singleton sets A ∈ Z, max{1, |A ∩M|} = 1, and we know
from (INS) that for any two singleton sets A,B ∈ Z, A ∼ B. Furthermore, we
know that for all non-singleton sets A ∈ Z such that max{1, |A ∩M|} = 1, at
most one element in A can belong to M, otherwise |A ∩M| > 1, and therefore
max{1, |A∩M|} > 1, contradicting our assumption. So, let A = {a1, ..., am}, B =
{b1, ..., bm} be any two sets of equal size containing at most one element that also
belongs toM. If there is an element in A that also belongs toM, let this unique
element be denoted a1; otherwise, let a1 denote any arbitrary element from A. Let
b1 be the element from B likewise defined. From (INS), {a1} ∼ {b2}, and since
we know that all remaining aj, bj do not belong to M, we know from (S) that
{a1} ∪ {a2} ∼ {b2} ∪ {b2}, and so repeated applications of (S) yield A ∼ B.
This establishes the inductive premise.
Having established the indifference condition, I now prove:
Dominance: A  B for all A,B ∈ Z such that either:
max{1, |A ∩M|} > max{1, |B ∩M|}, or
max{1, |A ∩M|} = |max{1, |B ∩M|} and |A| > |B|.
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Proof. Consider A,B ∈ Z such that max{1, |A ∩M|} > max{1, |B ∩M|}. Nec-
essarily, |A∩M| > |B∩B| and |A∩M| > 1, so let a1, ..., an denote the n elements
of A∩M. If B ∩M 6= ∅, then let b1, ..., bm denote the m < n elements of B ∩M.
Let H = {x ∈ A|x /∈ M}, G = {x ∈ B|x /∈ M}. From (MM), we know H ∪
{a1, a2}  G∪{b1}. If there remain no more bi ∈ B∩M, this means H∪{a1, a2} 
B. If there do remain elements bi ∈ B ∩ M, then by repeated applications of
(S) we get H ∪ {a1, ..., am+1}  G ∪ {b1, ..., bm}, i.e. H ∪ {a1, ..., am+1}  B.
Either way then, H ∪ {a1, ..., am+1}  B, and if n = m + 1, this just means
A  B. If n > m + 1, then, since (MM) implies H ∪ {a1, a2}  H ∪ {a1},
successive applications of (S) give us H ∪ {a1, ..., an}  H ∪ {a1, ..., an−1}, i.e.
A  {a1, ..., an−1}. By the transitivity of % it then follows that A  B. Thus, for
all A,B, max{1, |A ∩M|} > max{1, |B ∩M|} implies A  B.
Now consider A,B such that max{1, |A∩M|} = |max{1, |B ∩M|} and |A| >
|B|. Let G ⊂ A be such that max{1, |G∩M|} = |max{1, |B∩M|} and |G| = |B|,
and let H = A \ G. Further, let g1, ..., gn and b1, ..., bn denote the n elements of
G and B, respectively, and let h1, ..., hm denote the m elements of H. Further
if G (and therefore B) contains k > 0 minimally valuable elements, then, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ k, let ai,bi denote some minimally valuable element belonging to A,B.
Given how I’ve now ordered the elements of A and B, it follows that, for all ai, bi,
ai ∈M ⇐⇒ bi ∈M.
(INS) implies {a1} ∼ {b1, and (SM) implies {h1, a1}  {a1}. Successive appli-
cations of (S) imply H∪{a1}  {h1, ..., hm−1, a1. By the transitivity of %, it follows
that H ∪ {a1}  {b1}. Successive applications of (S) now imply H ∪ {a1, ..., an} 
{b1, ..., bn}, i.e. A  B. Thus, for all A,B such that max{1, |A ∩ M|} =
|max{1, |B ∩M|} and |A| > |B| implies A  B.




Proof that D is monotonic,
dispersing, continuous, and
translation invariant
1. I first show that D satisfies monotonicity. Let A,B be arbitrary sets such that
A ⊂ B. By definition, for any bi ∈ B \ A, the function gbi reaches its maximum
value of 1 at x = d(bi), while for every other ai ∈ A, gai has a value of strictly less
than 1 at x = d(b). Therefore there is a collection of open intervals in Rn such that
max(ga1 , ..., gan , gb1 , ..., gbm) is greater over those intervals than max(ga1 , ..., gan).
These open intervals will be the neighbourhood of points around each point d(bi)
that are strictly closer to d(bi) than any other element of B, which are obviously
open intervals since B is a finite set of points. Further, there is no point in Rn over
which max(ga1 , ..., gan , gb1 , ..., gbm) is strictly lesser than max(ga1 , ..., gan). There-
fore D(B) > D(A).
2. Showing thatD satisfies dispersion is harder work. Let’s start by considering
a set A of points d(a1), ..., d(am) ∈ Rn. Let K be the convex hull of A and assume
that d(a1) does not lie in the interior of K. Let H ⊂ Rn be a hyperplane which
contains d(a1) and which does not intersect the interior of K. Let v be a unit
length vector orthogonal to H.
Let us now “pull" d(a1) away from K while keeping d(a2), ..., d(am) fixed.
More precisely, for s ≥ 0, we consider the family d(a1, s) := d(a1) + sv. We
let gs(x) = maxi(e−|x−d(ai,s)|
2
) and we let D(s) =
∫
R gs. Note that gs is simply an
abbreviated notation for the integrand of my diversity function D, and accordingly
D(s) denotes the diversity of the set of options a1, ..., am as we vary the position
of d(a1). What we want to show is that as we “pull" d(a1) away from all the other
points – i.e. as we make a1 increasingly dissimilar from every other alternative in
A – the diversity of A increases.
More precisely, we wish to prove that D(s) is nondecreasing. To prove this, we
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begin by taking an arbitrary point b ∈ H. We consider the line l(t) = tv +b. We
will now study the restriction of gs to the line l.
By applying an affine transformation and choosing an appropriate orthogo-
nal basis we may as well assume that v = e1 and that H = span{e2, ..., en}.
Then gs|l = maxmi=1(Cie−(t−(d(ai))1(s))
2




that (d(a1)1(s) = s while for j = 2, ...,m, we have (d(aj))1(s) = (d(ai))1.
Lemma C.0.1. If d(ai)1 ≤ 0 for i = 2, ...,m, then
∫
l
gs|l is nondecreasing in s,
for s ≥ 0.
Proof. By translation, we may as well assume s = 0.
It’s enough to show that the set of t ∈ R on which e−t2 is greater or equal to
Ce−(t−α)
2 forms an interval of the form [d,∞). – if α = 0, then this is clear. So
assume α < 0.
We consider the quotient e−t2/(Ce−(t−α)2) = ea2−2tα/C. We ask when this is
≥ 1. Taking logs, this is the same as asking when −logC+ (−2tα+α2) is ≥ 0. i.e.
t ≥ (−α2 + logC)/2|α|). The right-hand term of this inequality is a real number
d, thus t ∈ [d,∞).






Proof. Since the integrand is nondecreasing, the integral is nondecreasing.
3. D is trivially continuous. Gaussian functions are continuous, the max func-
tion is continuous, and the integral function is continuous. Any function which
can be decomposed into continuous functions of other continuous functions is itself
continuous.
4. Let A,B be two equinumerous sets of objects such that d(b1), ..., d(bm) can
be obtained from d(a1), ..., d(am) by translation by some vector c. Then D(B) =∫
Rnmax(ga1+c1 , ..., gam+cm) which is obviously equal toD(A) =
∫
Rnmax(ga1 , ..., gam),
since the area under a curve does not change when you translate every point in
the curve by a common vector.
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Formal example of a liberal and
illiberal state
Consider two possible worlds x, y and let Ix = Iy = {1, 2} be our population.
Ω = {∅, a,¬a, b,¬b, a∧b, a∧¬b,¬a∧b,¬a∧¬b, a∨b, a∨¬b,¬a∨b,¬a∨¬b, a∨¬a}
is our Boolean algebra of propositions. Let’s interpret a as “prisoner 1 cooperates"
and b as “prisonner 2 cooperates."
Let R1 = {{a,¬a}} and R2 = {{b,¬b}}.
Ax11 = {a,¬a}, Ax21 = {b,¬b}; A
y
11 = {a}, Ax21 = {b}.
Therefore Ax = (({a,¬a}), ({b,¬b})), Ay = (({a}), ({b})).
By my definitions, x is a liberal outcome – corresponding under my interpretation
to the classic prisoners’ dilemma where both players are free to choose whether to
cooperate or defect – and y is an illiberal outcome – corresponding to a situation




Measuring disrespect for rights
To construct the family of fi measuring the overall extent to which an individual’s
rights have been disrespected, we first must have a way of measuring the extent
to which any individual’s rights have been violated, and a way of measuring the
relative importance of these rights. Different ways of combining these measures
will give us different families of fi. Below, I show how to construct one particular
family of fi, but I will flag along the way where one could have made different
choices.
Translated back into my framework’s vocabulary, to say that some right Rij
has been infringed more-or-less in some outcome x is to say that more-or-fewer
elements of Rij are missing from Axij. Some of the propositions you’ve a right to
make true or have a claim to being true are missing from the set of propositions
you can in fact make true/ have a claim to being true and are in fact true. Set out
in this way, there is a natural upper and lower bound on how deeply any right may
be infringed. The upper bound is reached when you can make true none of the
propositions you’ve a right to (or when none of the propositions you’ve a claim to
being true are in fact true) and the lower bound is reached when your right is not
infringed at all. So let Mxij = Rij \ A So define dxij ∈ R+, representing how deeply
Rij was infringed. Set dxij = 1 ⇐⇒ Mxij = Rij, dxij = 0 ⇐⇒ Mxij = ∅, and make
dxij linear in the ratio of |Mxij| to |Rij|. Thus dxij = |Mxij|/|Rij|.
To represent the fact that some rights are more important than others, we need
to work a bit harder for our meal. Let’s assume, along with all theories of rights,
that we are all born with the same natural rights. To the extent that our present
rights differ from those we were born with, that is because since birth we have
gained new bundles of rights, lost some bundles, or the content of some of our
bundles of rights has changed (e.g. you voluntarily surrender some, but not all, of
your liberties of movement – which means, actually, that one of youe original Rij
has been “replaced" by different Rij that share some elements of the old). Let’s
further assume that everyone’s rights matter equally at birth, something a plausible
theory of rights must imply. Translated back into my framework, this means we
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can define for each individual a “natural" schedule of rights Ri = {Ri1, ..., Rim}.
Intuitively, if R11 is the bundle of rights which represents individual 1’s natural
right to free speech, then R21 is the bundle of rights which represents individual
2’s natural right to free speech, and so on for every j(1 ≤ j ≤ m).
Next, define for each i the set Pi of probability distributions Pi over Ri ∪ {∅}
(or, more accurately, over a σ-algebra whose universe is Ri ∪ {∅}), and a rela-
tion Di over Pi ranking i’s natural rights in importance. Different interpretations
of Di are possible. You may interpret it as a representation of the individuals’
own preferences over their rights; this would be attractively liberal as it would
sensitize evaluations of how disrespectful it is to violate your rights to your own
evaluations of how important those rights are, and it allows different individuals
to prioritize as they please their own rights. Of course, this interpretation raises
worries about adaptive preferences, and that individuals might come to disregard
certain rights because they have been induced to by people who do not want them
to value those rights. In this case we wouldn’t want our evaluations to be too
sensitive to individuals’ own evaluations. Regimes which brainwash their citizens
into devaluing their rights should be penalized, not rewarded. So perhaps it is best
to impose some objective constraints on the structure of Di, and let individuals
fill in the remaining gaps. In this case Di is interpreted as the preorder which
is nearest to the individual’s own preferences but which also satisfy the objective
constraints imposed by the true theory of rights. I myself, being worried about
adaptive preferences, favour this interpretations, though I would endorse relatively
few constraints.
Now, Intuitively, the probability distribution 0.8R1 + 0.2{∅} represents a lot-
tery that gives you a 0.8 chance of “losing" every right except R1 (meaning it would
be permissible to interfere with your doing what those rights normally entitle you
to do) and a 0.2 chance of losing every right, period. Assume Di satisfies the
vNM axioms of expected utility theory, there is therefore a real-valued function ui,
unique up to positive affine transformations, representing D. Because Ri is finite
and %i is complete, there is a (not necessarily unique) Rmax such that Rj % Rj′
for all j′, and I assume that all Rj strictly dominate the empty set. I then use
the zero-one rule to normalize ui({∅}) = 0 and ui(Rmax) = 1. This amounts to
assuming that, at birth, your most important right is as important as my most
important right, and it would be as bad if you were deprived of all rights as if I
were deprived of all rights. Again, any plausible theory of rights implies this.
Finally, we use the function ui representing the value of each individual’s rights
at birth to set the origin and unit of the function ui which represents the value
of their present rights. If individual i’s schedule of rights Ri is different from
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their natural schedule of rights, it must be that their rights have changed in some
way since birth. Three sorts of changes are possible: additions, subtractions, and
replacements. Let R′i, R”i be two logically possible schedules of rights. R”i can
be obtained by addition from R′i iff every R′ij ∈ R′i is also an element of R”i and
moreover there is exactly one R”ij ∈ R”i that is not an element of R′i. R′i can
be obtained by subtraction from R”i iff R”i can be obtained by addition from
R′i. At last, R”i is obtained from R′i by replacement iff |R′i| = |R”i| and there is
one and only one pair of R′ij ∈ R′i, R”ij ∈ R”i such that R′ij 6= R”ij. Now, define
for each of R′i, R”i a function u′i, u”i in just the same way as before; I assume
that the importance of a bundle of rights (e.g. the right to free speech) does not
change if you gain or lose other rights, therefore I require that u′i(R′ij) = u”i(R”ij)
iff R′ij = R”ij. Thus if some R′i can be obtained by replacement, addition, or
subtraction from Ri, then ui sets the origin and unit of u′i. And since any individual
i’s actual assignment of rights Ri can be obtained from their natural schedule
of rights Ri by a finite sequence of addition, subtraction, and replacement, ui
determines a unique function ui representing the value of i’s rights.
That was a long walk in the dark, but we are now in a position to propose a
general measure of how deeply any given individual’s rights have been disrespected
overall. All else being equal, I believe it’s twice as bad to infringe two of your
rights than just one, and twice as bad to infringe one right twice as deeply, and
twice as bad to infringe one right that is twice as important. Note that these
statements are all meaningful: we can obviously always compare how many of your
rights are violated with how many of mine are violated, and since all dxij ∈ [0, 1]
and all ui share a common origin and unit, we can always make interpersonal
comparisons of the depth of rights infringements and of the importance of the
rights infringed. We can say “your right to free speech is twice as important as
my right to bear arms, but is infringed only as third as deeply." Thus, let F be
a family of fi : {(I, Ax)|i ∈ I} −→ R, representing the overall degree to which i’s




ijui(Rij). The construction is
now complete. One can still haggle over details – for example, we could make the
fi concave over dxij rather than linear – but in the main this process of construction




Proof of Theorem 6.3.1
Proof. Necessity is obvious, so I only prove sufficiency. The proof model I adopt
here closely follows that presented by Adler and McCarthy, adapted here only
slightly for the framework I am using and for the variable-population context.
Assume there is a function g : X −→ R which satisfies A, SI, RI, PD, PI, C,
and S. We start my making a conventional choice of common unit for all the fi. By
SI, no matter what choice we make, individual i’s rights are overall disrespected
to a greater degree in x than h’s rights are disrespected in y iff fi(x) ≥ fh(y).
Further, the difference in the degree to which i’s rights are disrespected in x and
individual h’s rights are in y is at least as large as the difference between the degree
to which individual k’s rights are disrespected in z and individual l’s rights are
disrespected in zz iff fi(x)− fh(y) ≥ fk(x)− fl(y). Finally, the ratio of the degree
to which i’s rights are infringed to the degree to which h’s rights are infringed is
equal to a iff fi(x)
fh(y)
= a.
Because g(.) is separable and continuous, and orders X by the reals, established
results in expected utility theory imply the existence of γ1, γ2, ... such that







for n,N being the number of columns in x,y.
Since g(.) is anonymous, γi = γi′ whenever n = N. Moreover since g(.) satisfies






N, n are the populations of x, y. There is a single γ for all i associated with the
columns in x and a single γ′ associated with the columns in y; this follows from







i=1 fi(x). Therefore γ(fi(x)) must be related to γ
′(fi(y))
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by a factor of n
N
. Simplifying slightly, there must therefore be a unique γ such that










for n,N being the populations of x, y.
Additionally, because g(.) satisfies PI, γ must be increasing, and because γ
satisfies PD, γ must be strictly concave. q.e.d.
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Proof of Theorem 6.3.2
The proof of theorem 4.2. runs in much the same way.
Proof. The proof of theorem 4.2. runs in much the same way. Necessity is obvious,
so assume there is a function g : X −→ R which satisfies A,SI,RI,PD,PI,C, but not
S. SI imposes the same constraint on g(.) as before. Because g(.) is non-separable
and continuous and satisfies RI, results by J. Weymark (2018) and Fleurbaey
(2018) establish that for any two x,y there are β(i)i∈n α(i)i∈N such that










where n,N are the number of columns in x,y. Since g(.) satisfies PD and PI, all
the βi and αi are positive and can be arranged in a strictly increasing order such
that a person whose rights are strictly more disrespected gets a greater factor βi
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